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'And now, therefore,. after having been long 
on the way, we Argonauts of the ideal, our 
courage perhaps greater than.our prudence, 
often shipwrecked and bruised! but, as I say, 
healthier than people would 1 ke to admit 7 
dangerously healthy~ recovering health again 
and again - it would seem as if our trouble 
we·re to be rewarded, as if we saw before us 
that undiscovered country, whose frontie.rs 
no-one has yet seen, a land lying beyond all 
other known lands and hiding-places of the 
ideal, a world so overflowing with beauty, 
strangeness, doubt, terror, and divinity, that 
both our curiosity and our lust for possession 
are wrought to a pitch of extreme excitement.' 
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (ECCE HOMO). 
'Nietzsche was the first to see the rich 
plenitude of the ethical cosmos ••• Here for the 
first time, with full consciousness, "beyond" 
and independently of everything which in the 
course of the ages had been accepted as such 
the question was raised concerning tho contenf of 
good and evil. This question is a hazardous 
undertaking, for it touches that which has been 
consecrated. And the hazardous undertaking 
avenged itself upon the daring doer .... His visiofl, 
only just freed fell upon the realm of values . · 
and in the firsl delirium of victory he though{ 
he comprehended the whole. The discoverer indeed, 
could not dream that what had opened itseif- before 
him was a field for intellectual work of a new 
kind, which could not as yet be completely 
surveyed ••• Seldom does a dis coverer know fully 
what be has discov.Jred. Nietzsche knew it as little 
as did Columbus. The successors inherit the fie14; 
to them falls tho task of acquiring what they have 
inherited, in orde·r to possess it.' _ ·. 
NICOLAI HARTNANN (ETHICS) • 
' 
INTRODUCTION 
In a world and a time when man is confront~d with 
but o:ne ultimate choice: either a return to sel.f-respon~ibility' 
or the annihilation of life, in which, because of his now 
:proverbial technical ascendancy and its train of spiritual 
impoverishment, he can indeed ne,glect to relearn the· abi~ity of 
exercising a wilful choice only at the· risk of sacrific~n,g his 
being as such - in such a world' it is a fatal omission to 
neglect. any thinker whose object it is to reconstruct for us 
our sanse of responsibility. 
In the field of philosophy no contemporary thinker 
has do·ne more in this respect. than Nicolai Hartmann whp 
considers Friedrich Nietzsche to have been his immediate 
predecessor. Yet Hartmann is not well-known in the Eng;tish-
spoaking world. 
The following study represents an attempt to 
explain Hartmann's position in epistemology, ontology ~nd ethics, 
stressing the inter-dependence o·f these disciplines for the: 
philosopher; in the light of Hartmann's appreciation o-, Nietzsche, 
to review Nietzsche's critique of "Christo-European morals" or 
the spiritual decadence of the West; and to show why Hprtmann 
made so much of Nietzsche's supra-moral philosophy of J.3ecoming 7 
the philosophy "beyond good and evil 11 • 
Since the Greeks, the case for· the responsibility 
of man as constituting tho essence of his existence, has not 
been stated more forcefully than in the philosophy of Nietzsche 
and Hartmann. Hartmann is extremely conscious of the need of' our 
time for a thoroughgoing appraisal of man's position in the 
cosmos. At the same time, he looks despondently to1..rards the future 
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when he conside-rs that man has become the· plaything of pe,tty 
politics from which we cart expect little, if anythin9 at all. 
"The t,Y'pe of states:man, as we know him in our day, a~d as 
history repe·atedly shows him," seys Hartmann, "does not act 
from a sense of responsibility for the wider future of nation 
and State, but from the need and opportunity of the moment. 
He is not a cons·cious carrier of the great and far-re~ching 
responsibility which actually rests upon him. I:Ie works for 
immediate ends, as if.beyond them there were no wid~r and more 
important perspectives ••• To us it may sound Utopian if we are 
asked to consider the children of generations which ).rill be of 
' 
anothe:r mind and another circumstance. Nevertheless it is true 
that those generations will be our heirs and will reap the frui'ts 
of our actions, and that we bear the responsibility for 1-rhat we 
load them with." But, Hartmann continues, 11politica~ life is only 
one example. Our responsibility is wider. It reaches to all the 
departments of ~ife. Everywhere the same law of spiritual 
inheritance holds good, the same historical continu~tyrr (E II,p.316). 
While Hartmann's philosophy is not by any 
stretch of the imagination a progra:r.mne for social or political 
reform, and while it also fights shy of an eschatological 
expectation, there is without a doubt inherent in it the hope for 
a better wo!'ld and a future in which man's spirit will approach 
what he calls "Ideal Personality" , the exercise of a supreme 
sense of self-responsibility as exemplified in the virtue of 
Love of the Remotest which Nietzsche, as he thought, had newly 
dis~covered: the capaci tyr and the will of present men to rise 
above the desire for short-lived glory and to take on themselves 
the burden of res:ponsibili ty for all the future; basically this 
means a return to the ethos of the Platonic Eros. 
Wherever there was Eros, however, there was 
an Ideal - indeed, Eros, as Hartmann himself points out, 
represented the unconditional passion of man for the Ideal. 
Howeve~r,, the difficulty o·f n philosophic definition of the 
"Idealtt is well-knovm; it is still most clearly illustrated by 
-3-.. 
the case of' Plato's Good; and after Kant's critique of speculative 
' 
metaphysics, it was. natural that philosophers should become' 
suspicious about, and even antagonistic to any attempt at positing 
an Ideal. Still it is clear beyond a doubt that if there is to be 
any faith in regard to tho future, and any hope and love to 
sustain it, we cannot do without an Ideal. It is impo~sible to 
believe., hope and love Nothing. 
That philosophy· alone is inca.pable.of rendering 
the Ideal, we cannot doubt; it has e.Jlways been so and Kant's 
. philosophy has merely rope,ated a truth which has becnme· obscure. 
There remains only one source from which be·lief ,, hope and love can 
acquire their sanction and uJl.tirnate significance - a,hd that is 
' 
re.ligion, that undenia.bly vi tal force in man's life which, ho-wever~ 
we must not confuse with ·:the theologic finery of centurie:s, and 
which, after a thinker like S¢ren Kierkegaard, need no longer be 
a threat ·to inte·llectuai h0nesty. Therefore we have found it 
necessary in our Conclusion to give a brief appraisal of Hartmann' r..: 
view of the Ideal, and to suggest that despite :N1e~zsche 1 s 
re,jection of religion and Hartmann's own separation 'of the spheres 
of ethics and religion, any future ethics which truE?ly und~rstands 
and wishes to oveTcome the! position of Nietzsche and Hartmann, wiJ.: 
have. to wrestle anew with the problem of its relatjon to religion .• 
It is here that Hartmann' s basis of ontology . 
does not satisfy us. He believe'S in an ideal self-existence of 
values, the everlasting Sosein o,f moral va:n..ue:s irrespective of 
man or tlme·. This is a gre·at step forward from subjectivistic 
ethics and affords us an idea for getting beyond ethical 
relat.ivism - and we believe with Hartmann that Nietzsche! broke the 
ground for this when he surmised that we have· never yet known what 
good and evil are-. Rationality, however, col!lp"'!ls us to discover 
an ultimate authority for values and everything pertaining to 
them. To stop short at ontology does not seem satisfactory. All 
through the history of thought we have! never really felt that "the 
worJLd is just so" is a sufficient. reply to· the wltx_ about existence; 




has been .Proved over and over again in history - we have· no 
illusions about this; but then "it is not the fault of the attitude 
as such - we believe,, indeed, that thi.s attitude is as much a part 
of the ontological des.cription of the world as anythipg else •. 
This primacy of ethics in Hartmann's philosophy 
/does not obviate the fact that in studying his work ~ must 
attempt an understanding of his ontological works, a~ more' 
especially zur Grundlegung dar Ontologie and Der. Aufbau der realen 
Welt, as a prer~quisite. It will not be possible to qo justice to 
his epistemology unless we see it against the background of his 
ontological research. In any case; Hartmann himseif ultimately 
intends the· epistemology as part of a single labour 11diesseits von 
Ideallsmus und Realismus", that is as part of ontol~gy. It is 
precisely for this. reason that he prefers to speak qf Metaphzsics . 
of Knowledge ("Metaphysik dar Erkenntnis") instead qf'epistemology 
or theory of knowledge ("Erkenntnistheorie"). For H~rtmann1 all 
philosophy is ont-ology - but all ontology is metaphysics •. 
Naverthe:less we must realise thaT purely 
historically, Hartmann's epistemology preceded his ~ntology. The 
Grtmdzftge einer Metaph.ysik der Erkenntnis appeared for the first 
tim~ in 1921, followed by the Ethik four year'S late-r;, whereas 
Zur Grtmdlegung der Ontologie:, the first of the ~ onto.logical 
works, was on]y ready in 1934. The order in which t~e: woTks 
appeared is for Hartmann not merely a ma:tter of co~on incidence. 
In.fact, he considers it as an evidence which itself is 
met·apbysically founded. He says. that the ontology forms the 
ess~tia:t background :fo·r the earlier work, and that the latte·r 
are labours lying towards the: periphery of the central task. He 
also maintains that it is in the nature of the world and .its 
problems that the experience gained on these outskirts of 
philosophy - the phenomena of which are the first to force 
themselves on our consciousne·ss - , should precede a conspective 
view of the world {"DeJUl so ist der Mensch: was sich nicht· 
drastisch antdr!ngt, 1hn nicht erfasst, herumwirbelt, bedr!ngt 
i 
. -s-
oder bedroht, das wird ibm so le-icht nicht glaubhaft'' (GO, p.244)) ~· 
It is only the impatience of speculative procedures "fhich causes 
this: order of thought to be reversed. 
I 
According to Hartmann, ontology's first task is 
a general consideration of the question of being as being ("die 
Fraga nach dem Seienden als Seienden in ihrer vollen 
Allgemeinheit" (AW, p.l))f next it must inquire into the broadest· 
modes of being - reality- and ideality - and their relation to each 
other· ("das Problem der Seinsweisen (Realitlit und Idealitllt) und 
. ' 
ihres Verhliltnisses zueinander" (AW,_p.l)); then, whf3n the problem 
of being begins to differentiate: itself, ontology a~tempts a full 
categorial analysis of being ( ttKategorielanalyse") ~d becomes a 
theory of categorie's ·( 11Kate.gor1enie.hre 11 ). A categorr:, for Hartmann~ 
is nothing else than a mode of existence- he calls:it a 
"GrundbEtsti.rmnung" (tum die Grundbestimm~ des Seienden also, und 
zwar in 1nhaltlicher Hinsicht, soll es. sich in den ~tegorien 
handeln. Das 1st eine klare Aufgabe, an dar es nicht viel zu 
deuteln gibt. Derm fragt man nun weite.r, was Katego~ien sind, so 
stellt sich die Antwort ganz von selbst e:ln, sobald man Beispiele 
nennt: etwa Einheit und Iviannigfaltigkeit, Quantitllt und Qualitat,, 
Hass und Grosse, R-atnn und Zeit, Werden und Beharrung, I,Causalitat. 
und Gesetziichkeit u.s.f. Man kennt die Se:tns:best-ungen dieser 
Art sehr wohl auch ohne Untersuchung, sie muten uns :vertraut an, 
begegnen_uns im Leben auf Schritt und Tritt. Sie sirid in Gewissen 
Grenzen das Se:lb.stverstandliche an allen Dingen; wir bemerken sie 
1m Leben zumeist nur deshalb nicht, we1.1 sie da.s Gemeinsame, 
Durchgehende sind - da.sjeniga, wodurch die Dinge. sich nicht 
untarscheiden - , kurz das Selbstverstafidliche. Uns aber ist es 
1m Leben um die Dinge in ihrer Unte.rschiedenheit zu tun. Die 
Philosophie dagegen ge~teht. wesentlich darin, dass sie das 
U:nverstandene im Selbstverst§ndlichen allerarst entdeckt" 
(AW, pp.2,3)). We can say that Hartmann considers the totality of 
being as a system of co-existing cate:gorie:s; we can never be 
definite about their number, no·t to speak of the number of ,problems 
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of which they are the carriers. Philosophy consis.ts in the 
"Heransarbeit'ung", the forcing to. the surface, of th~se problems, 
and philosophy can in any case only last" as long as there are 
problems. 
This sufficiently indicates the basic 
constitutive character of ontology in :!artmann's thought. 
Nevertheless~ for Hartmann man is first.and foremost Fi practical 
be~ng ;in so far as life unceasingly challenges him to apt and IIlake 
decisions; as such, "only ethical reflection can set. him free", and 
ethics "is the first and most positive. philoSophical_interest of 
man ••• It is the source and innermo.st motive of philosophical 
thinking, perhaps even o.f human intelligence in gen~ral" 
(E-I, pp.31,32)• The basic constitutive ~uality of ontology and 
epistemology in regard to ethics can perhaps be exp~ained by 
saying that before man can think ethically,- he must'first of all 
appreciate the fact that he finds himself in a world -which it is 
' 
his duty to think about. 
I , 
As to the problem of thinking o:r philosophizin~: 
Hartmann believes that it becomes evident only when· we already hav··-~ 
at least some knowledge of the object that we want ~o approach. We·. 
~· 
have a specific purpose when we say "becomes evident" instead of, 
. . 
' 
for instance, "is devised" or "is constructed", since Hartmann is 
e-mphatic about the, fact that the method o·f philosophy cannot be 
something of our making. In fact, for Hartmann, method is itself a!l 
aspect of being. Here, he believes, the problem of method acquires 
a new dimension (''Dami t rtlckt das Methodenproblem in ein neues 
Licht. Es ste:ckt in ibm selbst ein Kategorienpro,blem" (AW, p.577~). 
Hethod cannot be, our description of s way for approaching the 
problems o·f the wo.rld. The nature of· the problems alone can 
describe the method for us:. The choice of method cannot be a merely 
fanciful or arbitrary affair, and it doe'S not precede the activity 
of philosophy. That is, philosophy does not proceed in terms of a 
pre-es:tablished method since it is only in the act of 
philosophizing that the pro,blem of method ,i tsel.f becomes evident 
-7-
~'Denn alles. fruchtbare Forschen hat die, Sache allain im Auge und 
schreitet 1m Hinblicken auf sie fort, sein eigenes V~rfahren aber 
"erf§hrt" es be·stenfalls erst in diesem seinem Tun. Die Reflexion 
auf das Verfabran folgt nach; was vorausgeht,ist das unreflektierTh 
Verfahren" (AW, p,.fi?6)). Hartmann tells us that even historically 
this is true; philosophjzing as one ought to, without having 
pre-established any method, is what he calls "d:i.a arbeitande 
. . 
Methode" ("Auch gaschichtlich gilt der Satz: die, arbei tende MethodG 
geht voran, das Methodenbewusstse1n folgt nach ••• eigentliche. 
Methodologie 1st Epigonenarbeitn (AW, p.577)) 
Of course the problem arise·s whether such 
primal thinking (to· call it so·) without any trace of' 
methodological presupposition can get us beyond the bare 
conscioUsness of the ri.ecess.ity fol"' method - what Hartmanh calls 
"Netbodenba-wusstsein". That is, can we by such a simplest act of 
thinking (not in terms of any "idea" one might have of the world, 
but simply in the sense of 11 letting one's thoughts ~o"), and so 
becomi,ng conscio·us of problems, ·get· anywhere beyond· the mere 
realisation that unless from this point on : we adopt 
methodological means we: will not be able ·to make' haa:d or tail of 
the pheno·mena o·f and. in the wcr.rld? Hartmann sees th:ts diffi,culty 
and tries to argue away what he h~seJl.f calls the; seeming 
circularity of his position ("der Zirkel des Nethod~nbewusstse1ns" ', 
(AW, p.580)). He tells us that to become conscious ~f problems:, 
that is to begin thinking, is to· b&gin looking for possible· 
soJ.utions. But looking for possible solutions presuppose·s looking 
for me-thod (:'Problembewusstsein 1st imme·r zugleich schon die 
Umschau nach m5glicher Lostm.g. Die: Umschau aber ist die Reflexion 
der Methodel'lfindung" (AW, p .579 ;>, and when he says that "Reflexion 
der Methodenfindung ••• ist deswegen freilich noch kein explizites 
Methodenbewusstsein" (AW, p.579), he means frankly that ultimately 
philosophy cannot get· beyond a mere, consciousness of the world as 
problemati.c, beyond mere "Problembewuss:tsein". Philosophy would be 
sup·erfluous, and philosophers idle, if the world could not be 
understood as a problem, or rather as a system of problems - and · 
the problem of method is meTely one in the totality o' problems.-
As such,. philosophy is primal thinking; as such also ·:i.t 
distinguishes· itself from all other disciplines .• The·· pategoria-1 
structure of the· world is. ne,cessarily basic also to a].l science 
and all disciplines of research - science· cannot do without the 
fundamental posits. of a world and problems. But philo~ophy alone· 
is co-ncerned with being in its most fundamen'tal differentiations, 
that· is with the· ca:tegorial structure of the world as such. Eve·ry 
disc:t.pline of research with a .restricted field of enqJ1iry -
restricted either through prejudice, or through necessity as in 
the sciehces where there is a concentration on highly' 
differentiated and specific forms of be·ing.- should realise that 
it is ultimately and inescapably embedded in the me't~physical 
fotmdations of the world (" o. oda es ke:in anderes als das eigene 
eng gegenwtirtige Problemfeld kennt, so muss. man es i)lm auf eben 
diesem seinem eigenen Problemfelde nachweisen; d.h. \nan muss ihm 
beweisen, dass as selbst die grossen unabweisbaren Problemge-halte 
enthlilt und nur das Wissen darum nicht hat" (GO, pp.2,3)). 
It is in terms of this metaphysica;t. embe"ddedness 
of all existence and all thought, that true· philo soppy can be 
distinguished - it is recognizeu by the fact that it allows for 
the greatest- possible maximum of evidence 1n terms of which alone 
it can help to construct the totalitY' of things into a system. In 
this sense systematization is always a preliminary arfair, a 
contribution, conscious of its limitations, in the search after 
possible universal cohe:t'ence. Systematization in the light of 
pre-establishe·d conviction leads to the reduction of the entire 
phenomenon of existence to; !!!l point of view, which, however, can 
only be one evidence within the totality of possible evidence. 
Hartmann claims that the critics have not understood his views on 
systematization ("Anstelle der scheinbar , ,kritischen" Devise, so 
wezrl.g als mBglich Gegebenes anzunehmen, muss dar umgekehrte 
Grundsatz aufgestellt wer~en;, so via! als m5glich Gege-bene:s zu 
. t1bersehen. Nur das grosstm5gliche Maximum an Gegebenheit. ka~ der 





mBglichen Standpunkte zurilckgreift und auch gegen sie, kritisch 
bleibt. Die Durchfilllrung dies.es l1rundsat.zes ist nur m9glich, wenn 
~lle Ge·sichtspunkte der Auslese vorl~ufig zuriickgestellt werden, _ 
und das Gegeben.e ohne Auswahl hingenonnnen wird" (ME, ~.43)). 
Here Hartmann•s appreciation of Ni~tzsche 
explains itself; for in the field of ethics it was Nietzsche who 
broke mo·st completely with tradition, founded - as Ha~tmarm puts 
it - on the serpent's lie that man would be like God pr his 
( ' ~ 
knowledge· of good and bad. Heroically scornful of age's of wisdom, 
Nietzsche has· again made possible the asking of the most . 
fundamental questions. It was "a hazardous: undertaking, for it 
touches tha.t which has been consecrated. And tho hazardous 
undertaking avenged itsellf upo·n the daring doer11 (E I, p.84) • 
Hartmann, thaafore, considered it his duty to tryr to: understand 
Niet.zsche, better than this philosopher understood h~mself. ou~ 
task now is to try to understand bcrth Nietzsche and Hartmam in 
this way • 
t ' 
FIRST CHAPTER 
THE MAIN FEATURES OF HARTMANN• S PHILOSOPHY 
S~UlY OF CONTE~ITS 
1. Philosophy as Metaphysics 
The metaphysical foundations of beingf. epistemology 
as a metaphysic of knowledge, rather than theory of ~owledge ; 
the meaning of philosophy as "Herausarbei tung" of thet fundaDient'al 
problematics·or: the~ world illustrated by Nietzsche's:ethlcs; the 
timelessness of philosophical problems· and their ind~pendence of 
systems:. 
2. The Structure of Being: Hartmann's 
Theory of Categories 
Being as real and ideal being• the abso-~ute ideality 
of mathematical and ethical be.fngio basically· a cate,~o.ry is. nothing 
·else than. a mode of be!ing, al\_d al philosophy can b~ considered as 
a doctrine of categories; categorial being is normati"e being; the 
four categorial laws; an outline of the history of the doctrine of 
categories. 
3. The Subject-Object Rela·t.ion: The 
Primacy of the Irrational 
The three ways of resolving tho dualism of subject and· 
object indicated by the history of the epistemological problem• 
the true problemati"c nature of tho Sllbject-obje~ct. rE).lation mankests 
itself only when we approach the relation as a prob:t,em of ontology 
in the first place; the relatiqn is a correlation; '!gnoseologische~ 
Ansichsein": the representation of the obja:ct as a third autonomou~ 
factor 1n the phenomenon of knowing; the four gnosaological 
determinations of tb.e object of knowledge; the possibility of trutl.l 1 
as a matter of irrationality: the irrational foundation of all 
knowledge; a priori (intuitive) and a posteriori (symbolic) 
knowledgeJ conspe~ctive intuition and freedom from method • 
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FIRST CHAPTER 
THE l-1AIN FEATURES OF HARTl1ANN1 S PHILOSOPHY 
1. Philosophy_as Metaphysics 
Nicolai Hartma~ 1 s critique starts from th~ belief that 
there is always a remainder of problems in the world., He co·nsider~ 
tbis seemingly everlastiilg content of problems in the world itself 
to he a metaphysical phenomenon.( 11Die metaphysischen Theorien, 
gegen di.e sich die Kritik wandte,n (writes Hartmanp) tis1nd 
s.chlies:slich nur Losungsversuche gewisser Problemkomplexa. Ihre 
. ~ . 
sp·ekulative Verstiegenhe.it war ihr Fehler, aber das~ fiberha.upt sif! 
s.ich urn die gef§hrlichen Grenzen des Begreifbaren bewegten,. war 
nicht ihr Fehler; das lag in der Natur ibrer Proble¥te, und diese 
zu ~ndern, steht nicht in der Macht der Vernunft. E~ gibt Problemei 
. I 
die~ sich nicht ganz. 15scn lassen,. in denen immer eifl ungeloster 
Rest bleibt., ein Undurchdringliches, Irrationales 11 (ME, p.l2)) • 
Only :In so ter as this problema tic content p·f the: world is 
always there, is philosophy possible. We _ourselves pan d~ nothing 
abou:t this quality of the world; it is there in spi~e of ourselve~:~ ~ 
we cannot change it. It is not an arbitrary product:of our 
· curiosity-. We may ignore it, or purposely brush it aside, says 
' ' 
Hartmann, but that will not cancel its baing. We cannot avoid our 
own embeddaQooss 1n it, that is we cannot avoid metaphysics. It is . 
common to all our researches; which in the first and last resort 
are only products of the eternally enigmat_ic nature of the world 
(
11die swige R~tselhaftigkeit der Welt" (GO, p.2)) on which they 
are all founded. l'lian is constantly faced with the problematic 
nature of the worl.d ("der Nensch (1st) dauernd und unaufhebbar vor 
sie gestellt 11 (GO~ p.2)). 
All this might even seem very obvious, but,Hartmann 
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believes that generally our contemporaries are not at, all aware 
\ 
of this meaning of me~taphysi.cs ("(as) 1st zur Zeit keinaswegs 
Gemeingut. des Wissens" (GO, p.2)). 
Metaphysics, says Hartmann, was first 
considered as "Gebietsmetaphysik" (ME, p.ll). It was thought of as 
a specific field o~ problems ("ein inhaltlich bestimmtes 
Problemgebiet" (ME, p.ll)), a sort of scientific discipline, one 
may say, with a field of problems exclusively its OWih Speculative 
me-taphysics ("spekulative Metaphysik" 0.1Et pel2)) is something 
different. Gebietsmetaphysik was ai.so· speculative, b4t it was _ , 
consid.ere.d as metaphysics not in oo far as it was speculative, but 
mso far as it was supposed to describe a certain fieiJ_d of problems r 
I . 
Kant made 'this distinction clear and he endeavo!ured 'to overcome 
· the idea of a speculative metaphysics (''Die Kantisc4e Kritik nun 
hat den Unterschied deutlich gemacht: sie richtete ~ich gegen jane 
Me.taphysik nicht als ,,Gebiet", sondern als ,tSpeku~ation". Die 
Problemgebie~te bliebe!! in ihren Gerechtsamen; die Theorien nur, di·:-
sich an sie gewagt batten, verfielen dar Kritik. Metaphysik als 
Spekulation ist es, was seitdem mit Recht fur lahmg~legt gilt" 
nm, p.l2)) 
However, Hartmann's own view ·or :metaphysics 
differs. from both these views-. His view is: that of a metaphysic 
o.f problems. ("eine l"letaphysik der Problema'_' (ME, P•f2)). We may 
'· 
say - and this brings out his meaning more clearly .;. that for him 
· the proble'mat.ic nature of the: world is its metaph.vs:tca-1 nature. It 
' 1s metaphysi.cal msofar as it is problematical - ev~r].ast1ngly 
! 
problematical in the~ sense that there is in its. structure of · 
problems "1mmer ein ungeloster Rest ••• ein Undurchdring1iches, 
Irrational.es". 
This view of metaphy-sics, indeed, does not 
only repres·ertt the be·ginn1ng of Hartmann t s philosophy; it is fully 
definitive· of ·it. Hartmann considers his philosophy as a critique 
1n the Kantian sense and he maintains Kent's position that no 
metaphysics is po·ssible without critique. However, he believes that 




possible without metaphysics. It is in·this regard tp~t he writes 
' 
t bat metaphxsic of knowledge would be a much better name for 
. ' 
epistemology than theory of knowledge - not mataphys~cs in the · ' 
sensa of merely another speculatively propounded theory or 
"solution", but ra.ther in the· sens.e of an indication of unavoidabl~ 
though perhaps even insoluble, problems · ( 'Metaphysik ·der Erkenntni~· 
- das will ein neuer Name sein fQr Erkenntnistheoria - besser als 
Erke-nntniskrit1k: nicht eine· neue Metaphysik, deren Qrundlage 
Erkenntnis ware, sondern durchaus nur eine Erkenntnistheorie, dere:r:. 
Grundlag·e, metaphysisch ist" ·n1E, ·p.IIf''). All knowledge is an 
attempt. to understand something which precedAs it and is entirely 
independent of it ('iein Erfassen von atwas, das auch: vor eller 
; 
Erkenntnis und unabhangig von ihr vorha:hden ist•i · (~, p.l)). 
When Hartmann therefore tells us that philosoph: 
is metaphysics, he· means nothihg more than that phitosophy has a 
humble task. By way of defining his own work,, N .P. Van Wyk Louw 
" 
has adopted the following phrase which purports to be the judgement 
9f ''the intellectual" ..;. die intellektueel - , that is the person 
~ 
who searches for truth without any pretension or expe-ctation of 
e.asy- solutions and finality:- Because we cannot do ~nything else, 
we must think (Omdat ons n1ks anders kan doen nie, moet ons dink). 
I 
To the: patte·rn of this; w~ may say that what Hartmailll means is that 
philosophy, since it cannot do anything else, must 'traise" the 
p,rob]ems with which the world is always full. But it is not simply 
' ~ ; 
a matter of raising proble-ms in that sense of the wqrd which might 
suggest a mere fanciful creation of problematics by the mind - let 
' 
us say· the mind in a petulant or perhaps mischievously imaginative 
mood. Philosophy is, indeed, a game - but different. from, and · 
infinitely more serious, than chess 1 While 1n chess we can not 
,only move, but also make the. pieces, so that we know precisely how 
many pie·ces there· are to ·reckon-with, it is not so in philosophy .• 
In philosophy the pieces - the· ·problems - are there independent ·of 
us. They are part of the constitution·of a world which need not 
thank us for its being. How this can be so, is precisely one of the 
problems:. In any case, what is important for our analogy, is that 
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we do not lmow how many piece:s. - how many problems - there are in-
r 
this game· of philosophy; and moreover, however much w~ labour at 
a particular problem (the: problem of What ought-we to do, for 
instance), it seems that, instead of getting near fin~lity and a 
solution; the pro·blam be:comes more and more manifest fs a problem ~ 
perhaps: we may speak here of the problematics of a pr9blem. Thus 
the problem or tbe question What-ought we to do, is found to 
contain an indefinite. series of problems within apparyntly 
ilr.texhaustive problemat"ics. Chess has its pieces numbered; philosopr··· 
has not. The game: of chess. is a game' played with an a.ssemblage of 
pieces - it takes the totality· of the assemblage of its pieces for 
granted. The philosopher• s game, however,- consists precisely in 
his trying to assemble it.s. "pieces 11 • 
This analogy between philosophy an~ the game of 
che:ss is our own and not Hartmann• s, but it serves. tp throw light 
on his view of philosophy as me,taphysics. For Hartma!lll, philosophy 
is nothing more than an attempt at forcing to the surface the. 
problems inherent and hidden in the structure of the world, a task 
which he describes excellently as a "Herausarbeitung" of the world's 
problematic nature. Philosophy remains true to itse;Lf only to the 
extent that. it does this ("sofe~n es den metaphysischen Gehalt der 
~ . 
Problema s'elbst ••• nicht Uberschreitet, sondern einfa?h dessen reip.G 
Herausarbeitung 1st" (ME, p.8)). Hartmann's meaning pecomes eyen 
more: .clear when we consider a concrete example. Wa h~ve ·been 
labouring at the ethical problem, formulated by Kant: as the problerr. 
What ought we to do, for more ·than two thousand yaari3:. Yet. it was 
possible for Nie:t.zsche to stand up in the nineteenth century, "a 
so·litary figure, warning us with his startling assertion that we 
have never yet kno.wn what good and evil are" (E I, p.15). This 
discovery of Nietzsche, Hartmann te·lls us, "simply shows that in 
the realm of values we are only novices; and ••• we stand again at 
the very beginning of a .work the greatness of which is difficult 
to measure" (E 1, p~l6). Thus in-the field of ethics, philosophy 
can really claim nothing more than t.hat hitherto it has discovered 
some problems. 
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History i tse·lf the·refore proves that philosophy is 
not a matter of solving or settling problems, but rather one of 
p·robing for them. That is, it is of the nature of phflosophy that 
it should be· involved in problems, and as such it is me~aphysics. 
Hartmann is emphatic about this view of philosophy. E~ther one 
. : 
accepts philosophy as the humble preoccupation of "raising" 
problems, or one leaves philosophy alone. He te!lls us that 
philosophy is a way and a task who·se. end we cannot knc;>W (1'D1e 
Grundprobleme der Philosophie habeii zu allen Zeiten d~n Charakter 
des Esoterisc}:len gehabt. Man kann sie nicht nach Belieben auf das 
e!inge!ahrene Geleise zeitbedingter Intere·ssen umlenken. Sie 
schreiben d.em Suchenden ihren eigentiimlichen Weg vor9 der nicht 
jedermanns Weg sein kann. Hat man den ltleg erkannt, ~o steht man 
nur vor der Wahl, ibn einzuschlagen oder auf weiter~s Eindringen 
zu verzichten. Der Verz±cht ist. die·· Preisgabe· der P}lilosophie. Das 
t 
Einschlagen des Wage'S aber 1st das Aufsichnehmen e1t+er Arbait, 
\ 
deren End a .man nicht absieht" (MW, P• VIII)) There ceinnot be 
philosophy where there is not a belief 1n timeles~ ~roblems. (11Der 
tier e·ingerissene Relativismus. - in Deutschland am bekannte.sten 1n 
. ! 
der Form des Historismus- hat erschlaffend gewirktC!•• alle 
forschende Arbei t geht auf Erringung der Wahrheit·. lJ(ie aber, wenn 
als.wahr alles gUt, was dar geschichtlichen Geiste~lage einer 
bestimmten Zeit konform 1st? ••• dann kann es ••• keine Problembe~st§ni!.: 
. . ! 
mshr geben, die unaufhe~bbar waren und irgendetwas UZfachsichtig VO:t: 
uns erheischen konnten ••• So glaubt man schliesslion nicht mehr an 
i 
Problema. ~ n1mmt sie so wenig ernst wie die Wahrlteit, auf die' 
man mit ihnen abzielt. Und damit hebt man den Sinn dar Forschung 
' 
auf- zugleich aber auch den eindeutigen Sinn·der Position, die 
man mit eben dieser Aufhe~ung einnimmt. Es 1st die Selbstaufhebung 
des philosophischen Denkens 11 (GO, p.,3)) .. 
For Hartmann, then, this belie:r in problems is a 
perspe,ctive which must be gained before philosophy be,comes 
possible·. The ·question arises: Wha-t are: these problems? What sort 
of problem is it that ,can be~ called a philosophi'cal problem? 
Hartmann considers that a philosophical problem becomes 
. 
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distinguishable as such by its metaphysical character (' ••• alla 
e.tgentlich philosophischen Problema - auch die ganz nPchta~en, 
nicht himmelstdrmanden, wie das Erkenntnisproblem - (~ind) 1m 
latztan Grunde met.aphysische Problema" (ME, p.BJ. And again, its 
·metaphysical character means nothing more than its lasting 
I 
problematic quality, that quality by virtue·· of which tt maintains 
' 
itself as a problem throughout time, and despite the pretensions 
to finality of any particular system of philosophyo Only problems 
(if we may put it thu~) which defy solution, and ther~fore 
destru~tion (for a pro·blem which .is so·lved is no longer a problem}:. 
are philosophical. Ultimately, therefore, if we want to know wha.t 
so-rt of problem 1s philosophical, our appeal will have· to be to 
time itself. 
Philosophical problems are lmown as such because 
of their time·lessness. Thus, foT instan·ce, ethical pjroblems can be 
( 
philosophical beceuse of an independence of particul~r periods and 
persons::· i'The moral s~ tuatiort is never wholly merged in persons, it 
is a~ways something else lying above and beyond them, even if not 
something exist·ing indep·endently of them. It is, besides, a cosmos 
1n itself with its own manner of ?eing and its own l~gitimacy~ not 
less a determinant factor fo,r the person than the person is· fo·r;itr 
(E I,. p.40); and problems of ontology can be philosophical because ' 
of the· same. independence of systems (·'Sie verhalten ~ich ebenso 
indifferent gege·n Idaa·lismus und Realismus, wie gegep Theismus und 
Pantheismus. Das beste Zeugnis dafUr ist die Tatsach~, dass die 
idealistischen Theo·rien es zu aller Zeit und unter allen Umstiinden 
mit. denselben Seinsph~nomenen zu tnn haben wie die raalistischen•" 
(Go, p.40)). There can, however, be no such timelessness of problems 
' / 
if the structure of the world itself does not allow for it • 
2. The Structure of Baing: Hartmann's 
Theory of Categories . 
Hartmann considers the world, or more correctl7 
Being, as ideal and real under the· two aspects ( 11 Seinsmomente") of 
' 
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being-there ("I)asein")· and being-such (''Sosein"). Further, Being-
can be eithe'r possible, actual, or ne~cessaryo RealitY, is the mode 
I 
of existence, of eveTything having a place and duration in time 
("Realitat (ist) die Seinswe1se alles dessen:,was in qer Zeit seine 
Stelle oder Dauer, sein Ent.stehen und Vergehen hat - einerlei ob 
Ding oder Person, Einzelvorgang oder Gesamtlaur·der V{alt, so b1ete1: 
sich die Bestimmung an: das Seiende fjberhaupt 1st das Reale, Sein 
1st Realitl!t" (GO, p.73)); real b~ing, we can say, is concrete, 
I 
sensually observa.ble being. Ideal being is mainly mathematical, 
logical, and ethical being .- Hartmann speaks: of mathematics and 
logic as busying themselves exclusi'tely with modes. of ideality 
("ausscb11~ssl1ch mit Clem ,!gealitar Seiel'lden als solchetn" (GO, 
p.92)), and ethics is concerned with an ideally exi~tent realm of 
values ("das d~m idealen Sein zugehorige Reich dar t~erte" (AW, 
p-.57)). 
Modern positivists: might be· vexed tp hear of 
( 
mathematical and logical being, but Hartmann tells ps that the 
copula: is clearly more than a mere symbolic factor in a propositio.n 
·or judgement or expression • It is: that also, but apove and beyonC 
its copulative function in the mere grammatical sen~e, it indicates 
a type of being entirely independent of the express~on as such 
{'Die Aussage also 1st so beschaffen, dass sie sich ~elbst 
) 
tranzendiert. Sie· sagt nicht sich selbst aus - das ware ein Urteil 
Qber ein Urteil - , sondern den bestimmten Inhalt; pnd dieser 1st 
' 
schon 1n der Aussageform als ain seionder gakennzeichnet. Darin 
' 
besteht dar ontologische Sinn der Copula. Das ,.,;1st" 1m ·urteil ist 
zwar identisch mit dar Setzung, aber die Setzung selbst meint ein 
anderes, ein Seiendes" (GO, p .247)). The "is" ·of "36 is 729" , or 
"a0 is 1" , expresses a definite "Sosein", an entirely independent 
"Sosein" in terms of which alone the' expression is or is not true.-. 
Its·truth is entirely independent 'of the expression, praced~s it, 
and is presupposed by it C'Darin zeigt sich deutlich, dass ein 
Wirklichsein der Grossen a0 und a6 in ihrer Sphare, ein Sein sui 
goner is, 1m Sinn der Aussage schon vo.rausgasetzt 1st, auf welches 
b·azogen di.e Aussage wahr oder unwahr sein kann~ an dassen Bestehen 
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'" 
aber das Wahrsein oder Unwahrse:tn der Aussage nichts mehr ltndern 
kann" (GO, p.249))- "ao does not cease to be equal to 1 when it is 
not "thought" or "known", but ••• it "is" equal to 1 always and undeY' 
all circumstances" (E I~ p.223) • 
As for ethics, Hartmann believes that morel velua·;-, 
have an ideal self-existence, are supra-temporal, and have a being 
comparable to that of mathematical truths. The ideal ~elf-existenc~~ 
o.f the, latter "furnishes the analogy according to whiph we must 
understand the ethico-ideal self-existence of ·values" (E I, p.225) .~ 
Marr. is the· carrier o-f moral values only moo far as 1n every 
generation he ~enses them and attempts to form his l~fe with them 
as norms. Hartmann denies a relativity of moral val~os. Men cannot . \ 
make the:m, he can only make them real. Re depends on the·m for the. 
good life. Their being is not relative to him - "th~re is a realm 
of values subsisting for itsell" (E I, p.226). The: nealm of moral 
values has a 11Dasein" and a "Sosein" independent of .the flux of 
. time and human temperament. In so far· as man is morally conscious' h€: 
I 
is the link between ethically ideal and real being. 
Having pointed out the·se first and most bas:ic 
differentiations of" be:ing, we ha.ve alroady named a J:lUmber of 
categorie!S ( "Dio Nodali t~tsstufon sind die allgemeinsten und 
fundamental.sten Kate·gorien sowohl des Seienden als ~uch der 
Erkenntnis. des Seienden" "Alle Ontologie, wenn sie ins 
Besondere geht,. wird zur Kategorienlehre; genau so "-(ie auch alle 
• t· 
Erkenntnis>theorie und. alle: Metaphysik" (HW, p. VI)) '.Ilhis makes it 
clear that categorfes for Hartmann are really nothing else than· 
aspects or even. parts of being "- but aspects (and this is very· 
important) which throughout have· a principia! and normative naturae · 
Thus, for instance, men or stones (as real existences), or numbers, . 
triangles, and ellipses <as ideal existences) are~ not categories; 
they are aspects or parts of be.ing, but only "m so far as they ~' 
that is m SO"" far as they have be:ing. There is nothing rrGesetzlich" 
about them, end for Hartmann trGesetzlichkeit'' is a distinguishing 
feature of .cate:goria]. being. In tho .case of numbers, for example, 
Hartmann writes: "Zahlen sind ideale Gebilde, aber sie sind nicht 
Kategorien" (AW, p.56) • 
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Men, stone·s,. numbers, triangles, and so on, are in 
every instance a Concretum, normatively determinqd by a category, 
or also: a Concretum of a category, .the .category itself not being 
as immediately evident as the ·Concretum ("Nun liegt es ••• 1m Wesen 
der Kategorien, dass sie den Inbegriff aller notwendigen und 
allgemeinen Zfige an dem Concretum ausmachen, zu dem s~e gehoren. 
Das eben besagt ja dar Pri.hzipiencharakter 1n 1hnen, <;lass sie das 
7 ,Prinzipielle" 1m Concretum sind" (AW, p.so) -
11 Kate~orie:n sind 
' 
Uberhattpt nicht in gleichem Masse erkennbar wie das Cpncretum, das 
sie determiriieren" (AW, P•6?)). 
When we· speak of the· normativeness ("Geltung") .~f 
a category, we must, ho·wever~ be careful; its uGeltu:pg" is nE;>t 
normative in the sense of a merely prescriptive and regulative law 
or formal judgement, says Hartmann (and. least of all has it to do · 
with relative historical and empirical jUdgements). We know the· 
dist-inction between constitu·tive and regulative pri~ciples from 
Kant's philosophy, and in the .light of it we might e~ect categori~s 
to be of.a mere~y regulative nature in the Kantian s~nse, whereas 
Hartmann belleve:S that they are 1n fact constitutive ("Kategorien 
s~d· , ,konst·itutive" Prinzipien. Man kennt nun aus Iqmt den 
Unterschied der ,,konstitutiven und regulativen" PrinzipienJ man 
. I 
erwarte:t dahe:r v1elleicht eine gewisse ftleichstellung des Modale·n 
I 
mit dem Regulativen. Damit indassen wflrde man das Problem der 
Modalitat von vornherein verfehlen. Jener Kantische ~ege:nsatz. is:t 
e·1n rein erkenntnistheoretischer, er · scheidet das In.llaltliche der 
; 
Erkenntnis vom ~o1ologischen, be~rahrt also das Seinsproblem 
tiberhaupt nicht. lv£ethode gibt es nur im Gange der Erkenntnis als 
solcher. Das Se:f.ende als Seiendes hat kaine ~ethoden" (MW, p. VI)). 
A co·nsideration of categories cannot be the task or epistemology 
~'N!cht von Verstandesbegriffen handelt die Kategorienlehre, sondern 
von den strukturellen Fundamenten de·r realen Welt" (AW, p. V))• The 
. I . 
orientation and breadth of ontological research alone: is favourable 
to such a task ("Kategorienlehre ist nicht Sache der 
Erkenntnisthe·orie'i sie 1st fllr diese zwar unentbe,hrlich, kann aber 
von 1hr allein nicht bew§.ltigt warden. Nur ontologische Frage,weise 
\ 
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hat fiir sie die' rechta Einstellung uri.d die notige Weite" (AW, P• V))r. 
\. 
Categories are: therefore rrGesetzlich" in the sense 
that they_ are· aspects or parts of being that are such-and-such. and 
not diffeTent, despite us or anything, and in this se~se are of 
determinative· consequence for the: particulars within ~heir 
re~spective fields. Taking the two fundamental categor~al 
differentiations of being - ideal being and·· real be in~ - , we can 
say that one, part-icular, a triangle·, and aoother 
particular, a stone (let us say), are determined in t~e·se 
catego-ries, the former by ideality and th~ latter by i'eal.ity. The 
triangle cannot avoid ideaiity of being and the stone cannot avoid 
reality of be'ing, since being is categorially so dif~erent.iated an6. 
they- belong to these: different categories. It is, of cours.a, not 
possible to de.scribe· .or to name ali the cat·egories :t.pto which real· 
be-ing and ideal baing are~ in the,ir turn differantiatpd. We can 
point out that the stone is a single, or one, thing and also that 
it can be: seen as a member of a plurality of things, or that it is 
subject to efficient ca.u~sality, and so on, so that 1~ falls under 
the catego.rial de-termination of unity, plurality, capsa:tity, and so 
on; we can point out that a number is a quantity or ~ measure, or 
that a triangl~ is a sp~cial proportion, thus indicating ideal 
diffe;rentia.tions or categories of quan-tity, measure,·and space; we 
can fuTther indicate that the stone, as one thing, can be counted, 
and is there:fore also subject to a quantitative determination, and 
in this way we. would draw attention to the: phenomenon of the 
interplay of categorial funct.ions between the different layers or 
spheres of being; we· have: already shown how, for Hartmann, man is 
the· agent of the relationship be!tween the· realm of moral values and 
the realm o:f real be:lng • 
Hartmann discusses a number of these categorial 
dif:ferentiations and relations in detail, but the main purpose o:f 
his work, hs says,_cannot be more than to give us an idea of the 
co.mp,lexity and scope o:f the task in band ( 11 .... w1r ( stehefi) fiberha'Upt 
heute er~t in den Anffulgen dar Kategorie·nlehra ••• So ist as denn 
auch hetrte' nur ~in Ausschnitt aus der kategoriale:n Mannigf'altigkeit 
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was ich auf" diesen Bl§ttern vorlage· ••• Denn so steht es e1nmal im. 
icate:gorienproblem: as hl!ngt alles unaufhebbar ane·inander, und man 
kann die AnfMnge erst zur Klarheit bringen, wenn man mit der 
Kategorialana]yse bedeutend fiber sie hinausgelangt 1st und etwas 
vom Aspekt des Ganzen erfasst hat" (AWt pp. VI, VII)). Hartmann does 
not consider his work to· be more than a basis ("mehr als einige 
Grundztige" (AW, p.'IX)); as ye:t he could see the· categ9rial system 
·of the world only as a loose network of problems: ( 11 e4J, loses 
Geflecht, indem manches hypothetisch und viele's ganz offen bleibt" 
(AW, p.IX)). 
Hartma·nn' s so-called four cate~gorial laws 
( "kategoriale Gesetze") merely constitute a synopsis of the main 
features of his philosophy of the categories. The first law ("das 
Gesetz.des Prinzips") states that the being of a ca~egory is 
principia! being, it is be-ing which functions princ~pially· fo·r its 
Concretum; the·, second law ("das Gesetz de:r Schichte11gelttmg") statf,S 
that the: determination of a category is· absolutely qinding for 
every- Concretum falling within the sphere of its determination -
nothing can possibly·rer.nove the Concre-tum from the ra~ge of its 
determination; according to the third law ("das Gese:tz dar 
j 
Schichtenzugeh~rigkeit"), a category is absolutely binding only fm~ 
the Co.ncretum of its particular layer of be:ing ("Seinscbicbt"), 
outside of which it can only have a limited and modified normative 
pro.perty;theiCAlrth llM (ltl&s Gesatz&rSch:ichtandeterm1nation11 ). 
states that categorial being does no-t only absolutelr 
deterrn1ne its Concret.um , but also determines it . 1 
throughout - the Concretum is categoriall.v saturated ("kategorial 
saturiert") and requires ("bedarf") no other determination for its 
being~ (AW, p.412 etc.) ~ 
Trivial and even\ tautological though these laws . 
may appear at first glance, Hartmann considers them to be 
of fundarnenta·l importance - so much so that he finds it possible· 
to maintain tha·t they actually form the central theme of the 
do-ctrine of categories (i'dass in den. kate.goriale,n Gasetzen d~r 
e1gentlichen Schwerpunkt der allgemeinen Kategorienlehre liegt" 
(AW, p.205)). The importance fo-r Hartmann r s philosophy of (for 
instance) ,the fourth law becomes clear whe·n we consider his ethical 
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research which is intended as a labour on the basis 9r, but also 
m the: face of all the insight of history into the p:roblem of the 
"Ought", with Nietzs.che' s judgemen.t that we have nev~r yet known' 
what good and evil are, as the key - for this whole labour is 
undertaken to· prove the ideal self-existence of valuqs, that is to · 
prove the: supra-temporal existence of a realm of beillg (ethical 
being) so "categorially satura·ted", so much determined in being 
wha·t it is·, that it requ:!res no other determination :for being, 
whether man or anything else .• 
In the theory of cate:go·ries we indeed encounter 
the· most basic features o·f Hartmann's philosophy. It is "primal and 
foundation-laying philosophy" (E I, p.31) par excellence 
~·Kategorienle-hre 1st ausschliess:lich Fundamentalont9logien (AW, 
p·.42)). It is also nco~t the problem of one or a few p.pilosophies, but 
that of time or philosophy as such itself - neither sceptical nor 
critical philosophy could avoid it ( n.nio: grosse gesrhichtliche· 
' 
Linie~ des Se:fmsprobl.ems stellt sich, wiawohl vialfaoh unterbTo·cheP-., 
verdunkelt, Oberwuehert~ doch als klar und eindeutig heraus. Weder 
skeptische noch kritische Philosophie· hat sie: ablenken k8nnen" 
(GO, p.XI)). 
The first growmdwork was done by· Aristotle. For . 
him the problem of categories was a problem of essences, says 
Hartmann, and he took ove~r this prejudice in favour of essences 
· , from Plato .. Pre-Socratic philosophy was never a philosophy of 
ess.ences, but of substances, and also powers which govern reality. 
In pre-Socratic thought the nearest approach to a philosophy of 
essences is Pythagoreanism with its theory of numbers and table of 
opposites. The Medi~oval e?ntroversy over universals is as clear~ 
evidence of the pro,blem of categories as any - so much so that 
Hartmann tells us: "Der Universalienstrait ist nicht abgetan, nicht 
eine Sacha ferner Vergangenheit, Qber die, wir gl.ucklich 
hinausgewachsen waren. Er 1st, so mochte ich behaupten, noch eine 
heutige Angel.egenheit ••• Oder 1st. es etwa riicht wahr, dass dem 
Kate)gorienbegriff haute noch dieselbe Zweideuti~eit anhafte·t, die 
damals die Stre~itfrage der Universalien hervorrie,f? Ob Kategorien 
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Auffassungsweisen des: Menschen oder unabht:tngig von aller Auffassunr. 
be·stehende Grundztige der Gegenstande sind, ist heute: noch die 
ontologiseha Grundfra.ge, _der Kategorienlehre. Was aber war es, worUli: 
zwischen Roscellin tmd Anselmus, Thomisten und Occamisten di~ 
Kontroverse ging?" (GO, p.X) • 
Kant took over the problem of categories in the 
fo,rm in which it was le,ft to him by .Descartes· and Leipniz , whose 
s:tmplices ( 1i , ,die· ersten !dean" oder simplices, wie :Pescartes und 
Leibniz s1e schildern" ) , according to Hartmann, are not 
merely ideas understood as essences of the mind (''ttia)alsbegr.tfflich 
verstandene Wesenhe,iten. dam Intellek\ angeh5ren ), but also 
intended as· basic categorial units of befng as such ( "katego·riale 
Grtmdlagen des Seienden und der Welt 11 ) , fqr the:ir 
presupposition was that the human mind carries within it the 
categories of divine being since the mind of God is· architectonic 
with regard to the world. Kant 1 s theory of transcenqental 
! 
apperception as a matter of understanding the possibility of 
synthetic j,udgements: a priori in the light of the c~t'egories as 
"reine Verstand'esbegriffe", and al.so as. "Bedingunge~ der Ml>glichkeit. 
der Gegenst§nde 11 ·(Hartmann calls this> neine doppelt~ Funktion der 
Ieate:gor±enn ) 
' 
is also mere speculation. ~he view that 
categcrries are essences of the· mind is therefo,re al~o to be found· 
in Kant 1 s work, whence· it proceeds as the theme of the philosophy 
of the nineteenth century. (AW7 p.o45) • 
Hartmann considers that it is on~ the critical 
labours of Nominalism that prevented a return to the ancient 
ontology of essences, and for him these su,bjectivistic tendencies 
which falsify the problem ("die Subjektivierung der Kategorien" 
(AWt p.46.)) can only be overcome by epistemological research which 
understands that the gm.oseological relation is.not a basic 
ontological relation,and that being cannot be divided into 
"subject.ive" and "objective11 being cunas Erkenntnisverhliltnis 1st 
kein ontis:che.s GrundverhlHtnis. Es spaltet das Seiende n1cht in· 
eine Welt des Subjekts und eine des Objekts" (AW, p.172))• Hartmann 
maintains that being is transobjective ( 11ilbergegenstttndlich" (AW, 
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p.l72)), and eqttai for "subject" and "obje.~t" alike· • 
·~The Subject-Object. Relation: The 
Primacy of ·the Irrational 
For Hartmann the, problem of lmowledge is· 
entirely bound up with the phenomenon of the· duality of subject 
and o:bjact. He tells us. that there are three possible ways of' 
resolving this dualism, which are: also the three ways indicated 
by the history o·f the problem. Firstly, it is possible to consider -
the object as set over the subject ( 11Das Objekt 1st ~em Subjekt 
Qbergeordnet"}, so· that the subject is determined by the object in 
the act of kilowledge; second~y, the subject can. be. qonsidered as 
set over the objec.t ("Das Subjekt ist dem Objekt tlb~rgeordnet"), sc~ 
that the· shbject produces the. object in the act of lplowledge 
~'bringt as 1m Erkenntnisakt hervar") without receivi:n·g anything 
from it; and fina~ly, it can be considered that. a tllird factor is 
set ove.r both subject and object, itse~f not appear~g in the act 
of loiowled.ge: but constituting the origirial unity of 'subject and 
object and making the relation between them possibl~. In the first 
case the subject-object relation is an inner-obje,ct~ve ('•inner-
objektive") relation; in the second case an inner-s~bjective 
' 
("inner-eubjektive") relation; and in the third cas~ the relation 
is one outside both subject and object ( 11sowohl aus~er-subjektiv ' 
als ausser-obj.ektiv'i). (ME, p.l28 etc.) o· 
Epistemological theories of Realism, says 
Hartmann, are all of the inner-objective tYPe!. The most nalve form · 
of epistemological Realism is Natural Realism. Here man is sUppose{ 
to be simply aware of things in the world, whether these things 
are material. objects or creations of the imagination, it does no~ 
matt.er. All is "D1nglich" ( "Auch der Mensch 1st ein Ding, und 
auch die Seale 1n ihm ist ein Ding"). To be is to be a Thing 
(" ••• der Mensch (ist) von eilier Welt· dinglicher Wirklichkeit 
umgeben, in die hinein er geboren wird, in der er lebt und stirbt, 
die also· unabhlingig van ihm besteht und sich gleichgOltig gegen 
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sein Dasein und sein Erkennen ve.rhl!lt"). Knowledge b~comes a matte! 
of man's adjusting himself to the "Dinglichkeit und Konkretheit deJ~ 
Welt" , to the world as a Thing ( 11 e ine We 1 t a ls Ding'D in which h~ 
himself is the central thing. The world is anthropocentric, and the 
measure of mants knowledge of the world depends for him on how 
exactly he succeeds- in copying 1 t ("Die Erkenntnis hat die Tend en!?, 
ein getreuas Abbild des Wirkli~hen zu sein"). (ME, pp.l33,134) •. 
The Pre-Socratics already revolted ~gainst. this 
primitive· view o1f the wo,rld and lmowledge• Hartmann t13lls us tha.t 
the second phase of Realism is Scientific Realism. The mythologies~ 
admixtures of Natural Realism now disappear in the face of the new 
bel.ier in a thoroughly natural causality which ultimate,ly develops 
into the modern idea of the, function of the· natural laws ("die 
Funktion de's Naturgesetzes:11 (ME; P•l38)). Hartmann l!laintains that 
we can already discove·r all the basic features ,of our modern 
scientific view of the world in ancient Atomism ( "D~ese gewltige 
Revolution des Realitatsgedankens vollzieht sich in langatmigar 
Entwicklung seit den Zaiten der Vorsokratiker, In der alten 
Atomistik finden w1r schon fast alle GrundzQge des ·neuen Weltblldes 
beisamme.n" (ME, p.l37)). It ie, however, still the world's 
"Dinglichkeit", the wc.rld as an Object, Which is definitive tor 
the act of knowledge. 
That scientific principles cannot account fo·r the 
experiences of spiritual being, has been known of olp. Beyond mere 
scientific experience, therefore~ there existS' a p·ra~tically· 
unlimited field for speculation. This fact gives rise to what. 
Hartmann calls Metaphysical Realism which proceeds by borroWing 
from empirical or anthropomorphic expS!rience for its so-called 
"principial" clarification of spiritual being. Metaphysical Realism 
is a matter of analogy; it works with bo·rrowed terms ("entlehnten 
empirischen oder gar anthropomorphen ftealit§tszagen, die auf das 
Prinzip Qbertragen und so ins Kosmische und Hetakosmische· potenziert 
sind ••• Di.e Prinzipienbildung wird zum vagen Analogiespiel" (ME,· 
p.l43)). Such principles are Aristotle's forms and first entelechy, 
the Stoic logos and world-soul, the ontological substances of the 
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Scholastics, Schop~nhauer's "Welt als Wille", and so on. Here also 
the "Dinglichkeit".of the world is of determinative significance. 
j 
Idealism ado·pts the·· second view of the subje~ 
relat.ion. Its tradition begins with the Empirical 
or Psychological Idealism o.f ancient Scepticism. Hera, says Hartmann, 
it is maintained that we cannot k:rrow anything about objects as 
objects. The individual subject is the measure of all things. 
Worked out to its ultim·ate consequence, the theory is summed Up by 
the· formula: esse est percip~. 
Hartmarm tells us that Kant tried to overcome 
this position by considering the process of knowledge not as the 
projection of the individual subje·ct on the object, but as a process 
in which the individual subject can partake although the process 
rises above it .• He considered the process of lmowledge :in so far as 
it is one and the same for all subjects alike ("Erkenntnis 1m 
Grossen,. den , 7 sicheren Gang der Wissenschaft", der in 
' 
gescl'l'ichtlicher Entfaltung Qber das Einzelsttbjekt h~weggeht und 
niemals 1n 1hm aufgeht. Die Stuf&n dieses Ganges haben dem Erkennelj 
I 
de·s Individuums gegenQber etwas Objektives, Obergreifendes, an dam. 
der Einzeliner wohl teilhaben kann, das aber gegen dieses sein 
Teilhaben gleichgQltig dasteht" (ME, p.l49)). As such the subject 
is univeTsal or transcendental ("ge·meinsam und einheit·lich rtlr 
alle11 (ME,. p.l51)); the categories are· aspects of tra~scendental 
subje:ct.ivity and as such "reine Verstandesbegriffe" , "rein" 
especially:ln so fer as, at least for Kant, psychologism is not 
involved. But transcendental subjectivity also contains the 
"Gesetzlichkeit" for the appearance 1n lmowiedge~ of the object, so 
that the categorie:s are a].so determinations or conditions for the, 
objective content of knowledge ("Bedingun~em der MCSglichkeit der 
Ge gens tfblde"). 
I 
As we have said, Hartmann considers himself to be 
continuing Kant's criticism, breaking, howeve~, with this 
Pa.rmenidean aspect of Kant's work and all the! neo-Kantian 
elabora·tions on it. It is 1n this respect that Hartmann interprets 
his own work as· a new ,critique of pure reason ("rein kritischer 
Arbeit, und zwar aUf eine!m Wage: dar, wie' mir scheinen will, der 
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Weg e:tner neuen Kritik der reinen Vernunft 1st" (AW, p.V)) • It 
was ·Pa.rmenides who first identified thought with be!ing, and althou~.h 
Kant's work was directe.d against the ·pretences of speculat.ive 
metaphysics, Hartmann believes that he did not yet sa~ that it was 
p~recisely be·cause of the attribution to the thinking ~ubject of 
such a pre-eminent place in the world·, that speculatiye mat.aphysic~! 
' , 
is poss:ible at al.l. Hartmann maintains that while the;,;a can be no 
doubt about the blow dealt to dogmatism by Kant 1s formula "keine 
Metaphys:tk ohne Krit1k", there can, however, also be no doubt that 
this p·hiloso·pher' s work did not yet erase the unwarra~ted 
distinction between subject. a·nd object m so far as 1t.1s <mS!dered as 
. ' 
a final di.stinction belonging to the nature of the world itself. 
Kant did not yet appreciate the fact· that the ca;rrie.r of the> 
ap.paTatus of knowledge, even :f.nso far as it is consid~red as 
. . ' t 
supra-individual, that is· from the aspect of logic, ·and, in Karit s 
terminology, as "transcendental", as "Subjekt ilberha~pt", is 
itself merely one evidence: in the total f'lux of evid.ence in the 
world - one which can, of course, be recognized and pointed out but 
which cannot be. made the! guiding evidence for all o\t~er evidences 
in the world. 
Metaphysical Idealism and Logical Idealism resul~; 
from the post-Kantian concern over Kant's position ot Transcendehtc.l 
Ideal1S3Jl which left the problem of the 11Ding-an-sichi'· open and in . 
that sense tolerated irrationality. What happens in Metaphysical 
.Idealism, say.s Hartmann, is that the: transcendental subject· is 
itself made the 11D1ng-an-sich11 • The possibility of a real object iE 
entirely erased. The object lies entirelLy within the subject, it i~ 
the subject ("H1er a.ber liegt Qber das Objekt hinaus kein Reales 
./mehr. Denn das Ding an sich 1st in das Subjekt hineinverlegt. Das 
grosse , ,X" liegt nicht vor, sondern hinter dem Bewusstsein. Damit 
is~ der natfir]ichen Tendenz der Erkenntnis nach aussen, auf ein 
Reales, dem sie zustre.bt, der Weg abgeschnitten" (ME, pp.l58,159) ) .• 
According ·to Hartmann it was Leibniz who showed the way here. The 
monads repr.esent the deve:lopment of individual subjects from the 
mirid 'of God whiCh is the carrier of the etsrnal truths - the 
distinction between subJect and object ha.s disapp~a·red. Metaphysical 
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1 
Idealism passes over F1chte and. Schelling into Hege,l t s Logical 
Idealism in which all distinction between the real and the ideal 
I 
is finally wiped out and the process of the world is seen a.s one 
of its internal and dialectical self-deve:lopment, thE? process of 
its self-realisation as Subject and as "Ding-an-sich". 
The scient1sm of Logical Idealism~ again, is 
' 
opposed by the· anti-scientism of Phenomenological Idealism. 
Hartmann maintains that. the subject is here no longef understood 
to be merely se].f-identical (ttals Setzmg zu versteh~n" (ME, 
p.l69)), bu;t acquires once more a really objective s~gnificance 
. . . 
("gegenstandliche Bedeutung'' (ME, p.l69)). The subject can be 
col'lfronted with itself' once more, and assumES the attitude , 
' . 
characte:ristic of phe'llomenology, that its labours in the attempt 
ta understand its place and signifi.cance! 1n the· prqblem of' 
knowiadge must remain of a pre11m1nary nature ("Sie bleibt in de:~· 
Vorarbeit stehenn (ME, p.l?O)). 
In Realism, then, the subject is of secondary 
significance. In Idealism the possibility of a self-sustaining 
object disappears. Mo~ism wants to get beyond both Realism and 
Idealism to a unity- 1n terms of which the twofold appearance of 
.objectivity and subje:ctivity can be interpreted as mere 
appearance. All monistic procedures root in Eleatic Metaphysics, 
sa,s Hartmann. Parmenides, although he did not consciously seek 
it, touched the core of Monism when he aquated being with thought~. 
In Plot:hnus' Mqnism, the duality of subject and. object is 
considered as a secondary evidence; of primary significance is th~J 
irrationa-l .foundation, or God, in which sU1bject and object 
co-incide. In Sp1noza t s Panthe·istic Monism , thought and extensio:.::. 
the two attributes of God which the human mind can grasp, cannot 
. / 
be recanciled 1n human experience. Man cannot understand hOlW a 
mode of thought cari reproduce ("kann wiedergeben" (ME, pol78)) a 
mode of extension. But tbe parallelism of these attributes is 
reso)lved in God fn whose substance: they fall toge·ther. God is not 
1n the modes or the attributes - they are, in him • 
According to· Hartmann, Schelling's philosophy 
of identity is the most co·mprehensive execution of a monistic 
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standpoint. In Schelling's Absolute, ·subject and object not' only 
unite, but become· identical ~ here Idealism and Rea,lism co-incide. 
Hartmann himself wants: to overcome all these 
positions. He cannot ·see how a return to any one of tpem can throw 1 
i 
more light on the problem of knowledge!. All of them maintain more 
than can possibly be known. 
Hartmann reit.erates. his own ontological 
position. We should face all problems \Jithout thinkin~ t~at we can 
Solve all problems ("Gewiss da.rf die-se ke,in Problem apweisen. Aber 
sie bra.ucht auch nicht ein jades zu losen. Sie· stellt. sich vielmeru:~ 
von vornherein aUf den Standpunkt, dass es prinzipiel~ unlosbare, 
mataphysische Problemgehalte gibt" (ME, p.201)). OnlY; whO'n the 
problem of knowledge, is approached as part of the cov.~ring 
ontological problem, do.es it manifest its true· problematic nature. 
It is part of the primal deed of trying to 
know, says Hartmann, that a knowing subject should b:e distinguished·. 
( 11Dass a1le.s Erkennen an ein erkennendes Subjekt geb_unde? 1st, 
Hlsst sich wohl nicht im Ernst bes:treiten. Es gehort mit zur 
Urtatsache des Erkenntnisphtinomens" (NE, p.l7)). We have seen that 
misunderstanding of this phenomenon, when the·su:bject is cons1deroo 
as supra-individu·al in' the light of logic., leads to subjectivistic 
transcendentalism. On the other hand, when the subject is viewed 
empirically, epistemology falls into psychologism. Hartmann 't~arns 
us that we must therefore be care,fulnot to think of the problem of 
knowledge as either a logical or a psychological problem. 
Although the problem is entirely one of the 
subjoot-obje,ct rel.ation, we must understand, says Hartmann, that 
this relation exists also independent of any problem of lmowledge 
in fo.rms more fUndamental than, and· indeed presUpposed by knowledge 
~'Sie stehen au:ch abgesehen von aller Erkenntnis in mannigfaltigen 
Relationen, durch die sie ineinen realen Seinszusammenhang gebunde:r · 
sind, einen Existenz- und Lebenszusammenhang dar waiter, grosser 
und fundamentaie:r ist als der Zusammenhang der Erkenntnisrela tion 
tmd 1n die.sem schon vorausgesetzt is:t" (ME, p.205)). 
For Hartmann it is also important that we 
realise that the relation between subject and object is merely a 
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correlation. An object is an object only for a subject, .and a 
subje:ct is a subject only fo·r an object ("Ihre Relation ist 
Korrelation" (ME, p.44)) - and the subject itself can also become 
·an object, and not only an object for itself but one also for othel' 
subjects - an object among other objects. 
Gnoseo·lo.gically, within this relation, the 
function of the subje:ct consists in trying "to· lay hold of" 
' 
("Erfassen") or to comprehend the object, and that of the object 
1n being opew. to such a function on the par·t of the subject. This 
relation changes nothirig as regards the object, and· as regards th•; 
· S':lbject tDere is a change·, bttt onl.y one like the change occurring 
in a mirror with the play of objects reflected in it ("Das Einholen 
des Erfa.ssten berleuta-t nicht ein Einholen des Objekts in das 
Subjekt, sondern nur die! Wiederkehr der Bestimmtheiten des Objektz 
an einem inhaltlichen Gebilde 1m Subjekt, dam Erkenntnisgebilde, 
oder dem ,Bilden de·s Objekts. Der Gegensta:n~ also verhlilt sich 
gleichgfiltig ge.,gen das S'Ubjekt, aber nicht dieses gegen ihn. Nur 
1m Subjekt wird durch die Erkenntnisfunktion etwas ver~ndert. Am 
Obje:kt entsteht nichts Neues, 1m Subjekt aber entsteht das 
Gegenstandsbewuss.tse±n mit seinem Inhalt, dem , ,Bilde" des 
Objekts .. (ME, p.45)). 
For Hartmann, th1s. 1Tepresentat1on" of the object 
is a third factor inextricably pound up with the subje.ct-obje·ct 
relation and in its turn an entirely autonomous evidence - it is 
l!'!Ot there because of either subject or object, or because of their· 
relation; it is simply an essential asp.ect of the complete 
t 
phenomenon of the subject-object relation ( 11 so folgt, dass 
notwend1g in aller Erkenntnis jenes Dritte in die Subjekt-Objekt 
Relation schon eingeflochtan ist, und folglich unabh~ngig 
) 
von seiner Bewusstheit oder Unbewusstheit ja unabh§ngig auch 'Yom 
Grade seiner Aufze1gbarkeit 1m Einzelfall - immer schon vorhanden 
1st. Das abe.r he:isst, dass das ,,Bild" oder die· ,.,vorstellung" ein 
notwendiger Wesensbe.standteil der Erkenntnisrelation 1st" (ME, 
p.47)). Hartmann calls this phenome:non "gnoseologisches 
Ansichsein" (ME, p.51). 
Now each subject "covers" only its limited part 
of being, which may even be entirely different from that "coveredr: \ 
., 
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by other subject-s. We know, however, that intelligent communicatio:c 
between men. is possible~, and that truth can therefore be sought as 
a common factor beyond mere individualistic subjectivism and 
Protagorean relativism. For Hartmann it is at this point that it 
become-:s manife·st that there are: categories or principles of 
' ' 
knowledge (as evidenced bythe laws and relations of logic) in 
" 
terms of.wh1ch communication is posSible. But it remains for him 
an irrational affair, since truth, as he tells Us; has n~thing to 
do with psychology or the act or process of knowing. 
The content of lmowledge may be particular, but 
not its truth - its truth, in fact, precedes the act of lmowing. 
Tha·t Socrates died 1n 399 B.c., is true independent of whether it 
is lmown or ·no,t. is a matter. of intersubjective corresp-ondence 
("intersubjektive Verst!indigung" (ME, p.3;36 etc.)),truth is 
irrational as far as its poss~.bility is concerned.· We discern that 
the-re are pririciple.s, and we can know the forms the,y take, but why 
. they take on just these forms and what they are· or mean in 
themselves, we do· not know ("BedingUngen der Erkenntnis darf man 
alscr nicht sillechtweg als blosse Gesetze bezeichnen, sondern 1n 
strang allgemeinen Sinna nur als , ,Prinzipien" oder , ,Kategorien" 
dar Erkenntnis. Das Gasetzesmoment mag das relativ Fassbarste in 
ihnen sein, ihr WasEm erschCSpft es nicht." (ME, p.343.)). 
For Hartmann, knowledge is indeed ultimately 
possible only because it is founded on irrationality which, for 
him, is an ·ontological manifestation rooted not in the object but 
1n the subject ("Es steckt also hinter der gnoseologischer 
Irrat1onal1t§t - oder,- was dasselbe 1st, hinter dem ,-,bloss 
gnoseologischan" Charakter der Erkennba.rkeitsgranze am Gegenstsnde 
- doch eine achta onto·logische V.arwurze:lung, nicht anders als sie 
hinter allen anderen Teilphfulomenen der Erkenntnis au.ch steckt. 
Aber as 1st eine Verwurzelung nicht 1m ontologischen Wesan des 
Gegen·standes, sonde.rn .in dam des Subjekts. Dar sche1nbare 
Widerspruch 16st sich einfach: es gibt nicht das an sich Irrat1ona1e-,. 
es gibt nur. das fOr uns Irrationale" (ME, pp.249,250)). 
Hartmann distinguishes four possible. 
gnoseologica.l determinations of the object ("Gegenstand der 
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Erkenntnis."): as known {"das Erkannte (objectum)"); as what is 
to be lmown ("das zu Erkennende (objiciendum)"); as unknown 
("das Unerkannte (Transobjektive)"); and as unknowable ("da.s 
Unerkennbare (Irrationale oder Transintelligible:)")• These 
distinctions of objectivity can exist only for the subject. It is 
quite possible, for instance, that even an "unknowable" may have 
be~g ;.. whether we can ever lmow it or not. The designation 
11 object"ive" never describe:s the object -whether as known, to be 
!mown, unknown, or unknowable - 9 but only the representation of 
the: object ta the subject, this be-ing the third "autonomousn 
evide:rree in the subject-object relation ("Objektiv i.st niemals das 
Objekt sei.b,st, weder das Erkflnnte noch das Unerkannte an ihm; 
sondern das immanente Erkenntnisgebilde (das Bild) 1st , ,ob.jektiv" $-. 
sofern es die Zilge des Objekts trligt oder irgendwie strang 
reprasentierend auf sie bezogen ist") •· The being-in-itself of the 
object remains. what it is des.pite "objectivity", or any of its 
determinat-ions: ("das Ansichsein des Obj.ekts wird durch sein 
Erkanntsein nicht aufgehoben"). (ME, p.88 etc.) 
Hartmann points out how the primacy of the 
irrational in the process of knowledge be·comes abundantly clear 
. ' 
when we consider mathematical and logical knowledge. Our most basie 
presUppositions for knowing are irrational. We are ignorant, for 
instance, of what the, Law of Identity, or the Law of Contradiction 
mean in themselve>s; we lmow them only m so far as they are necessary 
presuppositil!lns: for knowing. Thetr validity is something we do not 
understand·(nas logische prius ist wohl erste Badingung der 
Erkenntnis aber nicht erstes Erkanntes, nicht cognitio prius" -
"Die Mathemati.k gibt al~ Pro.totyp eines rationalen Gebietes. Aber 
sind ihre Axiome auch rational?" (ME, pp.273,274)). 
Here again man's rol~ 1n the relation between 
ideal being and real being beco,me·s manifest. The problem of a prior~ 
kno·wledge of the real (ttProblem der aprioris·chen Realerkenntnis" 
(ME, p.474)) makes it clear that in knowledge,, ideal knowledge 
penetrates deep·into knowledge of the real, and that ideality can 
have a si.gnificance. far reality down to knowledge of the most 
concrete particular. We know.how mathematics and logic can be 
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applied ("Idealerkenntnis: (erstreckt) sich t1ef 1n die 
Rea:lerkenntnis, und ke·ine-swe·gs nur in die wissenschaftliche, 
(hmein) - 'W'ie denn die Strukturen des idealen Seins die des 
realen bis in dessen konkrete-· Einzelf§lle hinein durchsetzen und 
! 
bestimmen" (ME, p.473)). This gnosectlogical function of being a 
bridge between ideality and reality is inherent in man's 
ontological nature. And this is why real knowledge (knowledge of 
the real) is at the same time a poste·riori. as well as a priori 
("Reale·rkenntnis (ist) ilmner zugleich a priori und a posteriori" 
(ME, p.491)), while all ideal knowledge is exclusively a priori o 
In Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie Hartmann 
explains that a priori knowledge touche:s ( ''bestreicht") three of 
the four basic ontological determinations of be,ing, namely 
ideal being-theTa ( 11 1deaJie·s Dasein"), ideal being-such ("ideales 
Sosein"), and real being-such ("reales Sosein11 ). Real being-ther"' 
(reales Dasein") can be known only a po.steriori since it is a 
matter of sense perceptiono (To know that a stone is there, to 
' 
know its being-there, is pos.sible on].y a posteriori, through sens<-. 
experience.) It is easy to see that lmowledge of ideal being is 
a priori, and that knowledge of real being-there ("reales Dasein") 
is a posteriori. As far as the a priori as well as a posteriori 
nature of knowledge of real-be'ing-such ("reales Sosein") is 
concerned, we may explain that to know the stone•s being-such; 
which ultimately means knowing its constitution and the condition$ 
for its "behaviour", is in the last reso.rt a matter of 
mathematical_explanation- its''bahaviour" is empirically observed 
(and as such .it is known a posteriori),- but mathemat.ically 
explained (and as su.ch it is known a priori). According to 
Hartmann, then, nl.Die Erkenntnis· a priori bestra·icht drei von den. 
ontischen Gaga.nsatzfeldern (1.Ss., 1.Ds., und r.ss.). Nur das 
rea1e, Dasein 1st von ihr ausgeschlossen./2.Die Erkenntnis a 
posteriori bestreicht nur zwei Felder (r.ss. und r.Ds.). Die 
beiden Fe:lder des 1dealen Se1ns sind von 1hr attsgesch1Dssen./3.Die 
a priorische' und die a posteriorische: Erkenntnis haben von den 
vier ontischen Feldern nur einas.gerneinsam: das reale Sosein./ 
4.Raale·s Dasein ist nur der Erkenntnis a posteriori zttgt-inglich./ 
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S.Ideales Sain (sowohl i.Ss. als attch i.Ds.) ist nur dar Erkenntni~· 
a pri.ori z~gt!nglich" (GO, p.l44 etc.) • 
Hartmann believes that the concepts a priori 
and a posteriori in the definition of knowledge are both 
giwseologically false ("Beides 1st gnoseologisch falsch" (ME, · 
p.49)). Neither is essentially definitive of the subject-object 
re1a·t1on; they simply signify whether some insight was achieved 
at the hand of real being or oot ("A posteriori 1st alle:S Erfassen~, 
in welchem der reale Einzelfall als solcher gegebe~n ist. und an ihm 
als vorhandenern und vorliegendem etwas eingesehen wird ••• A priori 
dagegen 1st alles Erfassen bei welchem ein einzelner realer Fall 
nicht vorliegt" (ME, p.SO)). 
The problem of a priori knowledge, Hartmann tails 
us, ca:rumot 9 as with. Kant, be the problem of "synthetic a priori 
judgements:"; it is., 1ndeed7 the, problem of the irrationality of thc-· 
.. 
principles of lmowledge as such, since a priori knowledge has "den 
Charakter des Bedingungen ffuo alles besondere Ch:~genstandserkennen" 
(ME, p.34o).·And the problem of a posteriori knowledge is as much 
me~taphysical as that of a priori knowledge - it ultimately 
remains impossible to explain, and therefo,re irrational, how there 
can be: o·bjects of knowledge at all, 'since consciousness on the one 
hand do:es not pro·ceed outside itself through the senses 1n the 
l'Jlro·cess of "grasping" them, and the objects on the other hand do n~t 
enter consciousness through the senses ta form in it an immanent 
content. ("Wie kl>nnen bestimmtheiten des realen Objekts unmitte,lbar 
durch die' Sinne dam Bewusstsein gegeben werden, da .doch woder das 
Bewusstse1n durch die Sinne aus sich hinaus greifen und ein ihm 
Trans:zendentes ergreifen, noch auch der Gegenstand mit seinen 
Bestimmtheite.n durch s1e in das Bewuss;tsein eintreten und 1hm 
1mmanen t warden kann?" {ME, p. 387) ) • 
As for the structure of the a.ct of knowledge, 
Hartmann says that a posteriori knowledge is symbolic, that is it 
has a medium - he calls it an "Organ" - , namely sense perception. 
K.loo·wledge which 1s not symbolic, is intuitive~ knowledge {"eine 
Erkenntnisart, die nicht symbolisch 1st, 1st not.wendig , ,intuitiv" 
(ME, p.S29) ). A priori lmowledge is therefore intuitive: knowledge. 
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Also,. it is not at all mediated by any other form of knowledge:; and. 
as such it is st.igmatico 
When intuition is not only dire.ct·ed towards 
single evidences (when it is not me'rely "EinzelschAuu), but becomes 
a matter of appreciating coherences., it becomes conspective• 
Conspective·. intuition is more fundamental than stigmatic intui-tior.r 
(which is merely aspective - "aspektiv") , and is not merely a 
matter o.f deduction in the light of its aware,ness of relations. It 
is not bound to any·one method. It is therefore left free to 
dis.oove-r as. much as pos·sible ("Das aspektiv Geschaute! als solches 
1st ein anderes als das konspektiv Gescheute, wiewohl as derselbe 
g~scha.ute Gegenstand sein kann ••• Konspektive Anschauung als solcte. 
hat fiberhaupt nieht eine bestimmte Richtung des Vorgehens, an die 
sie unbedingt gebunden ware. Sie' 1st allen Richtungen gegentiber 
frei, stellt nach alle--n Seiten '~erbindungen her. Sie schreitet 
ebensc·wohl aufsteige,nd wie absteigend fort, analytis:che und 
synthetische· Metho~e umfa~.ss.end - je: nach dar Lage des Gegebenen 
und. des Unbekannten. Sie verbindet Deduktion und IndUktion,. 
reflektiert auf~rts wie ab~rts ••• " (ME, pp.520,521)). 
And what Hartmann holds to be true of 
conspect.ive intuition, he holds to be true of philosophy as: such. 
Philosophy must remain freo to allow for as much evidence as 
possible; free of tho idea of constructing a sys·tam on the basis 
of presuppositions, the internal coherence: of which should make the 
world "intelligible" - fo'r that will simply not make it so·; free 
allso as we have, seen 1n our Introduction, of any pre-established 
unity· of method. System belongs to the world itself and not to 
phil.osophy. Philosophy can only attempt an understanding of the 
system of the world • 
SECOND CHAPTER 
HARTVJANN' S ETHICS 
SUMJV.IARY OF CONTENTS 
1. The Person as Ethical Object 
Man is a person bso fsr as he is a mediator between the 
realm of the ideal self-exlstence 6·f values and real being in the, 
sphere of ethics; Nietzsche discovered that values are a manifold 
but his view of the person as a "revaluator of all valuesn leads 
to ethical relativism; in Scheler's work the independent existence 
-of values is stre·ssed, but moral action is ultimately rendered 
impossible: if personal being is considered to be correlative to the 
world; man is not only the ethical object par excellence, but also 
a subject. 
2, Moral Values, Goods-Values and 
Value-Feeling 
Hartmann is·appreciative of Kantts view that there are 
non-causal determinants O'f human action; moral values as non-causal 
determinants account for the person's freedom in the face of his 
complete determination by natural causality; the ancients were awan, 
of the problem O·f freedom; the relation between moral values and 
goods-values; value:-feeling and the problem it raises as to the 
senction for the claims o.f moral values. 
3. Freedom, God and Religion 
Responsibility implies freedom, and freedom responsibility; 
teleology in ethics is man's concern, no:t God's; the challenge of 
religion; the antinomic relation between ethics and religion, and 
the separation of the spheres; Hartmann sides with ethics and his; 
position is inconsequent - nevertheless his overstatement also 
illustrates his merit. 
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SECOND CHAPTER 
HARTV.LANN' S ETHICS' 
1. The Person as Ethical Object 
In his desire to get beyond th~ ethical philosophy of 
the' nineteenth century, which he accuses of subjectivity, Hartmann 
feels that values must again be allowed to speak for themselves, 
and this is what he calls "the· idea of a concrete ethics o-f values"o 
Acco,rding to Max Scheler, of whose work Hartmann makes 
very much, every ethics which proceeds from the question as to the 
highest good or the final go;al, was once and for all rendered 
untenable by the work of Kant. The implication is that such an 
ethics must necessarily be metaphysically speculative ("alle Ethik, 
die VO'n der Frage-: was 1st das hOchste Gut? oder: was ist der 
Endzweck allen Willenbe·strebungen? ausgeht, halte ich durch Kant 
ein fur allemal als widerlegt" (FEW, p.29). 
Appreciative o-f the relevant aspect of Scheler 1 s ethics, 
Hartmann says that. we have indeed never yet known what good and 
evil are, and that it was Nietzsche.who brought us to this 
awareness. Speaking of the subjectivity of the nineteenth century, 
he: says that "it_was far from troubling itself about the objective 
contents o,f moral claims, commandments and values. There stood 
Nietzsche, a solitary figure, warning us with the start'.ing assertioL 
that we, have never yet lmown what good and evil are" (E I, p .15) • 
· Instead elf sterile speculation as to the 'highest good", Nietzsche 
undertook a task which caused him to be "the first to see the rich 
plenitude of the ethical cosmos-" (E I, p.l6). 
It is this consciousness of the pluriformity and 
heterogeneity of values which describes Hartmann's own task in the 
field of ethics: "I have chosen as my central task an analysis of 
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the contents of values", he writes (E I, p.l5}, and maintains further that 
' 
when man senses the pJ!.urifo:rmity of the ideal self-existent realm 
of value'S, he also senses that he is not their author and creator. 
They are there despite and independent of him. 
We have: sean to what extent Hartmann 1 s fourth 
categorial law is impor.tant far an understanding of his pos:ition 
in ethics. We know tha.t tor him moral values have an ideal and 
independent exi~tence, are. not man-made, and do not change with 
time; they have a sUpTa-temporal and supra-individual existence, 
and always are what t.Pey are.. They are ontologically determined 
a:nd absolute. This simply means that for Hartmann their being, the 
being of each individual value,, is such and such and cannot be 
different, and is therefore existentially self-sufficient, requir!J1ic 
"no other determination for its being". 
But the ideally existent realm of moral values 
is o.n1y one half of the ethical phenomenon, the other half being 
the preTson and his acts: "Togethe:r with the concept o.f value," 
writes Hartmann, "that of personal being is the central concept of 
ethics ••• as every reaching forth of values out of the ideal realm 
into the· actual de:pends upon the part played by the subject. Among 
all real entities onll.y the subject has the power of mediation ••• 
The stllbject is a person in so far as he is a carrier of moral 
values and disvalues" (E I, p.317). 
Man, then, is not a creator of values, but the 
media·tor between the' realms of ideal and real . being, and therefore 
also the medium of the actualization of moral values. It is by 
virtue~ of his function as mediator that Hartmann calls him a 
person. 
Examining Nietzsche t s view of the person, Hartmarm. 
finds that it lerl to ethical relativism. Despite Nietzsche's 
d:is:cOJVery of the manifoldness of values, Hartmann tells us, this 
philosopher did not yet appreciate the ontological foundation of 
values "as a determining prius" (E I~. p.206) .fo•r our actions and 
attitude in and towards 11fe. Nietzsche was not yet awar& of the 
ideal self-existence of values:, and that man t s actions are· 
conditioned in their light, rather than they in the light of his 
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actions. Here, Hartmann believes, Nietzsche, was still a child of 
the· nineteenth century• He clearly saw how sterile the search for 
an absolute and highest value had been. But, H!?.rtmann maintains, 
Nietzsche went to the other extreme, so that in his philosophy the 
person became lost among the: values. now opened to his view in such 
rich pluriformity. It is true, says Hartmann, that Nietzsche 
showed us that "the prophecy of the serpent is the great deception~. 
Sin has not opened man's eye:s, he has not become as God; to this ds; 
he dae:s not yet know what good and evil are" (E I, pp.83,84); but 
in another sense Nietzsche's ethics does see man as a god, since 
for him man's choice of values now becomes absolutely .free and not 
dete,rminfold from outside himself in any way. Man can be an evaluato::·:. 
or rather a revaluator of all values• Man is actually above values ,., 
they are depende:nt on him. This is how Nietzsche understands the 
pers<D'n as the "carriern of values. In Nietzsche's "delct:rine of the 
"revaluation of all values" lay hidden the idea of valuational 
relativism", writes Hartmann - ttif value·s permit of being revalued~ 
-,. 
they also are capable of be,ing devalued, they permit of being 
manufactured and of being destroyed. They are the work of man, they' 
are arbitrary, like thoughts and phantas:ias 11 (E I, p • .85). 
Nietzsche1 s error here is, of course, the reverse 
side of his discovery, and according to Hartmann it ought not to 
blind us to: the significance O·f his work any longer. 
However, in Hartmann's opinion the cain 
contemporary example of ethical personalism is found in Sche1er 1 s 
ethics. It is important for us to note this~~ since Hartmann conside~: 
Scheler•s work to be) a bridge between Nietzsche and himself. 
Scheler, in his characteristic way, defined the 
person as 11die konkrete, selbst wesenhafte· Seinseinheit von Akten 
verschiedenartigen Wesens·, die an sich allen wesenhaften 
Aktdifferenzen .... vorhergeht. Das Sein der Person , ,fundiert" alle 
wesenhaf"t verschiedenen Akte" (FEW, pp.393,394). It is this 
definition Hartmann has in mind when he writes that "his (Scheler's) 
theor'y starts fro:m the pos.ition that person and act belong 
indissolubly togethe.r" (E I, p.319). This means, as Scheler himself 
puts it, that the person is not a mosaic of acts ("Aktmosaik") or, 
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in other woTds, that the essence of a person cannot be assessed 
by evaluating the sum-to~tal of his acts • Scheler's meoaning becomes 
c].earer when we consider his distinction between person and subject 
or ego (rtdas 'Ich"'). The uru, he tells us, can be an object of 
experience for the individual. But the person itself car:n never be 
an object of experience, since all experience is pre-conditioned 
by it. For S·cheler, the person is the whole behind experience 
wh·ich, precisely because it is that whole, cannot itself be 
object.ified. Only ~· the person experiences is capable of 
objectification, but not the person as such. Since acts issue from 
the person, the person and his acts, indeed the person and every 
individual one of his acts, "belong indissolubly together" - more 
exactly even, they fall toge·ther, they coincide. Hartmann comments 
that fo:r Scheler "the person is not something behind or above the 
acts, bUrt is aiready contained in them; he is their real unity, 
inseparable from their essence 11 (E I, p.319). Acts; theref(i)lre, like· 
the person, cannot be objectified ("Ein Akt (1st) niemals ein 
Gegenstand ••• Ist aber schon ein Akt niemals Gegenstand, so ist 
er~t recht niemals Gegenstand die in ihrem Aktvollzug lebende 
Person" (FEW, p.397))• Here, writes Hartmann, "we may very well have 
an inner experience of the ego and its functions, but not of the 
p:erson and his acts" (E I, po320). 
For Scheler, therefore, the person is above and 
beyond the subject, above and beyond experience, above and beyond 
the world. The world is correlative to the person. To every 
individual person there corresponds his individual. world which is 
ccr.ncre~te: precisely in so far as it is the world of a person. Every 
pravince of obje"Cts ('·tGegenstandsbereiche" ) , whether 
it be. ps.ychological, empirical, ethical, etc., is concrete in so 
far as it is part of the wo,rld - the world of, and correlative to, 
a person$ But the person is not part of the wor~d ( "Als das 
Sachkorrei.?t der' Person Oberhaupt nannten wir die Welt. Und also 
entsprieht jeder individuellen Person auch eine indjviduelle Welt:. 
Wie jeder Akt abe-r zu einer Person gehort, so , gehort" auch jeder 
Gegenstand wesensgesetzlich zu einer Welt. Jade Welt aber ist in 
ihrem wese:rihaften Aufbau a priori gebunden an die 
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possess. Scheler revolutionized ethics by emphasizing the: existenc(. 
of values independent of man, but in Hartmann's opinion he was led 
to, a theory o·f the person which must ultimater ~r make the realization 
<t)r actualization of values impo.ssible. Hartmann, however, reco:gnj ~es 
the achievements of both Nietzsche and Scheler, and this allows him 
not only to build out the description of the ideal self-existence 
o·f value·s, but also to bring into perspective the role of man in the.~ 
realm of morality • 
2. Moral Values, Goods-Value·s and 
Value-Feeling 
In its broadest outline·, Hartmann's ethics can then 
be' described by the two propositions that moral values have a 
self-existence, and that man is a person. The question now before 
us concerns the relation between the self-existing, ideal realm of 
values, and man as an inhabitant of the sphere of real being. 
The situation is reminiscent of Kant's vi.ew of man 
as being at the same time ho:mo phenomenon and ho·mo noumenon. For 
Kant, ma:q. belongs to the natural world, to the sphere of reality 
"as a part of it" ; as such "his doing and his leavinr 
undone are entirely drawn into it and into its regularity" • 
This ' 
says Hartmann,· is what Kant means when he speaks of 
man as homo phenomenon; further Kant presupposes''that the totality 
of the cosmic proce,sses is throughout causally determined" • 
Consequent 1 Y' , as homo phenomenon, man can in no way escape 
the causal nexus. Nat·ure will not tolerate· any gap in its network 
of sequ:ences. As homo phenomenon, man is fully determined causally .. 
( E I I I , p. 53 ) • 
However, man does not belong "to nature alone, (he) 
at the same time rises into a second realm with a law of its own" 
(E III, p.54). Man is also homo noumenon, not only a natural, but 
also: a rational being. As such,man is in no way exempt from 
causality, but he is the bearer of a determination which is 
non-causal, the latter being, for Kant, the will or reasc::m under its 
practical aspect. Here, Hartmann points out, nall the causal 
determinants which accompany the human will (let us say, as "motives') 
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and are efficacious: in it, remain unaffected. But to them is addee 
a new determ:f.nantn (E III, p.55). The will is non-causal nQt in 
regard to the natural order, but in regard to· itself in so far as 
it is not caused by anything but is the absolutely autonomous powe:r 
of man to· formulate· universal moral laws and, as such, it can and 
does act causally in the phenomenal wo.rld, the causal nexus of 
which "do~es not allow itself to. be suspended or broken but do·es 
permit of being diverted" (E III, p.55). Taking a concrete example,, 
we can point out that the commandment "Thou shalt not steal" whicL,, 
f(!)'r Kant, is a universal formulation of the will (or, as he would 
also· say, a rational prescription of' duty), has causal implications 
when either kept or broken; and either keeping or breaking it can 
alscr be causally inspired - a man may, for instance, keep the 
c<iJ'mmand'ment simply because he fears a retributive law or he may 
steal because of hunger, and so· on. 
Generally speaking, Hartmann accepts homo 
phenomenon as described by Kant. He considers Kantts achievement 
to consist in the fact that he saw that there are moral factors 
which are non-causal and determinate, and which manifest themselve;~ 
at that point in the: world where they be'come causally significant 9 
where they make their Ought for man felt; also that Kant realized 
that such OUghts can be experienced -indeed, that man is,above all~ 
the carrier and the only carrier of such Oughts. Hartmann says that 
we must concede to Kant ltfirst, a demonstration of the fact that 
there is a power in the moral. Ought, which as a heterogeneous, · 
non-causal, determining factor, strikes into the nexus of causal 
trends, and, secondly, a demonstration that the structure of the 
causal nexus makes such an intervention possible, without any 
interruption to itself" (E III, p.6o). Hartmann, however, rejects 
the idea that these moral factors and the Oughts which they express~ 
are created by and situated in homo noumenon: "(Kant's) homo 
noumenon.co.is quite subordinate to his achievements and may be 
discarded along with the rest of his idealistic metaphysics;" (E IIL 
p.60) •. 
Hartmann clearly saw, as did Kant, that the 
cardinal problem about moral action is the problem of freedom, the 
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problem as to whether and how man is free to act in a way differen< 
from the way of his causal determination in the realm of nature. 
"It is the pa'CUliarity of moral value and disvalue," writes Hartmat· 
"that these are attributed to· the person, that upon him fall guilt~· 
responsibility, merit. The person is not simply marked by the 
value (or disvalue:); he is also accounted to be the originator of 
its fulfilment or of the failure' to fulfil itn (E III, p.2o). If 
in the whole. world man is no:t determined otherwise than caus.ally~ 
then clearly morality is impossible, since man cannot be held 
responsible in any way. 
Hartmann te:lls us that Plato was already aware 
of the problem. Plato disce,rned that there must be "another realm 
of being than that of existence, than that of "real" things and of 
consciousness which is not less tireal1111 (E I, P•l83), and in the 
light of which alone man is a moral being. Hartmann indeed maintain,, 
that his no,tion of the self-existence: of moral values is Platonic: 
''in their mode of Being, 11 he: wr-ites, "values are Platonic ideas. 
They belong to that further realm of Being which Plato first 
disco-vered, the realm which we can spiritually discern but cannot 
see or grasptr (E r, pp.I84,185). And, says Hartmann, even Aristotle~.: 
ethics was in the last resort not empiricist, despite "the well-know;;--
difference between the Platonic and the Aristote,lian procedure" 
(E I, p.2'02); he believes that "if one examines the method of the 
ancients in close detail, one finds that under the! various forms of 
procedure - even when it is apparently empirical - there is 
everywhere a kernel o,f purely aprioristic research" (E I, p.202) o 
It is probable, he says, that S'toicism's poverty of content in so 
faT as it reje·cted the real world in its endeavour for @ateia 
' 
and its denial of patos, which amounted to "a renunciation of all 
human goods, a contempt for them, for even the noblest of them" 
(E I, p.l33), was due to an exaggerated apriorism. 
In any case, it is in this regard that "Plato~ 
Aristotle and the Stoics. have remained a model for all later ethics" 
(E I, p.203). Hartmann is a firm believer in their apriorism as such._ 
We have already- seen that foT him there is no coming-into-being of 
values, since "knowledge of values is genuine knowledge of Being" 
-47-
(E I, p-.219) end mor&l values sre given completely in the 
ontologica.I structure of the world. 
Hartmann maintains further that moral values 
should be distinguished from other values Which a .. ·e not so given -
economic, legal, social, aesthetic values, etc. He holds that in 
a purely material sense, non-moral values form the groundstuff of 
moral (personal) relations, and that the dependence of moral val.ues 
upon non-moral values is an ontologically "unequivocal, irreversible 
dependence" (E II, p.25). 
The goodness of a goods-value (the name which 
Hartmann give's to non-moral values), is always a matter of how 
good it is to or for someone. It is clear that. a goods-value 
adheres also to every moral value, since every moral value involve~ 
some good for someone ("every moral value is also a goods-value 
ind.ire.ctly" (E I, p.2.ll)): chivalry is advantageous to the weak, 
love for one•s neighbour benefits the needy and the burdened, and 
so on- "Wherein would an honest man be sUperior to a thief, if 
the things purloined were not somehow of value? What one man can 
steal, what. another can treasure as a possession, is nCll't merely a 
thing but a good. Hone:sty, then, 1f it is a moral value, 
ne:cessarily presupposes tho positive worth of material goods. It is 
inherently dependent on the latter. In the same way, chivalry 
which secures: an advantage to the weak rests upon the worth of that 
advantage; love' of one's neighbour, which gives, or which takes 
upon itself another mant s burden, assumes the' worth of the things 
given and of the relief from the, burden; not otherwise is veracity 
related to the worth (for the other person) of the truth asserted" 
(E i I? pp. 24, 25) • 
However, it is not its goods-value which 
dist.inguishes a moral value as such. Chivalry is not a moral value 
because of its advantageousne.ss to the weak, or neighbour-love 
because it favours the: needy and the burdened - the moral 
phenomenon here merely involves what Hartmann calls: ulife. as the 
ontological basis of the subject ••• the earthly weight which holds 
(man) down but also the root which sustains spiritual life (E II, 
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p.131). In this sense life itself is a value, although a non-moral 
value, the corresponding disvalue being death which is "no·t only 
an annihilation of physical life, but with it also of the 
spiritual and persona1 1t (E. II, p.l31). Hartmann tells us that "in 
all these cases the value of the act is altogether different from 
that attributed to the external good, whether this be some simple 
material possession or some co,mplex situat,ion. And indeed the wortL 
of al!ll a.ct is p:lainly of a higher kind, the character of which is 
seen in this, that its degree does not increase and decrease with 
the greatness of the non-mo·ral good, but according to a standard oi 
a totally different order" (E II, p4J25) • The moral act is ultimate,Iy 
entirely indifferent to its goods-value •. This is so because, while· 
the existence of moral values, as we have seen, pree;upposes the 
erlstence of goods as non-moral values, "'the· converse is not true. 
'Xhe' existence of the world of goods does not involve the emergence 
of a wcrrld of morality and immorality. The· basis of the latter is 
P'r<!llVided only where a ccr,mmunity of persons exists within one and 
the same· wo·rld of goods. The content of the moral world lies on 
another plane:; it is a structural novelty face to face with the 
who1e mass of values from other quarters. Hence the novelty of its 
inherent quality. And indeed its peculiarity - bo,th material and 
axiological - subsis;ts without prejudice: to the fact that the 
moral conduct of the pe.rsons touched by it has, mediate:ly and 
dependently, the character of a "good"" (E II, pp.25,26.). The 
actualization of moral values therefore depends entirely on the 
fact that the pers.on is an object unto' hims·.el:r. Moral values are: 
distinguished by the recognition on the side of the person that 
they ought to· be· actualized by him even if by him alone, and even 
if no goods-value whatsoever accrues either to himself or to anyono: 
else :rrmn such an actualization; they ought to be actualized simply 
and solely be·cau·se of themse]Lves as moral values fop h:im. Personality 
·is essentially not for others but for self - only because of this 
can it be for o·thers also·. Hartmann • s position means in effect that 
the distinguishing mark o.f moral values is not any utilitarian 
effect they may have 1n life, but simply that they constitute the 
possibility for the individual t~ become a better person. 
It seems as if Hartmann here immediat-ely leaves 
himself open. and vulne~rable teo: the quest-ion as to his criterion for--
11 good II:, nbad", better 11 , ttworse", etc., and an imputation of the 
very relativism and arbitrariness in morals to whJ.ch he is oppO-sed., 
We must point out, howeve:r, that Hartmann's idea is that of "a 
systematic co-ordination of diverse values (which exist) without 
culminating in ·one supreme point" (E- II, p.67). The problem of the 
hi.ghest va·lue is no,t settled one way or the other in Hartmann's 
ethics; - he does not consider ethics to, be> capable of settling suet 
a question. We can say that, for him, instead of a single value 
f<riJ.rming a criterion, every discernable value, does so - this applier 
in the case of purity, justice;, wisdom, w.urage, self-control, 
bro-therly love;, truthfulness, fidelity, humility, personal love , 
to mention some of the values which Hartmann exa,mines: individua1ly o 
He aJLso wants us toi understand that his list of values is not at 
all complete or nearly exhaustiv8' of the realm of moral values. On 
the contrary, he be]ieves that our knowledge here is only just 
beginning. Certain values are now for the first time being 
discovered or nemed - not created, since they were always there 
like oontinGnts or stars, only we were not yet able to discern 
them. Thus, for instance, Nie:tzsche was the first. to pronounce 
Love of the Remo,te ( "Fernstenliebe't) and he was also the first to 
name> Radiant Virtue ( tt schenkende Tugend 11 ) • 
We feel that the question as to what sanction the-re 
is fCIT Hartmann 1 s ideal self-existent realm of values; constitutes 
a serious problem; first of all, however, we must try ~o understand 
the philosopher, and he believes that the ontological and 
aJdo,logical phenomena involved in his researches do· not allow ro~r 
the absolute, standards; and criteria of so-called rationality. This 
attitude will no~t appear strange to us if we call to mind the 
p~aralle:l case of mathematical being which we ~have already described.:. 
That it shco,uld be so, and no,t otherwise, that a = a , a0 • 1 , 
6 
3 = 729 , al!Dd that we should clearly •tseen and accept that it is 
so and consequently arra·nge all our scientific experiments accordinr) 
to: this kno~wledge - this is basically irrational.. Yet we are not in 
the: least indignant about this irra.tionality. Why then should we be. 
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so when confronted with a discovery which tells us that moral 
values are what they are irrespective O·f time and us, that we can 
know them to be so, and that a.s such they expr· 3~ a claim - they 
claim of us that they Ought-to-Be and that we Ought-to-Act (Ought-
to-· Do) in their light .• 
It remains true, ho·wever, that Hartmann does 
not want to discuss the problematics of the authority for such a 
claim, and ultimately we ca·nnot accept as an explanation that "it 
is just son o The: furthest Hartmann ge:ts here is to speak of ttder 
Apr:to,rismus des Wertbewsstseins" (GO, p.306) in terms of which he 
maintains that moral value~s are known a priori, that our first 
awareness of them may be empirical or a pc:steTiori, but that such 
awareness of the.o1 is only in a secondary way demonstrative of the~ir· 
existence. We cannot be a.ware of moral va:Iues in the actuality of 
life if they are: not knowable: beyond actuality: "Insight into· that 
which is first is never the first insight ••• Values are not to be 
recognized by the fact that they are, or are not, contained in the 
real. They subsist even where the given case, indeed where all 
actual cases, contradict them ••• Ethical values are not to be 
discovered 1n the conduct of man" (E I, pp.95-99) but through "an 
apriorist.ic intuition, which is independent of' the posterius of 
actual phenomena and of the part they play as guides. Even here the 
poste.rius - just as with the' knowledge of' theoretical principles -
is only a roundabout way to autonomous aprioristic insight'r (E I, 
_p.l04). But must not this aprioristic insight., this intuition, have 
a sanction beyond itself? Hartmann himse:tr tells us that in choosinr 
our exemplars, our models in lif'e, the choice everytime constitutes 
a lfvaluational prefe-rence" (E II, p.48), that is; our stand on the 
side of values which are known outside or, and which rise above, the 
temporality of the exemplar: rtit cannot be an accident that I choose 
precisel.yr this one; that the Stoic chooses Zeno or Socrates, the 
Chris·tian the figure of Jesus" (E I, p.l95). But are we here not 
once again dangerously near to ethical relativism? 
• 
Hartmann's own choice of exemplars would evidentl::·· 
be where the valuational consciousness has the greate·st range, that 
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is where the greate·st possible number of values is allowed to 
"break throughu the· p.ers<rl'n into actuality. We can indeed consider 
this observation as of fundamental importance ~."!l any assessment of 
Hartmann's view of the moral man. For him the ultimate criterion of 
personal worth is the fullness of the valuational content of the 
person. 
The obvious difficulty about this criterion is thEr: 
the boundar·ies between value·s a:nd disvalues vary often remain 
extrama·ly shadowy and doubtful. It is true that Hartmann leaves us 
with no rigid meastllring stick for fixing boundaries between values 
and disvalues except what he calls value-feeling ("'Wertgeffthl"), 
the intuitive feeling of value which, according to h 1 m , has 
nothing psycho·logical or empirical about it but is purely an 
autonomous axiological faculty within the ontological structure of 
the world as a whole: nThe primal consciousness of value, the prime.::. 
recognition of a commandment is a feeling of that. which 
unconditionally ought to be, the expression of which is the 
commandment. This priority of feeling has nothing to do with 
emp\iricism" (E I, p.l?7). Hartmann is quoting Scheler when he 
speaks of the "WertgefiDll" as 11 eine apriorische "ordre du coeur" 
coder ''logique du coeur•t, wie Blaise Pas.cal treffend sagt11 (FEW, 
p.84; E I, p.l77). 
Whatever the case, however, when moral values and 
their character of Ought-to-Be have been discerned, the 
value-consciousness of the person transfers their 
Ought-to-Be into an Ought-to-Do f'or 
h:fimself • He finds their actualization imperative and binding on him·('""'" 
"behind every Ought-to-Do there stands an Ought-to-Be, behind every 
wise imperative, a mass of valuesn (E III, p.29). But ttbetween the 
commandment and the actual conduct of man stands his free decision, 
the opelm For and Againsttr (E I; p.99) • 
3. Freedom, God and Religion 
The possibility of the open For or Against, moral 
freedom based on persona]. decision, becomes unthinkable, for Hartmanr). 
-52-
if we accept the attitude· of non posse neccare as .formulated by 
Augustine:• This may or· may not be "a higher attitude to which man 
must rise" (E III,· p.274), but it denies the evidence that man can 
consciously actualize. o·r refuse to actualize valuas. Posse peccare 
et non peccare 1:3 an attitude of man and as such a phenomenon that 
cannot be~ argued away; says Hartmann. But then we ar·e compelled to 
acknowledge the ''moral freedom of the person even in face of the 
commandme,nt of God" (E' III, p.274). 
Hartmann's position amounts to a belief that, from 
an ethical point of view, the fact described in the phrase posse 
pec£.§!e et non peccare makes nonsense of the religious doctrine of 
predestination, or the idea that anything exists which can be 
co-responsible :ror the actions or omissions of man. Hartmann's 
ethics is an ethics of personal responsibility, and it will be 
perfectly correct to maintain that for him the notion of freedom 
amd the notion of responsibility coincide. 
we have already seen that, for him, man is a 
pe:rson, that is a moral being, solely by virtue of the fact "that 
upon him fall gUilt, :esponsibility, merit" (E III, p.20). Between 
guilt and merit. stands responsibility, bu,t 
responsibility implies freed0Jm: if freedom is denied, there can be 
no room for responsibility in life, but then,also,any imputation 
of guilt or assignation of merit to a person would be meaningless. 
Hartmann doe'S not think that the reality o:r the latter phenomena 
can be doubted, however: "The moral consciousness does not confine 
itself to the weighing of actions and dispos.itions; it also, imputes 
the discerned moral qualities to the! person. It not .only judges~ it 
allso· condemns. It metes out guilt and responsibility to the, doer, 
and this without discrimination as to whether it be oneself or 
another p·erson ••• The mora] consciousness turns, incorruptible and 
relentless, against. one 1 s own ego; it permits the ego 1n its sense 
of guilt to renounce itseJ'..f, to consume its.elf in remorse and 
despair. Or it Ie~ads the ego to conversion, to a change of heart, 
and a mo·ral ren.ewal of its own. nature" (E I,pp.l9S,l99). 
Hartmann argues that man cannot shove his 
responsibility on so-called divine causality, and it has a~dy been 
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established that natural causa1ity cannot be f~ly descriptive of 
hUJiD.an behaviour. The person cannot "surrender his special rights 
to the Creatc.r o'r to the wo·rJ.drt (E I, p.o291). :3thics must nrest.ore 
to man what. is man•sn (E I, p.282). In Hartmalll11 s philosophy, 
acco.rding to his own classic expression, Hthe metaphysical heritag~. 
of God falls to man'" (E I, p.282). This, he says, may sound 
blasphemous· to some, but it is at least not pretentious. It is a 
humble view in so far as it does not claim to know what it cannot 
know. As far as we know, he says, man alone is capable of ordering 
the world teleologically, according to a conception of ends. A 
finalistic sCheme is a scheme of consciousness, and according to 
Hartmam we know of no higher consciousness thalrn. man's. Again, 
there may or may not exist such a consciousness - according to 
~artmann, etbics should not quarrel with religion, but it can also 
eXpect of religion not to interfere with .!£! enquiry which can onl~? 
follow the. available evidence. 
However, we should not for get that Hartmann 1 s 
final. criterion for the discernment of the self-existing values, i:s 
the 11Wertgeft1hl11 , which he. himself admits to be completely 
intuitive; indeed, he goO's so far as to call it an emotional act 
( 11der direkte erfassende Akt 1st hier gar kein eigentlicher 
Erkenntnisakt, kein theoretischer Akt, sondern ein emotionaler, eir_ 
Akt ~er Stellungnahme, ein Geftlhlsakt: Wertgef'lUll" (.ME, p.554)). It 
would be a quite legitimate question to ask Hartmann what happens 
if religion claims a similar intuitive grasp of divine being? 
Whereas we ftilly agree with him that ethics should no.t quarrel witb 
religion, it doos not fallow that we can with justice expect relig:Lon 
to adopt the same attitude towards ethics if re·ligion c].afms 
awareness of a higher consciousness than that of man: religion is 
then the more encompassing discipline and can claim that man is: in 
fact teleologically and finalistically dete:rmined from a sphere 
of CO•nsciOUS.l'lleSS above am beyond himself • 
In any case, Hartmann believes that "divine 
providence threatens man in his independence and, when taken 
unconditionally (as. in the theory of predestination) must logically 
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reduce him to nathingn (E III, p.32). He thinks, however, that thi:1 
position has been sUI-passed, and maintains that Spinoza 1 s pantheisr .. 
has secularized the idea of God; God 1 s persono."'. ~n.aracter was lost;. 
God and Nature became indistinguishable. Thus nthe religious 
antinomy between divine and human efficacy" (E III, p.32) was 
Changed into 'the ethical antinom1 between natural necessity and 
human freedom'' (E III, Pe32), am it became rtpossible to discuss 
the ethical pro·blem of freedom" (E III, Po33). 
Hartmann goes on to say that in Kant's third 
antin(D'Jily, the antinomy of freedom, Spinoza's pantheism is 1n its 
turn overcome,, and the problem of freedom is seen in full clarity. 
It is the: problem of the situation of man between the de·terminatio:;_ 
of natural causality and another determination which he senses or 
knows, and~ which invo,lves his person, but which can no longer be 
vested 1n God. As su.ch, it is the p~roblem of man's situation 
between the 11causality of nature" and the "cansaiity of freedom" 7 
to use Kant's. own terminology which H8rtmann himself prefers since~ 
he says, it shows clearly that Kant did not see man as though he 
co)uld be lifted out of the causal nexus, or nature, but that the 
definition of' man's personality its.elf introduces a further causal 
factor into nature, which does not suspend nature's causality (for 
that it cannot do) but is capable of diverting the course of it. 
From inside itself,, philosophy has the.re·fore 
been .f'reed .from "the dictatorial aggression of religious thought" 
(E III, p.261). Hartmann 1 s five antinomies between ethics and 
religion are: intended to ilius tra te how cri tica 1 philosophy has 
secured what be believes to be the mutua]. independence of. two 
exrtirely separate· disciplines. We will name the first three 
antincmdas (1) the antinomy of Man • s Dest.iny, (2) the antinomy of 
Responsibility, (3') the antinomy of the Origin of ValueSJ Hartmann 
himself' names the remainding two antinomies (4) the antinc·my of 
Providence, and (5) the ant1nolll7 of Salvation. 
Ethics Religion 
(1) Ethically, man is directed Religiously~ man is directed 
only towards this world ; towards a wor1d other than this 
-55-
EthicS 
moral conduct is conduct .. 
hare and now, and 
invclvas no expectation 
of rewards "'hereafter" : 
j Religion 
., , world.,. towards a better Beyondo 
"All values wtich are of inherent 
worth lie in the Beyond. The true 
life is another lifett and ttwithin 
"the: tendency itself loses this world only that is good whic£.~ 
its ethical worth as soon tend.s beyond it" (E III, p.263). 
as it casts longing 
glances ~lWards a better 
lot in the Beyond 11 (E III, 
p~.263) 0 
( 2) Ethically, man :f s the sole Religiously, Divinity .is ultima teJy 
arbiter of his lot ; his in sole· commam of life;. the key t.o 
responsibility, his an understanding of ·man is his 
personal integrity, is the re:sponsibilityr to the dictates of 
key to his humanity - God. 
without it he would be, 
nothing: "That anything 
whatsoov:'ar in heaven or .on 
earth, even though it be 
God himself, should take 
\ 
precedence over Man, would 
be ethically perverted; it 
would not be moral" (E !II, 
Po264) • 
(3) Etbicall.y, moral. values must Religiously, moral values are 
exis·t entirely independent commandments. of God. azu.d as such 
of 8l11Y' authori tyr; moral . 
values are axiological 
they have no autonomous existence. 
"It is inherent in the nature· of 
absolutes rumd "no authori tyr God that~ 1n a world which is his 
nor any fiat. of power nor thought and his value, nothing can 
any will - not to mention be o:t value on any other gro,und,. 
man's sanction - stands except that he wiJLls it, that he 
behind. ethical valuesu. connnands it, or that- it 1n some 




(4) Moral freedom means that 
man finds himself' 
c~nfronted on the one 
hamo with moral values 
which· do no-t at all 
determine his choice 
directly, and on the 
other hand with natural 
causality - but the 
latter "is blind, it 
points t<01 no. goals to 
which it binds manit 
(E III, p.267). Man 
aJo..ne is capable~ of 
setting up ends for 
himself, his. teleology 
is not fins: listie, his 
providence not. 
Religion 
·only thus does it ha.ve the power 
of an Ought-to·-:9e 11 (E III, p.265). 
Religiously, freedom is a 
contradiction in terms; its 
possibility is excluded by the 
finalistic determinism involved in 
the will of God: "if we grant 
validity to personal freedom, .it 
inevitably abolishes the finalistic 
determinism of divine providence" 
(E III, p.267), and the converse 
is also truec Nevertheless religior: 
teaches a doctrine of rewards and 
punishments in the Beyond, and 
indeed •tit is pre-eminent.ly 
religion which takes into account 
responsibility, imputability and 
human guilt, as is proved by the 
central position assigned to the 
concept of sin" (E III, p.268). 
predetermined. Moral values The problematics involved in the 
are there, and nature is notion of divine providence are 
there, but moral life "is insoluble. 
like tbe art of the sailor·, 
Who, when there is no wind, 
is himself unable to sail, 
bt!lt. who, when the wind is: 
up, by the mere guiding of 
the sails and rudder can 
give the ship a~ course -
even 1nd1rectl.y against the 
wind" (E I, p.293). 
(5) Ethically, guilt means a Religiously, guilt or sin is an 




responsibility and personal., 
integrity; but the, guilty 
person must not run away from 
his guilt, he must shoulder 
the res.ponsibility, he must 
have a iiWUl-to-Guilt" (E III, 
I 
Po272). Guilt ttlas.ts as long i 
I as the value·s exist. which 
condemn it't (E III, po2?1) , 
but also: ·as long as these 
value!s exist, there exists 
tbe possibility of man's 
·return to responsibility. 
Bo,th guilt: and merit sttrvive 
man. 
Religion 
way to moral advancement", and 
the only way in ·which it can be 
overcome is through "forgivenes!s·'~­
which is dispensed by God as he 
wills. This is salvation and it 
is ttthe W(!}rk of God" (E III, p • 270 ~: . 
These antinomies are insoluble, says Hartmann, 
and any reconciliat-ion between the ethical and the religious 
attitudes must be referred to.a domain beyond that of reason. here 
again Hartmann is seemingly not aware of the inconsequence of his 
position: elsewhere, we have seen, he is prepared to stand on the 
side of irratio·nality and openly defend it; no,t here, however. He 
even cmsiders that evarytime~ one attitude within the antinomy o:f 
attitudes "must necessarlly be: illusory" (E III, p.263) - and it is 
not the ethical attitude~ Yet Hartmann al.so maintains that 
u,antinomies prove nothing against the co-existence of what is 
antinomically divided, even though they should be proved to be 
genuine antinomies, that is, should. be insolubl.e. They only prove 
the inability of thought to comprehend the co-existence" (E III, 
p~.262). 
We feel, however, that we must allow for 
Hartmann what Hartmann allows for Nietzsche when he says that the 
mistakes of a true disco,verer are "quite natural ones" and that it 
is not nearly so important to· thrash them as to taka note of the 
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discovery. And Hartmann's outstanding discovery, even if everyt~inc 
else 1n his account of ontology· and axiology could not be doubted, 
is the tremendous responsibility to which man is committed 1n life(, 
In the whole field of philosophy, we do not 
·lmow a more forceful repres;entat.io·n of human responsibility than 
Hartmann's ethics. If- Hartmann overstates his case, it is an 
overstatement in the right direction. If he anta.gon1zas religion b~' 
suggesting tha:t God must be done' away with if man is to become 
ful.ly- aware, of what he is, then it is perhap~s because a certain 
typ~e of theology has spoilt -us by exaggerating the idea of God 1 s 
·c·o- respons-ibi.lity- for our destiny. 
Especially- to-day we should be able to 
appreciate Hartmann's portrayal of man as a Prom~theus with the 
attribute of foresight in terms· of which "the future belongs to 
him ••• Indeed, to spe~ak exactly, the future is the only thing 
which practically does belong to him. The past stands eternally 
still and is not to be changed. Nor is the present to be changed.oc 
Only that w-hich has no·t yet entered into the present, that which 
is coming to us - for this is the meaning of the wo~rd 11Zuk0nft1g" -
cam be gtt:idad, can be influenced" (E II, p.l48). Perhaps man shoul(. 
also be. happy to be a mere· Prc!Mlletheus 1n Hartmann's sense, capable 
of setting up ends, capable, that is, of teleology in tbe· light of 
values aprioristically discerned, and of directing himself towards 
these en~s, knowing that he· may sttcce~d or fail, but nothing more; 
happy that he is not a god or a Cassandra whose "prophetic vision 
poisons her lifeJ for (whom) the divine gift becomes a curse; (and 
who) envies the happy o·nas who are struck with blindness and can at 
least spend unembittered the short span that still remains to them 11 
(E II, p.l50) • 
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I. The Negation of Absolutes 
When Nie:tzsche proclaims that God is dead, he prepares 
the· .way for the separation of the domains of ethics and religion 
as effect-ed by Hartmann. Nietzsche himself completely denies the 
signiricance of religion and claims that religion is meaningless 
except in so far as it is itself a more or less subtle exp1ression 
of a will to power. We will see how he arrives at this positi,on 
when we C()lnsider his views on how Christendom, or what. he calls 
C h.rist.ianity, came to conquer the Wes.tern world. 
The pronouncement that"God is dead", is most dramatic. 
However, the literary forms in which Nietzsche. clothes his thought; 
should no longermislead us. It should be our task to get behind and 
beyond the mere drama of Nietzsche, to discover his_essential 
meaning. 
When Nietzsche tells us that If God is dead'', what he 
wants us: to believe is not that God has died or has been murdered, 
as he also puts it, but that there has never been a·God, that God 
only- existed 1n the imagination of man. Zarathustra is more 
concerned to teach the SUperman than the death of God: ttThe 
SUperman I have at heart; that is the first and only thing to me" 
(AZ, IV:·73:3),and above everything else this. is his "task", his 
"wo.rk": "·Of What. acco'mlt is IIl1 happiness, tt he says, 1ti have~ long 
cease~ to strive any more· for happiness, I strive :for my worku 
(AZ, IVt61). It is not because "God is dead" that he teaches 
SUperman; he does so,/rathar because, according to him, there has 
never been a God, and because man• s illusion of God has we?kened 
him spiritually and has sapped his nobility. Nietzsche believes 
it to be the nature of a God or an absolute that it pro.strates its 
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believers before it, killing the:tr sense of mastery over their own 
destiny. Nobility, he tells us~ cannot to·lorate absolutes; ignob~e 
spirits., hoYrever, must have absolutes outside themselves since 
they cannot be1ieve in themselves; it all depends on the typ'e of 
man one is and this can. be: ascertained according to one's negation 
or affirmation of absolutes: nsystems of morals are only a 
sign-language of the emotions" (GB, 187). 
What Nietzsche seeks, although he never clearly 
tells. us how such a man must be, is; "a glimpse of a man that 
justifie.s the: existence of man, a glimpse of an incarnate human 
happiness that realises and redeems, fo.r the sake of Which one may 
hold fast to the: belie:f in mantt (GM ,"Cbod and Ev:D!':J2).Su<h aman,oov.9B',watJ.lt1 
not be of the type of 11'slave-morality (which) requires as the 
oond.ition of its.existence an external and objective world, ••• 
objective stimuli to be capable of action at all - (whose) action 
is fundamentally a reaction''(}M, "Gc;;trl am Ev:i.J!':JO), but wouJd 1:e "a harltage of 
the old noble aristocratic morality, .••• (of those who) do not have 
to manufacture their happiness artificially through looking at their.· 
enemies; ••• complete men as they were, exuberant with strengtb'f.(GM,~c._~QCl 
arl EN:il!':JO).,Zarathustra, as harbinger of Superman, is such a tYPe of 
aristocrat which must, ho-wever, not be confused with contemporary 
hereditary aristocracy that "'have become false, draped and 
disguised with the old faded pomp of our ancestors, show-pieces 
for the stupidest, the craftiest, and whosoever at present. 
trafficketh for power" (AZ, IV:63:l.). And Zarathustra would 
maintain his nobility even in the face of a God that lived. It is 
not the· fact that God is dead which prompts him to· be noble;) we 
have just seen that such a man requires no extraneous .stimulus, 
no incentive from outside himself, for action._His rejection of 
absol..utes is the sine qua no:n fo.r his personality or manhood. The 
negation of absolutes, is neithex consequent nor dependent on the 
so-called de,ath of God. It is not a natural co,rollary of it. 
We: may safely suggest that if Nietzsche's 
philosophy had not been largely a reaction to his time, of the 
very kind which he despises (in Jesus, for instance) as the 
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"s]ave-morallty" of 11 resentment"(GM, 'tb::d and Evil!': 10), h3 ouSbt to have ddnr 
witho~ut tha idea of the death of God. There can be little: doubt 
that this idea, and the way in which Nietzsche framed it, was 
intended above all as a hurt to am soorn for those who call themselveE: 
Christ.ians - for desp.ite the "Antt ... Ohristn in Nietzsche, he often 
wavers in his judgement of Jesus, even calling him nnobletta !.tHe 
(Jesus) died too early," Nietzsche maintains, "he himself would 
have disavowed his doctrine. had he attained to my age1 Noble 
enough was. he to disavowt tt (AZ, I:21); and once he even seas a 
Nietzschean approach in Jesus 1 way o·f loving God, the way in which 
the law was: o·vercome: ''Jesus said to his Jews: "The law- was for 
servants; - lo·ve God as I lo,ve him, as his Son1 What have we Sons 
of God to do with moralstu" (GB, 164). 
It is therefore clear that Nietzsche's call 
for nob:Uity, his desire for the ttelevation of the type ttman" 11 
(GB, 257), . wo,uld be. sustained even if, according to him, God had 
not died. He is in any case explicit about the· fact that man must 
negate all absolute·s even to their face. It is the negation of 
absolutes which. mflrks a man as capable of nobility. It is the 
negation of abso~lutes. wh;ich stamps a man as strong enough to 
herald the Superman. 
The importance of pointing this out becomes 
manifest when we find even Jaspers writing that t'Die umwertenden 
Grundgedanken Nietzsches sche:!nen ibm aus eine.r einzigen Quelle 
zu fliessen: ·Der Umsturz aller bisherigen gUltigen Werte ist das 
ErgebnisXdessen, da.ss Gott tot ist. Infolgedesse:nXist ail.es 
scheinhaft geworden, was einmal Glaubensinhalt war ••• n (Karl 
Jaspers, Nietzsche, p.379).We have shown, however, that we find 
this view untenable and suggest that it would only be correct and 
1n keeping with the whole of Nietzsche's philosophy, to sa:yr that 
in it. God's death is not the cause of the overthrow of all 
hitherto existing values; God's death and the transveluation of all 
val.ues fal.l together. Nietzsche's position is the re-sult of a 
deliberate cho)ice, o·:f an express will (although, as we shall see, 
he himself would not put it so) - he wilfully takes his stand Qn 
x ttErgebnis" and 11 Infolgedessen11 ha.ve been underlined by us. 
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the side of the~ negation of absolutes; it is not a position he 
arrives at because of sotnething that happened, because God had 
died (however one may· understand the latter). That God is dead 
is a purposive declaration of Niet.zsche to call attention to the 
fact that he considers himself to· have shattered all fixed 
standards· according to which man had hithe:r.to been evaluated, ever: 
that which have, been most firmly established, even the Christian 
God - for that this most important of past Gods that Nietzsche 
proclaims to be dead, is the Christian God, is clear: UHe was a 
hidden God, full of secrecyo Verily, he did not come by his son 
otherwise than by secret ways. At the door of his faith standeth 
adultery" (AZ, IV~66) • 
"God is dead 11 - this is how Nietzsche expresses 
his wilful resentment of Christendom, or what he: calls 
"Christo-European morality" (GE~ 203). Jaspers himself writes lat~r 
on 1n the passage from which we have already quoted: "Der Tod 
Gottes 1st .fQr Nietzsche nicht nur eine furchtbare Tatsache, 
sondern Nietzsche hat den Will.en zur Gottlosigkeit. Weil er die 
m8.gliche: Hohe des Menschseins, das allein wahrhaft wirklich sein 
kann, sucht, entfaltet er in seinem Denken den Willen zur reinen 
Diesseitigkeit" (Karl Jaepers7o Nietzsche, p.380). But for Nietzsc)).E-. 
this will to godle·ssnes.s is ce,rtainly not the· outcome of the death 
of God, and when we mention the Die:sseitigkeit of his thought we 
mus·t again remember that it also is preceded by Nie:tzsche' s 
negation of absolutes. Here we need only say how thoroughly 
Nietzsche was impress·ed by the Diosseitigkeit of ancient Greece 
and Ro,me, and ye·t there is only one philosopher of whom he sp·eaks 
with almost unqualified approval, the one "in whose presence, in 
general, I felt warmer and more at ease than anywhere else. The 
ye·a-saying to the flux and destruction of all things, the decisive 
element, in any Dionysian philosophy; the yea-saying to contradiet:ion 
and strife, the idea of Becoming, together with the radical 
rejection even of the concept Being - these: things, at all events, 
force me to, recognize him who has hitherto had the closest affinity 
to my thought": Heraclitus (EH, "The Birth of Tragedy11 :3). 
It is clear that the Heraclitic aspect or motion, 
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which .is much more than m~re Diesseitoigkeit (so that we question 
Jaspers' interpretation of the latteT 'as Nietzsche's concern 
ttnicht um einen Grundgedanken unter anderen, sondern um einen 
beherrschenden Antrieb, dem alle seine Grundgedanken dienen, 
gleichsam um den Grundgedanken dar G>rundgedanken" (Karl Jaspers, 
Nietzsche, p.380) ), is fundamental to: Nietzsche 1 s thought, and full~,· 
, I 
co.incides with the negation of absolutes. Nietzsche 1 s philosophy 
is Diesseitig, it does pro·claim the death of a Jenseits-ruler, it 
does exhort man to "re·ma1n ·true to the earth", and even calls for 
a belief in the ete~rnai recurrence of life - but all these 
requirements of man. wo.:uld prove to. be meaningless if Nietzsche did 
not posit his ideal of Superman and of no.bili ty. But immediately 
the idea·l of Superman is posited, Nietzsche's philosophy is one of 
Becoming, is Heraclitic and supra-moral in so far as no morality 
can correspond to man as long as man must be. "'a rope stretched 
between the animal and the Superman - a rope over an abyss" 
{AZ, Zarathustra 1 s Prologue:4), as long as men must be ''fathers ane. 
fC)'i'efathers of the Sup·erman 11 (AZ, IIa24) J for so long will they 
have, to overcome every morality and every error on the' way to~ the 
truth of SUperman, for so long they cannot be in any morality and 
must be living a supra-moral. life· of Becoming - that is, for so 
long must they nega-te all absolutes. "Man is something that must be 
surpassed - man is a bridge and not a goal" (AZ, IIIz56~3) ·-
therefore, also, every morality of man must be surpassed and none 
must be. allowed to claim our attachment to it. 
It is in this sense that Nietzsche exto1s error 
as the groundstuff of progress • Truth is not yet our po,ssession. 
Neither shoul.d we make error our possession. Y-et error persists. 
Error is the condition of contemporary man, a condition whicn, as 
we know, must· be overcome. Every morality and every belief at 
present is therefore ·an error to be overcome.- NietzsChe·· or.· 
Zarathustre who, announces Super~an must therefore think in 
supra-mo,ral terms, in terms of Becoming. Their philosophy is 





Here a questio.n ,arise's as to whether, in Nietzsche~~, 
·view, a stage wo:uld, or rather should, ever be reached when the 
Nie·tzsche,an man will be able to say: Superman has indeed arrived, 
the Truth now dwells among us, now we must believe in QY!: Absolute), 
now we also must be moralo It seems as if Nie!tzsche wa.s fully awar( 
o·f this weaknes:s in his position against abso].utes; his doctrine of 
Eternal Recurrence may even be a conscious attempt to co;unter the 
·accusation that Superman himself is but another absolute. Nietzsche:· 
prono~cements on Eternal Recurrence, however, leave· us ~ith no 
ultimate clarity- about its meanirig: ttEverything goet.h, eve.rything 
returneth, n he says, tt.eternally ro,lleth the wheel of existence •. 
Everything dieth, everything blossometh forth again; eternally 
runneth on the year of existence. Eve-rything breaketh, everything if:; 
integrated anew; eternally buildeth itself the same: house of 
existence. All things separate, all things again greet one anothert 
eternally true to itself rema:ineth the ring of existence. Every 
moment beginneth existence, arotmd everry 'Here' rolleth the ball 
1The,re•. The middle is; everywhere. Crooked is the path to 
etern1ty11 (AZ, III:57:2); and, he maintains:, 11 ! C@Ille again 
e:terca.l1y to this identical and sell-same life, in its greatest. 
and its smallest, to teach again the eternal return of all things,-
to speak again the wo,rd of the great noontide of earth and man,· 
to, announce again to man the Superman" (AZ, III:57:2). 
But how would Nietzsche "come again''·? In the 
flesh, as a living man? Or iil his work, the: lasting content of 
his written message:? Presumably the latter - "Souls are as mortal 
as bodies,'" he writes, 11but the plexus of causes returneth in 
which I am intertwined - it will a.ga•in create me'" (AZ, III:57:2). 
At no time does Nietzsche therefore seem to 
envisage the: actual advent of Superman; Superman will only be 
announced eternaTl.y. It is significant to note that Zarathustra is 
not pictured as Superman; he expressly states: "Never yet hath there 
been a Superman" (Az, II:26). Nietzsche suggests that SUperman will 
never be arrived at, but ther~ will be higher men, men Of the type 
of Zarathustra, noble men: whose struggle against 11 the petty virtues.; 
the petty policy, the: sand~grain consideratenos.s, the ant-hill 
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trumpe try, the pitiable. comfor ta blene's s, 'ths "happiness of the 
greates·t number"" (AZ, IV:73:3) will be endless and even ever more 
difficul.t, so that "always more, aJl.ways. better ones of_ your tYPe 
sha-ll succumb, - for ye shall' always have· it wo-rse and herder" 
(AZ, IV:73:6). In this same passage we find one of Nietzsche's 
mco·st moving tes:timonies to the meaning of the supra-moral life of 
Becoming, to: the meaning of "sup-ra-moral" and -of ttBecomingu for 
man: "I love you,'' he writes, ttbecause ye know not to-day how to 
live, ye higher ment For thus do ye live - best.l'' (AZ, IV:73:3). 
Thus a Nietzschean absolute will never be 
arrived at, and so Nietzsche, tries to: pass beyond the dangerous 
rock~ o.f morality - dangercms, since for h~ morality is merely 
another name for a belief in absolutes. The status of SUperman, 
·then, is never achieved; but we cannot agree, with c. Brinton fo.r 
insta-nce (although he) speaks scornfully) that, because of this, 
''the Superman is not quite Nie\tzsche 1 s highest flight. There is 
yet the Eterna.Jl. Recurrence ••• '' (C. Brinton, Nietzsche, p.l39). The 
Superman is necessarily Nietzsche,, s 'highest flighttt in the same 
way that "man" (which, for Nietzsche, has r~,ally be·come a- name of / 
derision for the hollowness of his time, a term for his reaction 
to it") is the lowest point that he has to look down upon. The span 
of the chasm between these two is essential to Becoming, and these 
two are essential to the span of the chasm between themt The 
do,ctrine: o,f Eternal Recurrence cannot do without the idea of 
Superman as Nietzsche's "highest-. flight-". Rather diO'.es Eternal 
Recurrence repre·sent Nietzsche 1 s retreat from that rthighest flight" 
because he, realised what would be involved if a landing had been 
insisted upo,n. Morality would have been unavoidable. The negation 
of absolutes would have~ turned empty and meaningless. Brinton 
maintains that ''Nietzsche's concept of Eternal Recurren.ce is an 
unrefined mixture o.f oriental specu:tation on metempsychosis, old 
European striving for a metaphysical absolute, and. misunderstood 
theoretical physics of the late nineteen'th century ••• " (C. Brinton, 
Nietzsche, pe140). This may· or may not be soo Here we wo1uld like. 
teo propose,. however, the probability tha't Nietzsche introduced 
Eternal. Recurrence in order to save his all-important negation of 
I 
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absolutes as the .·central achievement of his p;hilosophy. What would 
nbeyond Good and Eviln.otherwise have meant? If Nietzsche had 
de.fined s;uperman, if he had known exactly what Supermarr· would be 
like, if he: had posited Superman as an absolute, the;re wmuld have 
been neither ground for, nor sense in his ttstartling assertion", 
as Hartmann calls it, "that we hav>e neve!r yet known what good and 
' evil are'' (E I, po15); it would have been pointless for him to. 
maintain. that God, and all the gods~ were dead; and, above al.l, he 
could not have been true. to, the idea of Becoming and a sUpra-moral 
attitude towards life. "When the water hath planks,n. writes 
Nietzsche, ttt'lhan gangways and railings o'erspan the. stream, verily:.t 
he is not believed who then saith: "All is in fl~' But even 
sirnple:tons contradict himo "What?''; say the simpleton~, rtall in 
fl~? Planks and railings are still over tho streamt OVer the 
stream all is stable, all the values of things, the bridges and 
bearings, all 1 good' and 'evil 1 : these are all stablet rt - Cometh, 
. . 
however, the hard winter, the stream-tamer, then learn even the 
w1tti~st distrust, and vexily, not only the simpletons then say: 
"Shou]d not everything - stand still?" "Fundamentally standeth 
everything still" - that is arr appropriat-e winter doctrine, good 
cheer foil' an unp·roductive period, a great oo.mfort for -
winter-sleepers. and fireside-lo·ungers. 11Funda.rnentally· standeth 
everything still" -: but contrary there~to, ,preacheth the thawing 
wind~ The thawing wind, a bnllo,ck, which is no ploughing bullock -
a furious bullock~ a destroyer, which with angry horns break~th 
the ice i The: .ice: however ~ breaketh gangways.1 0 my brethern, is 
not everything at present in flux? l:Iave not all railings and 
gan-gways fallen into the wate:r? Who would still hold on to "good" 
and 11·evi111?n (AZ, III:56:8). 
This is Nie~tzsche' s test-imony in support of his 
Ephesian model• He consistently reEia.ins true to Heraclitus .• 
2. Nietzsche's New Earth of Creation 
Ju.st as Nietzsche's poetic and reactionary 
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prono:uncement that God is dead has been much misused and drawn out 
of persp;ect.ive, so also his doctrine of the Will to Power - so 
much so that scumeone. like Bertrand Russell finds. it possible to 
maintain with a supe-rficiality which borders on irresponsibility 
that: ttKing Lear, on the verge of madness, says: 'I will do such 
things: - What they are: ye~t. I lmow :.to1t - but they shal.l be the 
terror of the earth.' This is Nietzsche's philosophy in a nutshell1t 
(Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy:, po795) • 
But Nietzsche • s Will to Power is esse.ntially a 
Will ta> c.reation, a w.Ul to bring into being ever higher and highe:;; 
va]ues. This, however, implies the willingness and the necessity tc 
destroy· the; old or lower ones which have been sanct:fo:ned and 
hallowed by tradition and which have, become entrenched in man's 
self-<OmpJacence: "He who would be a creator in good and evil must first 
be a destroyer, and break values into pieces. Thus the greatest 
evil belo:ngeth unto the greatest good; but this; is the creative 
go.o.d" (EH, Wh.y: I Am A Fatality:2) • 
What is it that Nietzsche wants to destroy? 
What is· it that he wants to create? 
We have considered Nietzsche t s negation of , 
absolutes. He wants to destroy all absolutes, even, as we have 
seen, the idea that Superman is an absolute. He vrants, for instance;. 
to destroy the: absolute of politics, the state, which he calls 
"the new idol" (AZs I:ll), with all its hUman tools, the types 
that "vomit their bile and call it a newspaper. They devourone 
another, and cannot even digest. themselveso Just· see these 
stl!perfJI,~ous ones~ WHalth they acquire and become poorer thereby. 
Power they· seek for, and above all, the lever of power, :much 
money - these impotent onesl See them clamber, these nimble apesl 
They clamber over m1e another, amx:l thus scuffle into the mud and 
the abyss. Towards the throne they all strive: it is their madness 
- as if happiness sat on the throne1 Ofttimes sitteth filth on the 
throne· - and ofttimes also the throne on filth" (AZ, I:ll); he 
wants to destroy· commercialism which drowns every voice calling for 
an evaluation of men by means of a higher val.ue: "There is 
everything misheard. If one announce one's wisdom with bells'; the 
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h k t 1 W.l..ll out- J. ing"T:e it with permie s 
11 
shopmen in t e mar e -P ace ..L: 
\ 
(AZ, III:53); he derides sickly patriotism, the idolatry of the 
fatherland which tries to conceal spiritual barrenness, and does 
so badly: "All the swarming virtue of the "cu1t11red", that. - feast 
on the sweat of every hero~" (AZ, III:56:18); ~d. he wishes his 
disciples to lmow: "Exiles. shall ye be from al:l fatherlands and 
/ 
fore.fatherlandst o o o Unto your children shall yre make amends for: 
being the children of your fathers" (AZ, III:56:12); he hates all 
sa~p:ta:enm and hypocrisy and decries a degenerate h~reditary 
. aristocracy as well as that. "crude and boorish instib.ttion" 
(GM, "Good and Evil11 :9) of Christendom, the Church: "This counsel 
do I co,unsel to: kin~s and churches, and to all that is weak with 
age and virtue- let. yourselves be o'erthrownt That ye may again 
co,me to life, and that virtue - may come· to you~" (AZ, !!:40); he 
distrusts demo-cracy as the social dominance of what he calls the 
"power-rabble'' (AZ, II:28); he has no time for faint-spiritedness, 
for the ttobsequious, doggish one=, who immediately lieth on his 
back, the submissive one; and there is also wisdom that is 
submis$ive, and doggish, and pious, and obsequious 11 (AZ, III:54:2)1'; 
In shnrt, Nietzsche. opposes himself to all those who, in one way- or 
another, nwith their v1rt.ues want to scratch out the eyes of their 
enemiesu. (AZ, !!:2'7). 
Abo;Ve all, he wants Christendom, and even 
Christianity, to be, destroyed. In tracing his reasons for this, we 
shall also see more closely what he wants; man to become. 
Niet.zsche', Jesus and the Will to Power: Christianity·, Nietzsche 
tells us, was born out o.f the Jews' resentment of the domihance o:f 
the, Imperium Romanum - the Jews, a priestly people with the sharpest 
moral instinct history can show, the Romans, a worldly people, th~r 
most remarkable of all time, fCJ>r their suprf.l'.-moral virility·. Jesus 
was born into this .Jewish hatred which, acco·rding to Nietzsche, was 
the mos:t. pro,found and mos.t cleverly-.directed hatred the world· has 
ever seen. Israe'l hated becau-se she was the very antithesis of Rome? 
a people who "'for the first time co:J,.ned the word "wo:rJLd" as a term 
o.f reproachn (GB~ 195). This a]so is creation, in which, indeed, 
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genius is hidden, btll.t it is creation as a force activated by 
resentment, and therefore inspired frem outside, a virtue with 
which the Jews wanted tt:to scratch out the eyes of their enemiesn; 
it is not Nietzschets idea of creation. Judaism was an. invention 
of the experience of Jewish weakness against Rome who, because it 
was n(l))t weak, could be to.lera:nt, exercising lli virtue which was 
entirely and spontaneously gen-erated insicre itself" ... the strength 
of the· Romans: was that of true aristocrats and was in no way 
reactionary, Nietzsche tells us. The Romans lived true, to the 
"aristocratic equation (good a aristocratic = beautiful. : happy = 
loved by the gods)" (GM, ''Good and Evil":?), the equation of the 
ttaristocrat' s system of values: it acts and grows spontaneously, it 
merely seeks. it~ antithesis in order' to pronounce a more grateful. 
and exultant "iesn to, its o\Jn self; - its negative conception, 
"low", ."WJlgarn, ttbad", is merely a pale late-born foil in 
comparison with its. positive and fundament.al conception (saturated 
as it is with\ life, and passion), of "we aristocrats, we good ones, 
\ . 
we beautiful ones, we happy ones 11 " ( GM, "Good. and Evil'' : 10) • 
This is how we must' understand Nietzschats 
Will to Power, name-ly that for the weak it is a forward desil:'e in 
time, and its consummation, power itsel!.f, lies in the futureo Grudge. 
is a'lt the root c:t>f this po·wer. Therefore it is the type of power 
that co:rrupts. For the' strong, however, the Will to Power means 
something entirely different. They have· not become strong, at least 
net by means of a grudge, and they d~ not ·strive fo·r power. They 
~ strong. The gods, chance, fate, have conspired that they should 
be strong at the very moment of their emergence in history or timeo 
Will to Power therefore means to, them a Will to the Present, not to 
the· future or to the past, and amor fati pertains to them: ''My 
formula for greatness in a man is amor fati: that a man should wish 
to' have no·thing altered, either in the future, the past, or f('Jlr all 
eternity" (EH, Why I Aln So Clever:lO). This is also what Nietzsche 
means when he says "This moment draweth all coming things after it"' 
(AZ, III:46:2), the) idea being that no,thing else can be origi.Dal 
except such strength or power; all else can be merely reaction to 
it. Such power will. therefore always' be fo;und back in life and, 
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as such, there is· eternalL recurrence; it is the power of ffthe soul 
which hath the longest ladder, and can go deepest down: hO>W could 
there fail t~ be most parasites upon it? 11 (AZ, III:56:19). This is: 
the powe:r of Nietzsche's idea of creation and it clearly is not 
simply po·wer for power's sake, but a definite and distinctive orde:c-
of power. It is power of the ty-pe· that, in Nietzsche's opinion, 
does not corrupt. Unless we understand this, we cannot und.erstand 
the meaning of Nietzsche 1 s Will to ·Power. In this case the powerful 
have no desire to· maintain their power indefinitely and at all 
costs~/ It is, indeed, inhe,rent in their power that they will 
succumb without a grUdge! when time calls for such a "going under" ~· 
their greatness can in any case never be annihilated and remains 
procreative. Nietzsche says of his man of powerz "I love him who 
seeketh to· create· beyond himself, and thus succumbeth"' (AZ, I: 17). 
Thus on:ty can the Will to Power be supra·-moral and a matter of 
Be.ccrming; thus only can it he true> to· Nietzsche's negation of 
abso·lutes. It must be emphasized that the negation o:f absolutes is 
also at the bottom of the Will to Power, for as soon as power 
becomes absolute, that is, as soon as it becomes a god, Procreatior 
and Becoming cease. 
It was this Graeco-Roman negation of absolutes 
and the strength with which it laughed at them, that the Jews hatec 
and on which they would revenge.· themselves; with fateful ingenuity 
they invented a doctririe of love· am· a promise of salvation, 
reversing the "arist-ocratic equation" so that men had· now to 
understand: "The wretched are alone the· good; the poor, the. weak,, 
I 
the lowly, are alone the' good; the suffering, the needy, the sick~ 
the l.oathsome, are the only ones who are pious, the only ones who 
are. blessed, for them alone is salvation - but you, on the other 
hand, you aristocrats, y~u morrof·power, you are to a]l eternity 
the, e:Vi1, the ho.rribl.e, the C<J1Vetous, the insatiate, the god1ess: 
e-fernal.ly· also; shall· you be unblessed, the cursed, the damned~" 
(GM, 11 Gc;lod and Evil" :7). This philosophy triumphed over Rome_,. This 
"slave-insurrection in morals," as Nietzsche cal.ls it, suacaeded. 
But how? - by "that stroke of genius called Christianity" (GM, 
"Guilt, 11 "Bad Cons.ci.en ce" : 21) • 
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At this point Nietzsche proposes an idea with whic!.; 
his cap1a,city to exagger·ate perhaps reaches deeper into grotesquene~,, 
than at any stage of his thought. He pretends that the Jews 
possessed a sort of sup:er .... intelligence, an uncanny psychological 
far-sightedness that could pierce through history so that the:y 
could get, their own back on their enemies fo:r: al.l time - ublack 
magicn, Nietzsche ca·lls it. His hypothesis is thatr the Jews used 
Je.gus as their tool, in cold~ blood and clearly conscious thatt 
nothing could furth~ the caUsG of their revenge more than tOJ kill 
this Jes.us, creating the impression that he was the martyr of 
<:''pposition to them, whereas in fact they· knew that his teechiiJ.g was 
the: verY' consummation of their own ideals - as such they were· 
throMing him out as a bait to all generations of .their enemies. The; 
Jews, therefore, prepared the mUrder of ·Jesus as the grandest. ruse 
fOT adversaries that history has produced, and, claims Nietzsche, 
they have succ·eeded 1n confusing all ages to such an extent that 
they were still succeeding up to, his timeo He, ho~ver, has now \ 
"unmas),{e!d Christian morality" (EH, Why I Am A Fatality:?), he has 
' . ~ 
seen through the "black magic of a really great policy of revenge 11 
(GM, 11 Good and E:v'iltt:8) o 
Nietzsche·, as Anti-Christ, would like us to 
. 
consider what Sp1irituai effort and courage really is involved in 
this breakthrough in the philosophy of values, by taking note of 
the fact that it was the hyPno·tic profundity o:f the Orient against. 
which he had to· lay his axe: "It was the Orient, the profound 
Orient, 1 t was the Ori.ental slave who thus took revenge on Rome 
and its noble, light-minded toleration" ( GB, 46). And the 
profundity is borne out by the fact that Judea not only conquered 
Rome once, at one historic time; their fight was not a mere]y 
loca.lized o·ne, it is the primary antagonism in history and, indeed~ 
in li.fe; the great revival of aristocratic anti!lUityr, the 
Renaiss:ance, was once again revenged by Christendom io· the 
Reformation, a fact for which Nietzsche cannot forgive the Germans; 
and what remained of political_ aristocracy was shattered by·.the 
French Revolution of freedom, equality and brotherhood; yet again 
the struggle of Judea versus Rome was pinpointed in the peTson of 
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Napo,leon whom Nie,tzsche calls "the most unique and violent . 
anachronism that ever existe:d, and in him the-! incarnate problem 
of the, aristocratic ideal in itself - consider well what a problem 
it is.:- Napoleon, that synthesis of Monster and Superman" (GM~ 
ttGood and Evil": 16). Claiming., therefore, that he was the ffrst 
psychologist capable of handling Christianity, Nietzsche maintains 
that he has uncovered the ancient lie of the Jews which extended 
and branched dovm into every· field or co~ntemporary life. 
The Will to Power consequently rescolves itself 
into the eternal. antithesis of Judea-Rome, an. antinomy between a 
Will to· the Future and a Will to the Present which has no solution§ 
no· synthes.is or reconciliation is possible since this would absolve 
life of it.s very meaning, which is Becoming. In the last:. resort, 
therefore, Nietzsche do·es not desire a solution. 
The; Historical Nece~ssity of Judaic Vai.ues: Hans Vaihinger has made 
a special no~te1 of his be·lief that Nietzsche would probably not .havs 
freed himself so radically fro·m all tradition if it had not been f{l,::'· 
his s~journ in southern Europe where, as he puts it, lif9l pulsates 
differently than in the no~rth and where memories of ancient Greece~. 
the Imperitml Romanum and the: Renaissance are' vividly alive ( nErst i: .. _1 
S6den 1st Nietzsche zur vo.llendeten Zuspitzung seiner Lehre gelangt ,. 
Ich g:ta:ube nicht, dass er in unserem Norden dahin gekornmen vd.ire, 
sich von allen Traditione.n so vollst~ndig loszureissen. Dort 
pulsiert das Leben ganz anders in den Menschen tmd in der Natur. 
Do·rt sind andere Farben, andere Formen. Dort sind die Gegensatze 
greller, dort ist der Uh~rgang zwi.schen dem bliihenden Leben Wld den 
Schrecken des Todes schroffer. Dort., wo die Spuren der Antike noch 
mannigfach hervortre.ten, ist die Erihnerung an das Imperium RomanUE~ 
ja an die gri6'chische Zeit tmd die grie:chischen Tempel noch leberidi~.· 
Ebenso aber auch die Erinnerung an die Renaissance urid ihre 
Gewaltmensche:rrn vall Leben und Kraft" (Hans Va:Lhinger, Nietzs.che als. 
Ph1lo:so,ph, pp • 7, 8) ) • 
It may now be asked why Nietzsche insists on 
the necessity fo:r an ·antithesis to this Graeco-Roman ideal in 
history. Is it no·t enough that Nietzsche's nobility should be 
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non-absolute and that their stature, their type, should be fixed 
as the goal and criterion for man's achievement? Why should th~ 
idea of a ne:cessary maintainan-~e in time of an opposite, absolute 
type be held alongside the thought that it is precisely such typ~s 
which are to: be~ destroyed? 
Essentially, however, this is no·t a contradiction 
in Nietzsche's philosophy; on the contrary, it is the only possible 
logi.c for a Heraclltic thinker fa·r whom Becoming is only p9ssible jf 
o.ppos.ites remain. Now Nietzsche's ideal for man, as: we have seen, J.~ 
S~erman; nCOlt being Superman, but be,coming Superman, that is, livbg 
the: supra-moral life~ living life without absolutes. And yet,. sine~:· 
an oppo.si te is necessary fo~r SU'ch living, the logic of the Heraclit.fc 
position require~s an absolute within the totality of life. It is 
for this reason also that we maintain that the type of Nietzsche's 
no:bility, "c<rHn.plete men as they were" (GM, rtQood and Evil't:lO), 
whose existence is supposed to be, motivated entirely spontaneo,usly 
from within themselves without any refe:rence at all to extraneous 
factors which could spark off the~ir behaviour as reactionary, is 
impossibl.e - logically within the framework of his thought., as we 
have just expla~ined, and perhap·:S also' psychologically - a1though ir.~ 
the latter case it is·better not to: generalize. It is impossible 
because HeracJl.itic tension between opposites is a mutual. affair ant: 
in the Heraclitic scheme movement or action acaounts also for 
reaction, and Nietzsche's philosophy itseli' cannot avoid being 
reacticmary, wha·tever he himse].f wants us to believe. 
If we ask fn·what Nietzsche's reaction 
fundamentally consists, there· can be only one reply, namely tha~ it 
is a reactio'n against spiritual miserliness. Janko Lavrin quotes 
from a letter of Nietzsche's where he writes: 11~There have been 
evil enou,gh and slanderous hints with regard to me - but how is 1 t. 
that no one feels insu1ted when I am abused? And during all these 
years no comfort, not a drop of human ·sympathy, not a breath of 
loven,. and remarks that "The last sentence is particularly poignant .. 
It sounds like the cry of an isolated :IDdividual whose secret cravinS. 
was not one: for power, bu:t for ordinary human warmth and sympathy" 
(Janko Lavrin, Nietzsche, pp.86,87); but it is more than tha1t, it 
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is res:entment, and if this: becomes clear enough in his books, it 
becomes transparent· 1n his letters: "The Nietzsche of the letters 
\ 
is the man who abal!lldoned the ruggedness of his mountain cave to 
seek, yes, frantically crave; the~ least stirrings of kindness, who 
may even be content with decency and plain courtesyu (Karl F. 
Leidecker, Nietzsche: Unpublished Letters, pp.l~2). 
The. Bestowing Virtue: It is Hartmann's merit that he recogn1zas 
that. Nietzsche was the first ·oo attempt a definition of Radiant or 
Bes.toMing Virtue (ttschenkende T·ugend") (E II~ p.333), which we 
suggest is the: central theme o,f Nietzsche's views on the noble or 
the good; more than thisc we believe it to be the crown of 
Niet:zsche t s teaching f~,r man to be "true to the earthn (AZ, 
Zarathustra' s Prologue::3), to' "love the earth as creators, as 
procreators" (AZ, II:3?) ·and, as such, Nietzsche t s major Apolline 
or (if we must speak po:pularly) constructive contribution to 
ethical rese:arch. Since, however, it is. rooted in and grows from 
Nietzsche's criticism which, as we now realj z·~, is the very 
ground-stufr of his concern, we do not hesitate to maintain that 
Nie,tzsche,' s entire wealth of ideas meet together in his thoughts 
on Bestowing Virtue, the latter being the most positive fruit of 
his philosophy, and a true.ly great c'mception as we shall see. 
At this stage it should be clear what Nietzsche 
means when he pleads f0>r man 1 s "flown-away vir.tue" to be led. "back 
t€ll the earth - yea, back to body and lii'e: that it may give to the 
e.ar-th its meaning, a human meaning" (AZ~ I 122:2). We have been 
stre.ssing the fact that this, is more than the mere opposition of a 
Grae:co:-Roman Diesseitigkeit to the Judaoo.'-Christian Jenseitigkei t; 
that it is, above all, the; opposition of a non-absolute attitude 
towards life to an. absolute one~ Nietzsche's idea is that wherever 
men have so.ught their ideals .outside themselves, they have lacked 
inner nobility and fell into! absolutism by way of reinforcing their 
-spiritual mediocrity-with an illusory strength coming from nbeyond" 
themselves. For Nietzsche, howeveT, the oody·, a.s the visible symbol 
of man's existence on earth and therefore of Diesseitigkeit and the 
negatio.n o:f absolutes, represents the· full range of man's ability. 
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To be tr.ue to the e~arth means to be true to that. ability. The 
richne!SS and beauty of human experience, the joy of tolerance and 
reasonab:llene;gs, the e-levation of the spirit beyond the desire for 
"small victories" (AZ, IIl:56:30) of hatred and revenge, rumd 
' 
·thankfulness towards life for experiencing it as something full 
·and whole, as a super-abundance amid which spiritual pettiness 
become!S tmnecessary ·since there is nothing lacking, so that we 
also continuously want to be: giving to lif'e in ret.urn, and giving 
gratuitously - this is what Nietzsche does not want to sacrifice . 
tcr absolutism in which, he claims, duty,. responsibility and life 
have! been rationalized. and have be.come terrors and requisitions or::. 
man from outside himself for which existence is made the torture 
stake~ and testing ground. The! position becomes worse when men turJ1?;: 
hypocrites even to their own absolutes, a condition which 
Nietzsche undo.ubtedly finds to bH general in Christendo~m. He call?· 
Pascal (rtwhom I almost. love because he taught. me a tremendous lot") 
the only logical Christian (KarlE Ia:iOOcker, Ni;}tzsche: Unpl.tQl.iS'lail.ettErs,pJqS~ 
and Georg Brandes, of course, wante,d to bring lq.erkegaard to 
his attention. 
However, Nietzsche~ opposes himself to 
rationalism, saying that he loves the man whose "head (is) only 
the bowels of his heart" (AZ, Zarathustra t s Prologue:4). lie; 
considers that rationaliso is dangerous; to our .exp·erience of the 
fullness of life because it must lead tOJ abso)lut:ism, even .if only 
that o,f "reason" its·elf; he saw that even Kant. could not avo,id 
metaphysical absolutism and laughs at the categorical imperative; 
he censuxes: dialectical Socratism fo.r negating the Gre·ek instinct 
to grasp intuitive:ly the plenitude: of existence • .Socrates, he tells 
us 11 was at first a rationalist who ridiculed "the akward incapacity 
O·f the noble: Athenians who were men of instinct, like all noble 
men~ and could never give satisfactory answers concerning the 
motives o:f their actions" ·(GB~ 191); later on, however, Socrates 
was a dishonest rationalist Who found in hiniself ''the same 
difficulty and incapacity-" (GB 11 191), but wanted to: ap:alogize for 
it With good reasons:. To this extent. Socrates was false, since 
he "perceived the irrational! ty in the moral judgment11 ( GB, 191). 
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Descartes, ho)wever, ·was .the real ttfa ther of rationalism, and 
consequently the. grandfather of the Revolutiontt: llf'i)escart-es was 
supe:rficia]n (GB, 191) o 
Nietzsche's objection to rationalism has its 
roots in the fact that the rational attitude desires explanations 
in life, that it seeks causes, also of valuational phenoEena, 
beyond their mere ontological appearance; and explanation implies 
a concern over method. Nietzsche, however, finds that methodology· 
is a presunptuous and necessarily superficial mode of approach, 
whether it be to the individua:t person ("'the only thing I have 
always· suffered from is 11multituden, the infinite variety of my 
own soUl" (EH, Why I Am So Clever:lO)), or to life as a: whole., 
"a worlld so overflowing with be,auty, strangeness·, doubt, terror 
and divinity" (EH, .Tb)Js· Spake Zarathustra :2). Nietzsche does not 
want us to think that the body, or sensuaJl.ism as the discipline 
most akin to the body, is a heuristic principle: t~Sensualism is not 
a heuristic principle'" (GB, 15). In this· sense he want.s us ·rtto, vievr 
science through the eyes of the artist and art through the, eyes off. 
life" (EH, An Attempt At Self-Criti.cisn:2). He claims that even 
physics is in no way an explanatory discipline, cmd blames 
empiricism as due to rtfundamentally plebeiam.: ta.stes't ( GB, 14). 
Life: is infinitely richer than method can make. 
us realize, and since Nietzsche de-sires man. to have an awareness 
C>'f nothing less than this full richness, he rejects method 
completelyo Fo,r him philosophy is not a rna tter of specialization -
specialization impoverishes our experience of the world since it is 
no;t concerned with existence as such but with problems, and above 
all, with answers·; and method, in· Nietzsche 1 s opinion, is not only 
an approach to possible answers, but is itself alreadyr an an,swer. 
Method is a seduction into: one-sided absoluteness. For Nietzsche, 
rationalism leads man in the last reso:rt to mo,rality- and is opposed 
to the) supra-moral mode of exi.s tence, while the- Will to Power o-r . 
the noble, man, the man whose life refl.ects the gladness of the 
super-abundance of existence, is a passion which Nietzsche describes 
as the "p'assion for power: the earthquake which breaketh and 
upbreake:th all that is rotten and hollow; the rolling, rtnnbling, 
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punitive demolishe:r of whited sepulchers; the flashing 
\ 
interrogative-sign be-side premature answers"· (AZ, 11!:54:2). 
This proves once mo,re that it is the negation 
of absolutes which is basic to Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole, 
amd as one) of supra-moral Becoming; and the lila of Becoming is 
the life of Bestowing or Radiant Virtue. Of this, Hartmann has 
written that: "inherent in the essence of sp1r1tual imparting, as 
distinguished from material giving, is the peculiarity that he whc 
bestows does not give away, doos not become the poorer, but himseJ'.:: 
stands by· as a recipient of gifts., Imparting to others is the on~~ 
attitude of mind which accords with the nature of spiritual goods~ 
for they can never be really surrendered. Radiam.ce is the life of 
spiritual fulness; its life is no~t the fulness itse:r.f' - the 
pre-sence and value o,f which are! here presupposed - but personal 
living in acco~rd therewith, a vast ove·rflowing, the ability to 
share, to: make rich, to scatter broadcast.; and 1n addition to thi.<: 
a delight in so doing and in enhancing the spiritual insight of 
those who accep~tlf (E II 7 p.333). This· alone is great and noble:, blr. 
the definition of Bes.towmg Virtue becomes a unique event, not onJ.~.< 
in Nietzsche 1 s philosophy but in the entire realm of ethical. 
research whe:n we consider that Nietzsche calls· man to a life sole1~· 
and exclusively by· this virtue. He has no higher attribute for his 
"new n01bili.tytt, his "higher men". The Bestowing Virtue is the mark 
by· which they are to be known. It is the exact antithe:sis of the· 
s.P·irit of .resentment and reve-nge and, as Nietzsche thinks, of 
Christianity. Yet he could call Jesus noble and we may not-be 
wro-ng in surmising that the obvious antithesis which Jesus is to 
contemporary Christendom must have struck him, and that J.esus' · 
doctrine, or ra the!r life of love was not so far removed from his 
heart. Nietzsche calls himself ttthe battle and battl&-field of 
virtuesn (AZ, l' : 5 ) and it has been said of him that nzijn 
gansche leven heeft deze mensch met. den Engel ge.worsteld an naar 
nieuwe goden gezocht" (Herman Wolf,. Nietzsche, p.5). We are 
confident. that the Bestowing Virtue: is Nietzsche's finest v:i.ctory 
and gain. For an understanding of ·Nietzsche's philosophy its 
importance cannot be overestimated for the simple reason that 
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it accepts and reveals: the Dionysiac as well as the Apolline 
tendencies in his thought. To understand its definition is to 
understand what Nietzsche means by creation, since creation is 
·for him the· "sacrifice in the temple of both the deitie:stt (GT, 
25) • Dionysus, on the one hand, whose meaning, Nietzs.che tells us, 
is b&st conveyed by the image of drunkenness, a primordial, 
self-fargetful, destructive force, and on the other hand Apollo 
who represents sensitive plasticity, form, light and balance: "Th(, 
effe·cts wrought by the Dionysian seemed tttitan-liken and ubarbari ... ! 
tOJ the Apollonian Greek: while at the same, time he could not 
cm'nceal from himself' that he too was inwardly rale1ted to these 
overthro"W''l Titans and heroos. Indeed, he had to reco:g:nize even 
more than this: despite all its beauty and rooderation, his entire 
existence rested on a hidden snbstratum of suffering and of 
knowledge, which was again revealed to him by the Dionysia:rm. And 
lo' Apollo could not live without Dionysustn (GT, 4). 
It is· important that. we de!} oot confuse the 
antithetic process of the struggle of Judea versus Rome with the 
synthetic crea~t.ive, force of Dionysus-Apollo. Dionysus and Apollo 
are the dual force of creation in the mode of life represented 
by Rome;; the: Judaeo-Christian heritage is not the playfie]d of 
these gods and knows no:th1ng at all about them. How can Dionystts 
and Apollo negate the earth, ho,w can they equate the Hworldn wi.th 
"evil", if they ~ the meaning of the, earth? In their turn they 
lmow no:thing of "this sJLandering of the world" (EH, 'W:Qv I Am A 
Fatality:6.), as Nietzsche calls it. He describes his own WtO>rk ·1n 
terms of these creative impulses as rtmy onslaught on two thousand 
ye·ars of oppo·sitio:n to Nature, of the degradation of humanity" 
(EH, "'JheBirthaf~':4)and seems to have two ideas about this 
"degradation": there are those who ma.intain honesty about their' 
ideal of Jense_itigkeit, the Pascals, and they impoverish life 
by denying themse,lves where no denial is necessary - this 
corresponds almo,st exactly· to Hartmann's view that man ought to, be 
defended "agains:t ba'ing degraded by high-flying speculation, 
against the surrender of his special rights to the Creator or to 
the world" (E I, P'o291); and there are those who are hy-pocrites 
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to the same ideal and who with this dishonest background want at 
the same' time to lay the:ir hands on the strength of (Nietzschean) 
nobility. These are the ones who Nietzsche probably thought were 
to be most de,spised. 
This then, is. Nietzsche's ideal and the idea o·\ 
tho Bestowing Virtue: that we should, so to speak, put all 
elevatadness of spirit into the earth, into the Diesseits, so that 
the whole of life can become as rich and overflowing with 
benevolent strength as it even now can make some of mankind; for 
this, however, rationalism must be vanquished and substituted by 
the instinct of no,bility which means that every ves:tige of I 
abso·lutism must be destroyedo But hare even Nietzsche can only 
bo,ast, for the latter task is one of an impossible immensity. 
Nietzsche's e:Xaggerations are only repaired in so far as his 
ooncept of Bestowing Virtue has 8Dl Apolline aspect. It remains tru~,. 
~owever, that the Bestowing'Wr"tlle can be oonsider,.d as a chastising 
rod of conscience to contemporary Chr·istendom. In its 
Jight the latter can be expected to account for itself whether the 
evidence proves that its behaviour has a higher motivation than 
that of an "Anti-Christ" who called Jesus no:ble and who writes of 
noble men that. nthey desire to have nothing gratuitously, least 
of all, life ••• we, to whom life hath given itself- we are ever 
considering what we can best give in returnl" (AZ, III:56:5). 
Nietzsche dreamt of a New Earth of Creation: 
ttye lonesome ones o·f to.-day, ye seceding ones, ye shall one day 
be, a peo,ple.: out of you· who have. chosen yourselves shall a chosen 
peop1a arise:- and out of it the Superman. Verily, a place of 
healing sha'l.l. the earth become lAnd already is a new odour diffused 
around it, a salvation-bringing odour - and a new hopet 11 (AZ, 
I:22:2:>.Mthts New Earth will mver materialise, and in terms 
of his Heraclitic basis of Becoming Nietzsche· had to know 
this. He explicitly promised himself to be satisfied to have 
called for the ideal, and to go down thus satisfied. It is in 
this sp.irit that he give's his most moving testimony to the 
meaning and significance of the Bestowing Virt.ue : ttFrom the sun 
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did I learn this, when it goeth d01wn, the exuberant one·: gold 
dcrth it then pour into the sea, out of inexhaustible riches, - SO· 
tha:t: the poorest fisherman roweth even with golden oars.t For this 
did I o.nce see, and: did not tire of weeping on l:Jeholding itn; and, 
he concludes, "like the sun will also Zarathustra go down'' (AZ, 
III:56&3) • 
3, The Origin of Values 
T·o go down as a creator means, for Nietzsche, 
to. gfDJ dovm as a valuator. For him, creation and evaluation are 
absolutely identical, Therefore, since creation, as we have seen, 
1 s a matter of Bestowing, so. also evaluation. We have intimated 
that f(O>r Nietzs.che Bestowing or Creation and Nobility are exactly 
the same. To ask the question Bestowing what al'lJd Creating what wo~ul· .. _ 
not be meaningfUl for him, as little as it would be to ask the 
qU!estion Nobility ~. The reason for this is that Nietzsche 
creates oo distance at all between the noble man and his activity 
or fUnction. There i.s not a noble man as an entity of Being on the 
one hand, and on the other hand a motivator or motivation to 
activity fcr·r the noble man as a similar entity of Being. Nietzsche r • 
philosophy, as, one of Becoming, cannot allow for such static 
factors. It is in this regard that Wenzl maintains that "BeiNietascL 
fehlt nicht nur de~ Tr~ger, sondern auch der Inhalt des Willens, un<.~ 
das ist der dop:pelte Grundirrtum" (Prof. Dr. A. Wenzl, Nietzsche, 
p.22). 
Whatever the case may be, Nietzsche completely 
identifi.es the 'tJligher man" with his activity - the noble man is 
what he does, his function is his description. To point the finger 
at him is not to indicate a subject, a substantive, one who does 
something - subject, predicate, objectt - but a force, an activity-, 
a doing. Nietzsche indeed blames language as a seducer of man. 
Rationalism is mere grammar and play with words; it is calling life 
by mmes which are not its name. What is life's name? To this 
)l!etz,sche' s reply would be: that must be experienced. This is the 
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deepe:r meaning of his repro•ach to "scholars 11 as "good clockworks •• ~ 
ingenious in little artifices" (AZ, !!:38) that "they want in 
everything to be merely spectators, and they av(O)id sitting where 
the sun burneth on the stepstt (AZ, !!~38). Unity-, Identity, 
Duration, Substance, Cause, Being - all these are empty words; our 
eyes are error as fa·r as the movement of the heavenly bodie'S is 
concerned, but as far as values are concerned, language is error. 
Nietzsche: calls rat.ionalism "Sprach-metaphysikn and remarks: 11Heutc 
sehe1111 wir genau sa weit, als das Vernunft-vo.rurtheil uns zwingt, 
Einheit, Identitat, Dauer, Substanz, Ursache, Dinglichkeit, Sein 
anzusetzen, uns gewissermassen ve.rstrickt in den Irrthum, 
neces.sitirt zum Irrthum; so sicher wir auf Grund einer strengen 
Nachrechntmg bei tms dartlber sind, dass hier der Irrthum ist. Es 
steht damit nicht anders., als mit den Bewegungen des grossen 
Gestirns: bei ihnen hat der Irrthum unser Auge, hie.r hat e.r unsre 
Sprache zum bestandigen Anwalt" ( G-D, Die , 1 Vernunft" in der 
Philoso~phie:5). Rationalism is a process to piecemeal life, wherea~ 
life is a whole. Nie·tzsche, of course, does not tell us whethe,r 
"a whole.tt is not also grammar. In any case~ uMan is·t nothwendig 7 
ma:ttt 1st ein Sttlck Verhi!ngnis. , man gehOrt zum Ganzen, - es gibt 
nichts, was unser Sein richten, messen, vergleichen, verurthe:ilen 
k5mnte, denn das hiesse das Ganze richten, messen, vergle.ichen ••• 
Aber es gibt nichts ausser dem Ganzent" (G-D, Die vier grossen 
Irrththner:8). An ethics o.f values as moral standard is theTefore 
impossible for Nietzsche,. The question as to the value of life, 
tbe why of life, its explanation, and obedience to the demands o)n 
the human ethos which that explanation might entail, is ruled out. 
Jaspers gives a good account of: this and explains 
that, fo:r Nie,tzsche, this is an impossible questi.on since, if it is 
to be answered, man requires a standpoint (ttStandort") from which t, · 
scan or overlook the' whole of erls tence, bttt such a standpoint for 
overlooking life is impossible since we are in life which means tha·;, 
there is no standard for evaluation of the whole ("das Ganze") 
except itself,. but this ultimately means that existence knows no 
values o·ther than its own ttvalue"', which is itself as such (Karl 
JaspeTs, Nie,tzsche, p.294) • 
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Yet, it may oo objected, Nietzsche~• s philosophy 
is an elaborate play-off against each other of two sets of values, 
Judae.o-Christ.ian values and the values o~r Dionysus-Apollo. How, 
then, have! these value·s, so to speak, come to stand out above. the 
surface of the whole, ho:W did they originate~ how have they become 
differentiated out of existence? Here we encounter an evident 
weakness in Nietzsche's thought. While on the one hand his positio:::·'. 
is that existence is the' duel between these sets of values, he als~ .. 
maintains on the other hand that the values of the one set (the 
J"udaeo-Christ.ian) are so differentia ted out of existence and 
therefore untrue to· life and to the earth, whereas values of the 
othe:r set are identical with existence as such (or rather, as it 
ought to be 9 although Nietzsche would not like putting it this 
way) and· therefore true to the earth. For Becoming to be maintaine(;. 
the Judaeo-Chr.istian set of value:s is absolutely necessary as the 
antithesis to the Roman set of .values; but since Becoming is, for 
Nietzsche:, the meaning of existence, of life, of the earth, or of 
the: whole, the former values must certainly be· essential to 
existence, therefore they also:· must be 1n the whole:, and if being 
in the whole is really Nietzsche's concern, what objection can 
there be. to siding with the·se values? Is Nie;tzsche true to 11 the 
whole" in siding with the opposite values? 
Nietzsche, of course, also tries to, say that the 
Roman set of values is Hthe whole" - which, however, endangers 
the entire concept of Becoming in his philosophy. 
Howeve!r, it is now clear that values for Nietzsche, 
that is the value:s of' Dionysus-Apollo, are not made by anyone 1n 
any way: they .m:2; they identify themselves with the fuUness of 
existence, and man is a Creator, that is an Evaluator, just in so 
tar as he identifies himself with them. Judaeo-Christian and all 
other val.ue:s are made, are manufactured, are due to illusion and 
imagination. (ttDer ganze Bereich der Noral und Religion geh(),rt unter 
diesen Begriff' der imaginaren Ursachen" (G-D, Die vier grossen 
Irrthtlmer :6)). 
But if we have· said that the values of' Dionysus-
Apollo ~, we have not ye,t said that they are always the same; 
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it must be understood that they 1\!2 in so .far as they are not 
explained, in so .far as they are no·t caused beyond themselves. 
The reason why these va·lues da no·t always remain the same is 
therefore also not because times and circumstances change, but 
because, as we have seen, there must be continual progress towards 
SUperman - Nietzsche, ho.wever, never gives any details of what 
' 
such change would entail. Identification of these VP lues at any 
time is for· him simply a matter for the instinct of nobility which 
wlll find them w1 thin itself. Here again ''the whole' is emphasized 
as the complete falling to,gether of v~lues and persons, change 1n 
amy one identifying itself with change in the other. In this sense 
and in this sense cnly is man a Creator of values and an Evaluator(· 
The "Transvaluation of All Values", the breaking dom1 of all 
values that do not belong to the categttlll'y of Dionysus-Apollo, the 
destruction of Judaeo-Christian values - this neither precedes nor 
follcws such creation of values and evaluat.ion, but falls t<O>gether 
with it. In tha process of Becoming, of growing towards Superman, 
nobility nace.ssarily and s:funultaneously identifies itself more and 
more with Dionysus-Apollo and more and more negate-s the opposite 
values. This is how we must understand Nie·tzsche when he writes: 
u.veril.y, man ha.ve given unto themselves all their good and bad. 
Verily·, they took it not, they found it not, it came not unto them 
as a voice from heaven. Values; did man only assign to things in 
order to maintain himself - he created only the significan.ce of 
things, a human s1gnificance1 Therefore calleth he himself ttman", 
that is, the val.uator. Valuing is creating: hear it, ye creating 
ones~ Valuation itself is the treasure and jewel of the valued 
things. Through valuation only is there value; and without 
valuation the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear it, ye 
creating onesl Change of values - tha.t is, change of the creating 
ones. Always doth he destroy who hath to be a creator" (AZ, 1:15). 
The origination of values is there.fore a 
spo~ntaneo.us activity of values themse1ves - this insight, according 
to Nietzsche, amounts to a reinstatement. of the innocence of 
Evaluatio~n and Beooming, that is of Creatfon. The earth need no 
' 
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longer have a complex o.f guilt 1n the face o:f a causa prima which 
in any case is illusory· ( 11Dass niemand mehr verantwortlich gemacht 
wird, dass die Art des Seins nicht au£ e1ne causa pTigm, 
zurQckgeflihrt warden dar.f, dass die Welt wader als Sensorium, no:ch 
als ,,Gefs:t" eine Einheit 1st., dies erst 1st die grosse Befreiung, ... 
damit erst 1st die Unschuld des Wardens wieder he!l'gestellt" (G-D, 
Die vier gro·ssen IrrthQmer:8)). ·And this condition reflects its.elf 
in higher men to whom freedom means self-responsibility; in terms 
of su·ch freedom (and, here Nie·tzsche expresses an almost Stoical 
idea), man remains indifferent·. to affliction, hardship-, privation; 
the fight for this attitude of self-responsibility is infinitely-
p,referable t@ a search for tthappiness", fq;,r instance (HDenn was isi: 
Freiheit? Dass man den Willen zur Selbstve~antwortlichkeit hato Das· 
man die Distanz, die uns abtrannt, festhalt. Dass man gegen Mnhsal~ 
Harte, Entbehrung, selbst gegen das Leben gleichgllltiger wird. Das2 
ma!il' bereit 1st seiner Sache) Menschen zu opfern, sich selbar nicht 
abgerechnat. Freiheit be.deutet, dass die ml!nnlichen, die kriegs-
lmd siegesfrohen Inst'inkte die Herrschaft haben llber andre Instinlc:•,, 
zum Beispiel Obex die, des ,,GlOcks"" (0-D, Streif-ein,et§ 
Unz.eitgemlissen:38)). 
It remains an open question to what extent 
Nietzsche's own illness. stands behind his entire philosophy; he 
maintained, ho:waver, that 11 '00 an intrinsically sound natu~e, 11ln~s~ . . 
may- even act as a powerfUl stimulus to life, to an abundance of 
life. It is thus that I n~ regard my long period of illness: it 
seemed then as 1f I had discovered life afresh ••• out of my Will 
to Health and to Life I made my philosophy" (EH, Why I Am So 
Wise:2) • His affirmation of llfe and o:f the earth leads him to -
declare that. "pain cannot rank as an objection to life" (EH, ThU§ 
§pake Zarathus.tra:l.). Self-responsibility should ove:rco,zne even 
that, for these are the "signs of oo~billty: never to think of 
lowering our duties to the rank of duties :for everybody; to be 
unwilling to renounce or to share our .. responsibilities; to count 
our prerogatives, and to exercise them, among our duties" (GB, 
272). And, in any case, the: noble cannot do otherwise since, 
' 
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according tO'· N1e,tzsche:, they have: no choice. Since they are what 
they are, there is for them no either-or. 
Nietzsche does not want us· to confuse the 
freedom of responsibility,towards onesseli' with the so-called 
Free Will and ail i~s problematics; he: calls the latter a mere 
theologian-artifice ( 11Theologen-Ktmststf1ck" (G-D, Dia vier gro,ssen_ 
Irrthf1me~:7) ~. Self-responsibility has no need fo;r the concepts of 
gull.t and punishment which are tho reverse side of the religious 
do~trines of Will; self-responsibility must do away with the 
concepts of guilt and. punishment ("mit alle.r Kraft den Schuldbegr:i£{ 
und den Straf"begriff ans dar Welt wieder he.rauszunehmen't (G-D, 
Die vier grossen Irrthf1mer:7)), and finally, self-responsibility 
implies not only responsibility towards the .individuaJL self, but 
since the' individual self is in''the whole':~ as we have seen, it 
implies responsibility towards ''the whole' and towards all existence-:. 
We believe: that it is entirely w1 th this. understanding that 
Nietzsche commends what he calls Fur the!st Love ("Ferns tenlie be" ) • 
It is. almost as if he wants: ttO' say that all life depends on the: 
self-responsibllityr of the few. These ttfurthest ones" must be 
loved, yes, men must beoome: such "furthest ones" be!cause nthe 
furthe1st one)s are they who pay for your love to the near ones; 
and where there are but five of you together, a sixth must 
always die" (AZ, !:16). 
For Nie:tzsche, the origin of value'S is the 
responsibility of man towards himself. 
Nietzsche maintained that "Every philosophy alsr: 
conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also a lurking place, 
every word is. also. a mask" (GB, 289) .• We cannot deny that this 
O•:p:inion is largely upheld by his thought. tat it would be foolish 
to; ma~tain that the face· o·f Nietzsche canno·t ·be recognized; it 
is our be>~ief, however, that if we want to do so, we must allow 
for the masquarade in Nietzsche, we must recognize that the mask 
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is part of the· face; we must be able to understand' Nietzsche as 
a nuance - 11 alasl I am a nuance" (EH, Tho Case Of Wagner:4): that., 
1n any case, is all the· mean,ing of Nietzsche 1 s mask. It is true 
that if we want to bring ho·me Nietzsche 1 s philosophy with meaning 
1n the: whole of the histo.ry of thought, we must attemp:t to· get at 
its "truth", its "real meaning"; to so. much we agree. But we 
maintain that a description of this "real meaning" will in the las·~:­
rasort have: to be as unashamed of Nietzsche's contradictions. as 
Nietzsche hims.elf was - without, however, keep~g itself unaware 
cf them, for that 'W(O)Uld be dishonesty and enough dishonesty has 
already been perpetrated against the thinker by political and 
other apologists. SUfficient cl.arity about the philosopher ~s 
achieved every time he: is understood anew as a fundamental 
dcr.ubter inspired by· a singular will to reform, as one who was 
.n,zwis:chen zwei Nichtse 
einge>krihmnt, . 
ein Fragezet~~n, 
· ein mt1des Rtithsel,."x . 
x (Diouysos-Dithyramben, . Zlg.schen Raubvogeln) •. 
. ... ·. 
,; 
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FOURTH CHAPTER 
HARTMANN'S APPRECIATION OF NIETZSCHE'S APPROACH 
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS 
1, Hartmann and Nietzsche:: Ontology , 
Creation and Responsibility 
Nietzsche's work forced to consciousness two things on 
which the entire future of ethical research dependsi in the 
philosophies of Hartmann and Nietzsche the notion ol" human 
responsibility is a common feature; Nietzsche)• s view of man is a 
key to Hartmann's idea of the ontological determination of ethical 
reality; the "conflict. of virtues" and Hartmann's judgement that 
"Nietzsche was the firs:t to see . the rich plenitude of the 
ethical cosmos"; Hartmann's appreciation of Nietzsche's Heraclitic 
basis; man as creator in OOth philosophies!· Hartmann 1 s appreciP tion 
of the Dionysiac and Apolline factors in 1 fe; Hartmarm and 
Niet.zsche' as critics of our time, and their concern for the ftrture" 
2, Historical Relativism: Hartmann's 
Indictment of NietzsChe 
~ ·-
Rela~tivism: the danger inherent in the attempt to 
philosophize n.beyond good and evilrr.; to Hartmann, Nietzschets view 
seems to, be not only that man is in "the whole", but als.o that 
rt.the whole" is in man; the error of the dactrine of the 
11Revaluat.ion of All Values"; Nietzsche's "instinct" and Hartmann's 
"'Wertgefllhl."; Hartmann inherits the paradox of Nietzsche's position 
and his philosophy is only saved by his notion of the ideal 
self-existence of values • 
. 3 1 Sp&cific Values 
Hartmann warns the student of Nietzsche against 
sensationalismJ Nietzsche's discovery of two values; the e·rror 
in his rejection of Brotherly Love; Hartmann's view on the 
n~cessity and need for a synthetic view of val.ues; wherein 
Hartmann and Nietzsche are~ both at fault; Hartmann • s testimony 
of his indebtedness to Nietzsche. 
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FOURTH CHAPTER 
HARTMANNt S APPRECIATION OF NIETZSCHE 1 S APPROACH 
1, Hartmann and Nietzsche: Ontology 2 
Creatio·n and Responsibility 
we have said of Hartmann's ethics that it is the 
most comp1JLete exampJl.e of an ethics of .humarn responsibility in the 
history of explicit philosophy; we recall once more his view that 
ethics ought to be a defence or man's responsibility against both 
God and the world; we have also seen how, for Nietzsche, the 
origin of values is to be discovered in the respo)nsibility of man 
tco:wards himself, It is in this. return to man as a responsible 
creature that Hartmann's appreciat-ion of· Nietzsche centres. 
Hartmann reco.gnized the fact that Nietzsche alone 
of' modern thinkers has again drawn attention to the richness and 
f\illness of the valuationa]. life, the consciousness of which, as 
Nietzsche himself considers, was lost with the passing away of 
Greek and Roman antiquity. Thus, according to Hartmann, Nietzsche 
provided for ethics the on:ny basis on which it could meaningfully 
continue~ its researches. It is his belief that the :f"Uture of ethica: 
re·search depends entirely on two things which, as a result of 
Nietzsche • s labours., "forced their way to consciousness: (1) Values 
are many, their realm is a manifoldness; and (2) we know neither 
-" the entire manifoldne·ss nor its unity" (E I, p.83). ecause of thi;:; ,, 
Hartmann has made his own 'bentral task an analysis of the contents 
of values·tt - "I have~ done so," he says, "in the belief' tha.t only 
in this way will it be possible in the future to grapple afresh 
with the problems of conduct" (E I, p.l5). Only by rejecting 
absolute presuppositions, he feels,. can there be any progress in 
the definition of the human ethos, The idea of' a unity of morals 
must be set aside, even if temporarily, Till no:w it has proved 
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·sterile as a working hypothesis in ethical research, This has been 
so because, in order to maintain it, it was always necessary to 
proceed fro·m the presUpposition that the ul.timates of "good" and 
nbad" we-re already known. This, however, has only led to a Babel 
of confusion since every philosophical system has claimed a 
different uhighest good" a:r.,:~ each was eqttally convinced of ~he 
othe.r' s e·rro:rc nThe most contradictory tendencies of thought have 
at all timas had this in common, u writes Hartmann, "that they 
professed to lmow already wha·t good and evil are. The "goodu has. 
stood for the absolute unity of the morally valuable in general -
an interpretation which one could the more readily accept since on'l 
had the name for the unity and did not observe the manifoldness of 
values. Neither did one see that all these tendencies of thought 
meant, in fact, fundamentally different. things by the "'good'', and 
each denied the truth of the other, That this belief was rutile is 
one of the most recent discoveries; we have to thank Nietzsche fo~ 
the first clear statement of it" (E I, p,83), 
Nietzsche has again weighed the anchors of 
the concepts "good" and "evil", and put them adrift. As far as 
Hartmann is concerned, this is Nietzsche's merit; his erro,r (to 
continUe our simile) is that his. idea of man 1 s responsibility 
towards himself became the entire ocean and medium for this drift,, 
For Nietzsche, "beyond good and evil" meant only the self-responsible 
strength of no)b1l.1ty. 
Hartmann's differences with Nietzsche, 
therefore,. begin preeisaly at the p-oint of his greatest: appreciat:?.cn 
foT Nietzsche's -work. We have seen that Nietzsche's idea was a 
complete, l.ibeTation of man from the consciousness of guilt, a 
removal of the notions of guilt and punishment from the wo1rld. Yet 
we lmow that for him this by no means entailed a licentiousness of 
the individual towards life - on the contrary, it desired the 
individual to live. by the consciousness of his responsibility, and 
by it alone. In this way the responsibility of Nietzsche's noble 
man becomes an tmbounded respons1bil1 ty; Hartmann seas this and to 
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hm it is incomp,rehe-nsible tha.t a consciousness of' guilt can remai!·J 
absent from a consciousliDess of such responsibility. Hartmann t s 
view is that unlimited power would be the only thing that could 
sustain unlimited responsibility-, but only the idea of God is an 
idea of such Almightiness. He finds that "unbounded purposive 
activity me--ans unbounded responsibility, responsibility for 
everyt~ing, Guilt falls upon him. who has power •• ~ Man is not such 
a being. The degree of responsibility which he can bear is narrowl~i 
limited; and in real life, when it is: exceeded, he collapses under 
the burden and gives up in despair ••• An excess of power falls 
upon him like a crushing load" (E II, P'ol53). Yet, even if 
responsibility· crushes man, he cannot escape from itJ according 
to Hartmann, there is no way in which he can avoid it; even if he 
tries ta rm away from it in life, it will remain present with him 
in his consciousness of guilt.l and death is the annihilation of 
every value, the reduction of man to nothing. 
In the last re·sort, therefore, it is true that 
for Hartmann, as for Nietzsche, man lives by responsibility alone~ 
This is an attribute of divinity which man must claim for himselfo 
Hartmann identifies himsel.f almos.t completely with Nietzsche when 
he calls life "a playing with this dangerous gift; of cours.e it is 
not an idle play, but necessitated, inevitable. For in it man has 
no freedom; so) long as he breathes, he cannot withdraw from the 
game" (E II, p.l54). 
Hartmann's appreciation of Nietzschets 
approach stems from the fact that Nietzsche has again made man, 
and man only, the concern of ethics, .and not as a matter of 
subje,ctivity· since, as we have seen, the outological basis of 
Hartmann's work contains a square rejection of subjectivity. The 
essential aspe.cts of Hartmann's ontology and Nietzsche's view of 
"the whole" ("da:s Ganze") are closely akin. Proceeding from 
responsibility as the common denominator to their work, Hartmann 1 s 
indebtedness to Nietzsche as his immeniate..predecessor can 
especially be ascertained from two affinities which their 
philosophies maintain mutua]ly - we will call them (a) the 
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affinity of the:fr grounds 1n ontology, and (b) the affinity of their 
views of man's creative fUnction. 
~) Hartmann's Appreciation of Nietzsche's Ontological Position: We 
have considered Nietzsche's view that man belon~s 1n and to "the 
whole", that is the complete fullness of e:Xistenca,, so that man has 
no choice which can be directed beyond existence; as Jaspers 
explained, there is no standpoint f~DJr man from which he could 
exercis.e such a choice since, wherever he ~ight stand in life,, he is 
bound to be inside its total.ity· and there is no point from which 
he could rise above it, or out of it, in order to. place himself 
over against it or even op·pos:ite it. This falling together of man 
and existence, this basic levelling of their identity, as wa may 
call it, is one or Hartmann's fundamental co·ncerns. If it were not 
for this, subjective ethics could no·t be overcome. 
Nietzsche tried to overcome the P'roblems 
inherent in his ontology of man, those problems which Hartmann 
1nd1cate:s when he writes that "Nature, if it were structura,lly 
like man, if it were: also like him teleologically and axiologically, 
would leave no room for mantt (E I, p.292), by emphasizing .what he 
called the 11instincttt of no:b:Uity; this "instinct" lifts man into 
a position of consciousness of and about existence .. it is the 
point at which man becomes differentiated from "the· whole". 
Whatever we may think of this, it is important 
for us hare to note that Nietzsche's basic position is precisely-
what Hartmann claims of ontology- as a preliminary· orientation for 
ethics: "The to.tal determination of ethical reality is embedded 
in the universa1 ontological determination. It must contain the 
universal tYPe of the latter, but must rise above it" (E I, p.291). 
The account we have already given (when we discussed the do,ctrine 
of categories) of how, for Hartmann, ethics '!rises above" its own. 
onta1ogical foundation, shows the differences between his own and 
Nietzsche's approach in this regard. We have, however, also pointed 
out that as far as valuational judgement is concerned, even 
Hartmann's final appeal is to ''intuition". 
Hartmann's appreciation of Nietzsche's 
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presuppositions. in ontology is even more manifest. when we leave 
Niet.zsche• s ontology· of man as such to, look at his ontology of 
values. 
Hartmann's belief that "Nietzsche. was the first 
. to see the rich p].enituda of the· ethical cosmosn (E I, p.l6) is 
nowhere better justified than in Nietzsche's view of the trconflfct 
of virtues''·, each of which claims fo.r itself no·thing less than the 
sup:reme position in the judgement of the evaluational 
conscio·Usness: "'My bl'other, if th<!J;U he fortunate," writes 
Nietzsche, u then wilt thou have one virtue and no) more·: thus goest 
thou easier over the bridge. Illustrious is it to. have many 
virtues, but a hard lot; and many a ·one hath gone into the 
wilderness and killed himsell, because he was weary of being the 
battle and battl~field of virtues. My brother, are war and battle 
evil? Necessary, however, is the evil; necessary are the envy· and 
the distrust and the backbiting among the virtues. Lo1 how each of 
thy virtues is covetous of" the highest. place; ·it wantath thy whole 
spirit to be its herald, it wanteth thy· whole power, in wrath; 
hatre·d· and l:ove. Jealous is every virtue of the others, and a 
dreadful thing is jealousy. Even virtues may succumb by jealousy. 
He whom the flame of jealousy encompasseth, turneth at last, like 
the scorpion, the poisoned sting against himself'o Ahl my brother, 
hast thou never seen a vir:tue backbite and stab itsell?" ( AZ , 
I : 5 ) • 
Nie!tzsche' s idea is that values, all val.ues, 
in sa far as they are: values and in so far as, for him, each of 
them represents existence equally with every other, confront man 
only w1 th a single claim, name,ly tha.t they should be accepted 
indiscriminately- in lifeo This means that, for him, values lmow no 
diffe.rentiat.ion in their basic onto,logical. structure. 
Hartmann accepts this; as a fundamental .. 
presupposition of his olm ethics. His view on how conflict develops 
breadth of mind sounds like a full understanding and thankful 
' acknowledgement of the meaning of Heraclitic opposites in life - he 
could as well have been describing the human type of Nietzsche: 
"'The ethos of mcmr--s1dedness presup'poses mental breadth, . space fo,r 
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everything. This is of especia•l significance! 1n re~spect to .moral 
conflict. Conflict widens as well as deepens· a man. Precisely in 
it and while standing in the midst of it a man be·comes conscious 
of lifets richness of content. From this point of view confiict 
is seen to· be pre-eminently positive and valuable. To shrink from. 
conflict, to avo.id it, is· moral short-sightedness. There must be 
! 
room even. for tragic conflict, from which there 'is no es.cap·e 
without guilt. Especjally in it the ethos is widened. Whoever is 
incaP'ab].e of conflict. is incap.able of tragedy"' (E II, p.208) ~ 
Hartmarm's fundamental statement about the 
signifi.cance of such an ontoJ.o1gy· of values, ho:wever, occurs in 
connection with its relation to the responsibility of man - the 
latter, as we have intimated, always peing the ultima~te in which 
Hartmann~s appreciation of Nietzsche: resolves itself. 
Accarding to Hartmann, ancient ethics considei'eC 
mora~ conflict as ttnathing but the antagonism between moral and 
immoral. (or even only non-moral) impulses in mann (E I,· p.300) and, 
1f we are to believe him., this is also basically true of · 
Christianity. Hartmann ·agrees that nthis conflict is a part of the 
concrete l!lO'ral problem .• But, tt he s_ubmits, "'it is not the whole" 
(E I, p.300). He says that there is in life 'fbesides the conflict 
between moral and anti-moraJ. impulses also a conflict between moral 
and moral. The structure of th9' fo\rmer is not purely ethical in 
the: inward sensef that of the latter touches the essence .of 
ethical situations proper. Where in any situation value stands over. 
against va]ue, there nco, guiltless escape. is possible. For a man 
cannot abstain from making a decision. He must choose ei thar so or 
so, and evetiD. to• do nothing is a positive decision. He may stay· 
where he was, but he mu·st cboo·se at any cost. In th~ real wo:rld a 
man is continual:Jl.y confronted with the necessity of settling 
conflicts of value, of so decid'ing that he can be answerable for hiF! 
obligation. It is his· destiny not to be: able to escape the 
obligation" (E II, P• 76). 
·Responsibility is, there:rore, founded on the 
onto,logical structure of values and, despite the fact that 
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Nietzsche denied ·.the free will, we can have no doubt that 
Nietzsche's position here has been most. valuable to Hartmann's 
insight. Hartmann goes so, far a.s to maintain that if we. do not 
allow f<01r such an 11 eqna.llty of valuesn, or rather, if this is not 
true of the ontological description o~ the wor~:i and life and it 
were possible for man to''place himself' without conflict above the 
demands of eqtrelity, the· alternatives between which he has to 
choose freely WIDlUtld not, as regards his real conduct, continue to 
exist" (E II, p.ll6); that is, e·thical life would be destroyed~ 
Hartmann is. ftl'lly aware of N1etzsche 1 s denial or the· freedom of 
the will, and sees the error of it which leave~s Nietzsche without 
the means. for rendering a sptisfactory account of how the 
· conflict of "backbiting virtuestt is resolved 1n man in everyr 
c~ncrete. si.tua t.ion - fCJJ1r in every such si tuat.ion man must make. 
a choice and a decision, he must act in terms of one. or one set 
of values rather than another; even Nietzsche could not and, 
indeed, did not want to escape this logic. However, eveEt here 
Hartmann tries t«r overcome Nietzsche by first attempting to 
understand Nietzsche better than this; philosopher could understanf' 
himself .as a child of his time. There was no need for tta denial 
(as with Nietzsche) of the freedom of the will," he writes~ ''0nly~1 
in that case, by· the strong will one must. not understand one whiC:h 
1n action ruthlessly executGs its purpo-se, nor one that is 
inwardly- passionate and stops: at nothing, but a will in which the 
autmoi!OOUs dete.rminan t rules ove.r those which are heteronomous, 
with decisive energy"' (E III, p·.253). This, of course, is not 
yet Hartmann's position, but it is an attempt to cl.arify Nietzsche' r: 
po)sition 1n a sympathetic manner which one only uses where one is 
oons:cious of one•s indebtedness. 
(b) Hartmann•s·Appraciation of Nietzsche's View of Man as Creator: 
We know that Nietzsche 1 s ontology· of m8l'JJ. and ontology of values 
ulti.Ina,.te:ly coincide. Values and thB person are for him inseparablec. 
Each has not its own being, as we have pointed out, but the two 
fall.. toge~ther and their falling tCJlgether is a function, a 
Becoming. And this: Becoming Nietzsche has also called Creation 
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and Evaluatio·no Man, for him, is a valuator in so far as he is 
a carrier of values by· which he. himself is carried. Nietzsche's 
nob!e man is a creative function in so· far as he himself' .is 
continually regeneTat~g his responsibility towards himself, and 
because his nobility, so teo: speak, gua rantaes t:~at responsibility; 
no app·aal is made to sources of value outside himself - according 
to· Nietzs.che such sources of value are in any- case no.n-existent. 
It is because of this, we noted, that man ''calleth himself "man" i 
that is, the valuator. Valuating is creatingo.~ amd without 
valuation the nut of existence wo·uld be hollow" (AZ, !:15). 
Hartmann in his turn believes that ethics, ae 
the: discipline most concerned with values, ttis. the· first and most 
pos:itive philosophical interest of mantt (E I, p.31) • The ring of 
Nietzsche can escape no-one in the following remarkable passage 
from the· Introduction to his Ethics; we can already clearly-
distinguish ·Nietzsche in the words of the first sentence where 
Hartmann speaks of ethics as man's rttra.ining in his world-vocation~: 
the demand upon him to he! a colleague of the demiurge in the 
creation of the WoTld"; in the next:. paragraph we discern Superman~ 
the· goa~ that will never be attained, the purpose of eternal 
Becoming ... we see man as the "rope stre·tched between the animal 
am the SUperman": rtthe crea,t:ton of the world," he writes, "is not 
comp·le.ted sol lo,ng as 6nan) has. not fulfilled his creative fUnction 
in it. But he procrastinates. For he is not ready, he is not 
standing on the summit of his humanity. Humanity must be: first 
fulfilled in him"; next Hartmann confronts us w1 th the! idea of 
the creativ-e responsibility of man towards himself of which 
Nietzsche makes so much: "The creative work which is incumbent 
upon (man) in the world terminates in his self-creation, in the 
fulfilment of his ethos"; and finally we en.counte·r Dionysus and 
Apollo.: 11The ethos of man includes both the chaotic and the 
creat-ive. In the f01rmer lie his, possibilities but also his 
danger; 1n the latter he finds his vocationo To fulfU it is to 
, 
be human" (E I, p.31). 
There is every reason why Hartmann should 
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turn to· the most solitary philosopher of the nineteenth century 
as the example par excellence for the fu,ture of ethics. Hartmann 
is concerned about the, present condition of mankind. If we want to 
remedy· man's spiritual retrogression it is not sufficient. fco~r us t.~· 
rely on historical experience, aays Hartmarm.. On the contrary, we ma.y 
·cave to contradict the latter.. 'f}JC! task in hand demande much moraoX.u.s, 
For man n<)!W "the chief question is not how much. or bow little 
is in his power, but how fully or ?ow little he grasps the task 
which looms before him"' (E·II, Po327). Hartmann be]ieves that 
only the full creativeness of man is. equal to the task; it must 
be creativity of the) stature of Homer's who "created far the 
Greeks no't only the!ir Gods but the·ir· men, the Greeks themselves" 
(g II, p.327). For this, says Hartmann, even the poe:tic genius of 
Nietzsche could no·t suffice. Thro·ughout his work, however,· he 
retains a consciousness of the fact that Niet:zsche was a most 
trustworthy gauge of the decline of the time.. It is therefore 
little wo,nder that he felt h1mse].f drawn towards Nietzscheo 
Nie!tzsche' s work, in every sense the completest mirror of the 
sickness of modern man, must have: appealed to, Hartmann as the 
mo·st f<Olrceful expression of the necessity for the liberation of 
man's creativity which has been stunted· by. the mechanics of 
P'rogre-ss. In this connection we may quote Windelband 1 s view of 
Nie·tzsche as Han individual of the highest cultUTe, and o:f a 
thoroughly origina]. stamp, who experiences all the tendencies of 
the time, and .suffers. from th-e same unsolved contradictions by 
which the: time its.el.r is out of joint. Hence the echo which his 
language has found; hence the danger of his; inf'luence, .which does 
not heal the sickness of the age, but increases it" (Windelband, 
P'o677) o Even.tnough Hartmann would not be:l.ieve that Nietzsche 
increases the sickness of' the time, he recognizas the fact that 
he does not heal it; f'or him, Niet.zsche indicates a direct.ion 
which is the, only possible diract.ion for the future, namely that 
of the most fundamental, even though most painfUl self-criticism, 
that of "bestirring" ourseivas about our destiny - ttMankind must. 
best.ir itself about. its destiny" (E II, p.327). 
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Hartmann considers Nietzsche's philosophy to be 
the most important attempt at this, and his appreciation for such 
a courageous thinker as Nietzsche,who is mistaken. for 8 nihilist 
wb.ile his reaction was in the: last resort one against the nihilism 
of the time (which is just the same as what Har'~~mam calls the 
nil admirari of modernity), can be·fully understood when we read 
his own account of the siclmess of modern mazu "If there is. such 
8 thing as an awakening of the conscioUS'J!lle~ss of value, it is. our 
time that has need of it ••• The life of marn today is. not favo~urabl8 
to depth of insight. The quiet and ~ntemplation are lacking, life 
'is restless and hurried§ there is competition, aimless and without 
refJLection. Whoever stands still for a moment is overtaken by the 
neJ~:to And as the claims of the outer life chase one another, so 
likewise do the impressions, experiences and sensations. We are 
always looking out for what is newest, the last thing continually 
governs us and the thing befo,re the last is. forgotten ere it has 
been fairly seen, much less comprehended. We live from sensation 
to sensation. And our penetration becomes shallow, our sense of 
value is blunted, by snatching at the sensational. Not only is 
modern man restle•ss and precipitate, dulled atlld blas6, but nothing 
inspires, touches, lays hold of his innermost being. Finally he 
has only an ironical and weary smile for everything. ~es, 1n the 
end he makes a virtue of his moral degradation. He elevates the 
nil admirari, his incapacity to, feel wonder, amazement, 
enthusiasm and reverence, into a pl~nned habit of life. Callously 
.... 
passing 11 ghtly over everything is a comfo.rtable modus vivendi. 
And thus he is pleased with himself in a pose of superiority 
which hides his inner vacuity·. This morbid condition is typical. 
It does not appear today for the first time in history. But 
whe!rever it has made its. appearance, it has be·en a sym;ptom or 
weakness and decadence, or inward failure and general pessimism" 
(E I, pp.44,45). These last words could have been the preci.se 
ward~ or Zarathustra. nWhat is bent on being destroyed," Hartmam 
continues, none: should allow to· go to ruin." (Nietzsche conjured 
his: disciples: rtAnd him whom ye do nv,t t~ach to fly, teach, I pray 
you- to fall faster!"' (AZ, III:56:20)). "Yet from every downfall," 
\ 
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says Hartmarm, "young healthy life shoots forth.n And it is 
precisely fo,r the same reason that Nietzsche desired hardness in 
man; he did not speak of destroyers who were to bo hard, but of 
creato-rs: "If your hardness will not glance and c.ut. and chip to 
pieces, how can ye one day - create with me? For the creators are 
hard. And blessedness must. it seem to you; to press your hand 
Upon millenniums as upon wax, -blessedness to write upon the will 
of nillenniums as upon brass, - harder than brass,noblar tim brass•(kz,_ 
III:56:29 ). 
Hartmann 1 s dream for his: time is therefore 
clearly that the creative fo)rces of Dionysus-Apollo should ba let 
loose with the fullest. possible intens:ity in the affairs of men. 
2. Historical Relativism: Hartmann's 
Indictment of Nietzsche 
We have rerne.rked that Hartmann's 
differences with Nietzsche be6in at the very point of his greatest 
admira-tion for the thinker. "The knowledge of ono' s ignorance," 
write1s Hartmarm, "is always the beginning of knoW'ledge. Evan the 
knowledge of good and evil can take no other route than over this 
threshold of all knowledge alike. To it Nietzsche's work brought 
us" (E I, p.84). But in thus leading us again to innocence and 
"beyond good am ·evil", Nietzsche went to an extreme where he 
thought he would be farthest away from the condition of the 
ethical philosophies of the past - but which, instead, brought hin~ 
dangerously close to them; in fact, bad it not been for the 
tremendous positive significance of his insight that we have never 
yet known the- meaning of good and bad, his position might even 
have bean more dangerous than the.irs for the fUture of ethics, 
since each one of them had its absolute, a single absolute, but 
Nietzsche), so Hartmann :maintains, handed ovor a11 absolutes to man;, 
he denied even mare ontological Sosein as a boundary -ror man as 
creator; Nietzsche made man an absolute creator and as such, thinks 
Hartmann, an arbitrary creator. This is what. he means when he tellr. 
us that nNietzsche was the first to see the rich plenitude of the 
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ethical cosmos, bttt with him it melted away in historical 
relativism" (E I, p•l6). 
While Hartmann is ap.p·reciative of 
Nietzsche's position in ontology·, bis differences with the 
philosopher are due to the latte:r' s refUsal to allow for 
ontological differentiation, tbat is his identification of man 
with existence. To Hartmann it seems that Nietzsche's position is 
.not onJt that man is 1n nthe whole" but also that 11 the whole" is in 
man, and man is 1n sole c~wnand of existence. In this way man 
become:s the arbiter over values - a "revaluator or all values". 
Hartmann's doctrine of categories, that 
is of ontological differentiation, however, is opposed to such a 
view. The ideal sell.f-existence of values and the real baing of man 
pertain tc· the fundamentals of his philosophy as we saw when we 
discu·ssed its. basic features. We reca:ll his argUment that unless 
man can stand over against values, not as fictitious things of the 
imagination but as ontologically ind.ependent structures, ha cannot 
cho·ose, cannot live ethically - amd existence for him would be 
m€aningless since he cannot evaluate. Evaluation for Hartmann is 
e-valuation in terms of values, but where man is the arbiter of 
values, it is evaluation in terms of the caprices of man's will. 
Hartmann canoot sea how Nietzsche 1 s phUosophy can escape this 
accusat.ion and consequently maintains that tttba most fatal error 
on Nietzsche's part is to bo traced ••• to his doctrine of' the 
"revaluation of all values". In that lay hidden the idea of' 
valuational ralativism:. If values permit of being revalued, they 
also are capable of being devalued, they permit of' being 
manufactwred and of being destroyed. They are the work or man, the~·, 
. are arbitrary, like thought and Jtuntasias. If this be so, tho 
meaning of the great disco~very is: again 1r:mnediately annihilated 
at the f'irst step; for then. the path over the th!-esho·ld does not 
lead into a new and unknown realm which is still to be openedJ 
there is nothing further to discover and to· find" (E I, p.85). 
We must. point out, however, that Hartmann 
is fu~ly aware of the paradox 1n Nietzsche's view of man as the 
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"·revaluato·r of all values". On the one: hand Nietzsche speaks of 
a "hierarchy of values", while 0n the: other hand he openly teaches 
persp.ectivism or what he calls "immacu-late perception" 
('tunbeflekten Erkenntnis"): UThis: do I call immaculate perception 
of all things: to want nothing else from them, ll.:rt to be allowed 
to lie before them as a mirror with a hundred facets" (AZ, II:~?). 
But this. ttlying before them as a mirror with a hundred fa-cets" does 
not imply human passivism with regard tO' the events of the world. 
On th9' contrary, everything here dep:ends on what Nietzsche calls 
the Will. Immaculate perception is, indeed, a matter of "willing 
with my whole w:Ulu - Nietzsche describes it as a condition of 
inno,cence and beauty: "Where is imlocence? Where there is a will 
to procreation. And he who seeketh to create beyo-nd himself', hath 
fo-r me the purest will. \lllera is beauty? Where I must will with my 
whole Willf where I will love and parish, that an. image may not 
remain mere]y an image" (AZ, II:37). This means that it is the 
task of man and man alone to· form the world, that is to make it 
"baautifuln, to make it as it ought to be. This is a task for men 
of a type in and for whom "an image (will) not remain merely' an 
image", a type capable of "creating beyO'nd themselvesn. Where do 
we find this type o·f marn? Nietzsche points him out to us - in the 
case of Rome, for instance, history has proved the- possibility of 
his. existence on a grand scale and it is still being proved in 
individtr.al cases - Napoleon was an example. These men are: guided 
by instinct, the instinct o:f nobility, as Nietzsche calls it; or 
by- a '"primal consc1ousnO>ss" of values, to use a term of' Hartmann 1 s. 
Nietzsche, however, would no.t agree with Hartmann that this 
np,rimal consciousness" is also "the primal recognition of' a 
comman~ant ••• a feeling of' that which unconditionally ought to be, 
the expression of which is the commandment" (E I, p.l77). Nietzsche 
recognj&as no COOJmandmoo·ts, no "musts"; the type of Nietzsche's 
noble 1nd1vidtl!al never acts because of "must-sn, ha acts only-
be-cause he wUlsJ his responsibility is such that he needs no 
"musts". He h1mseU is the only "must". Whatever causality there 
may· be for his· behaviour, it is centred entirely within himself. 
Here everything depends on the historical 
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personage, the rr;great man"', the man who can say: "To redeem the 
past, and to· transform every !It was' into 'Thus would I ha.ve it'~ 
that alone do I call redemptionl" (EH, Thus Spake Zarathustra:8). 
But this is: not all. Here also· Nietzsch& remains true to himself 
as one who, in his o.wn wo,rds, rr:contradicts himself 1n every word, 
in (whom) all oppo.sitions are resolved into a ne!W unity" (EH, 
Thus Spake Zarathustra: 6) • 
Nietzsche's thought'melted away into 
historical relativism" (E I, p.l6) in so far as at any particular 
time in history everything depends on his individttal, the individu~,:~: 
belonging to th& class of ttgreat mann. Nietzsche's emphasis 1s not 
on the class as such, but on the individual, so that (as Scheler 
points out) it is true that. for him history realizes its purpose 
in its "graat't individuals; his philosophy was neve·rtheless far 
removed fr001 an historical cult of ttgraat mentt (''Das Ziel der 
Geschichte des Menschen besteht - tar Nietzsche - in den 
, ,oochsten Exemp,laren"' des Menschen ••• obzwar Nietzsche weit 
entfernt war von allem billigen Historikerkult der , , grossen 
Manner" (FEW, pp.508,520). These individuals may behave very 
differently from one another for the simple reason that it will be 
dif"ferent circumst-ances that the different individuals will have 
to deal with at different times, while in every· time and in every 
set of circumstances the individual has nothing to obey or to 
conform with beyond his own volition. In Nietzsche's case, 
rela.tivism is completely bound up with individualism. Yet 
Nietzsche could speak of a "hierarchy of val..ues" (ttRangordnung der 
Werthert) (EH, "The Birth of Trasedy" :2), defining the class of 
individuaJLs, that is "great men'' in general, according to "a 
formUla of the most extreme life-affirmation, born of abundance, 
of super-abundance - a yea.-saying free of reserve, ro1. affirmation 
of sufferir.lg itself, of guilt., of all that is que·stionahle and 
strange in existence"' (EH, "The Birth of Tragedy":2) - 1n a word, 
they are all men of a Bestowing Virtue, in terms of which they are 
to transform the world. 
Here Nietzsche gets beyond individualism 
and takes his stand on the side of a specific value, one which, as 
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we have shown, is minutely defined in his philosophy. This is no 
longer relativism as a rejection of Bestowing Virtue is a rejection 
of the ve:ry meaning of life for Nietzsche, or, as he likes to put 
it, of th~ earth. Even though Hartmann wrote of Nietzsche that 
he'~s tha first to see the rich plenitude of the ethical cosmos, 
but with him it melted away in his-torical relativism" (E I, p.l6), 
the paradox of Nietzsche's position also: compels Hartmann to admit 
that n1n his (Nietzsche's) statement that there is such a thing as 
the falsification of value:s, he actua:Jll.y gives the lie to the 
relativism which he proclaims" (E I, p.22Bn). 
The fact rema·ins that Hartmam does not 
resolve Nietzsche's paradox in his own work. As we have pointed 
out more than once, it must be kept in mind that if Hartmann is 
challenged to show us h15 own ultimate criterion for value-judgement 
he fares no better than! Nietzsche; he presents us with a 
"·Wertgefflhl "· and arJl "intui tiontt which, undoubtedly, belong in the 
same category as the "instinct" of' the Nietzsche,an man. If it is 
so that Hartmanlll believes that "valuational consciousness, whatever· 
else it may be, is in the first instance a sense of value, a primal~; 
imme-diate capacity to appreciate the valuablett (E I, p.86), 
Nietzsche will be found to do the same. Furthermore, if Nietzsche's 
individual is inve~sted with the attribute of divinity in so far as 
his responsibility- must be unbounded, 1 t is no less so in the case 
of Hartmann's moral person. For both philosophers the will-to-guilt 
is a necessary attribute o:f manhood, and this is. the supreme 
responsibility, it is responsibi11ty without a limit. ttit is not as 
if one wanted guUt as such, u writes Hartmann, "-one should be glad 
not to have it. BUt once we are laden with it, we cannot allow it 
to be taken away, without denying our selfhood. A guilty man has a 
r:tght to carry his guilt. He must refttsa deliverance from without" 
(E II, p.l45) - he evan speaks, of the "notorious notion of the 
transference of guilt in the concap,t of '!3acrif1ce"" (E I, p.l12), 
and Nietzsche maintained that "No deed can be annihilated, how 
could it be undone by the penaltyl This, this is what is eternal 
in the rtaxistence" of penalty, that existence also must be 
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aternally· recurring deed and guiltln (AZ, IIt42). 
With this common basis or the! two 
philosophers with regard to man's responsibility towards himself, :i" 
is only- Hartmann's ascription of an idl.eal self-existence to moral 
values which can cause us to.· he:sitate to impute to his phUosophy 
the same fatlllt that. he imputes to) Nietzsche's. Yet we cannot doubt 
that Hartmann's notion of th~ self-existence of values has 
destroyed ethica~ solipsismand idealism allka; the dominance of 
the "'Itt , whether singular or universal, 1n the sphere of ethics 
has been crushed, and Nietzsche broke the ground for- this. 
3, Specific Values 
Turning to specific values, we find Hartmann 
commending Nietzsche for his pioneering work in the discussion of 
valuational evidences for which there has so far been no 
corresponding "historical ethos" (E II, p.3ll), sa that they ·have 
remained unnamed and unrecognized: "The attempt to) define them 
objecttvely is a bo·ld venture ••• Hare Nietzsche: has been the pionee 
in more than one direction" (E II, p.311). In this place also 
Hartmal'lll warns us against a misunderstanding o:r Nietzsche's poetry 
and with sound insight tells us that. ";the: sensationalism of the 
past "which fell greedily- upon these exaggerations and cast 
suspicion upon the seriousness of the problem, must be entirely 
ignored, So .far as it was right, what was prophetically seen under 
the pressure of passion must now be calmly surveyed" (E II, p.311) ~· 
N1e~tzsche. 1 s ccmtribution towards the 
characterization of two va,1ue.s is especially appreciated - these 
are Love: of the. Remote ( "Fernstenliabe.") and Bestowing or 
Radiant Virtue (ttschenkende Tugend'"). 
Love of the Remctet Nietzsche romarked canstically that 
"Chri.stianity gave Eros poison to drink; he did not die of it, 
certainly·, but de genera tad into· Vice" ( GB, 168). It is easy- to see 
how a degenerate Christendom, boasting a doctrine o.f love while 
being more interested in commercialism, partisan politics and 
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sensatio·naiism, should lead a sensitive mind to snch a thought; 
the general evidence about''Christian love" at Nietzsche's disposal 
could not give him the impression of magnanimity; the logical next 
step was to equate Christ-ian love with the death of Platonic Eros 
as; the spirit of magnanimity, the passionate procreative love of 
distant times and men, a seeing buyond the present which apprecia·t(; 
the present as a responsibility for the future - in Hartmann's 
words a ttThe, trend of its (Eros') intention has exchanged the breadth 
of simultane-ity for the depth of succession" (E II, p.315). 
We feel that the spiritual pregnancy and 
bringing to birth of Plato 1 s Eros is the germ-idea in Nietzsche 1 s 
d(!))ctrine: of Eternal. Recurrence, the eternal return to life of a man 
through his ideas. Here man's tremendous responsibility towards lit~ 
is. evident and his love becomes defined as love even of that which 
is furthest away from him and which he does not even know - Love o:£ 
the Remote, "Fernstenliebe"'• Hartmann describes it as tta love wh:tr.h 
lmows no return of love, which radiates only, gives only, devotes, 
overcomes, sacrifices, which lives in the high yearning that 
cannot be fttlfilled fer tha one who loves, but which knows that 
there is a1ways a future and that indifference to it is a sin. Such 
love is "Fernstenliebe" (Love of the Remotest). This is the name 
Nie-tzsche gave to the, newly discerned virtue, to contrast it with 
"NI:Ichstenliebe" (Love of the llearest)" (E II, pp.317,318). 
Hartmann rightly maintains that we can now 
ignore Nietzsche's rejection of Neighbour-l,:;,ve. He omits to say, 
however, that the life of Brotherly Love as taught. by Jesus entail;, 
a projection of man's spirit into the future as much as LOve of th': 
Remota, and that it is not a.t all a social idea - ir it has been 
watered down to the spiritua·l. parochialism of a social. idea, then 
it is not the fa·ult of its author. NeV•)rtheless Hartmann points 
out that if, by definition, Neighbo:ur .. Love means love first and 
fo,remos;t of the nearest, rtthe whole val.ue is not that of the object 
intended. On the contrary, all the moral value lies in the 
intention" (E II, p.331). This is what Nietzsche could or would 
not see am. it was his error; but we can now appreciate that "in 
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the two kinds of love the value of the intention itself is 
practically the same"' (E II, p.331). 
Here aga:tn, therefaTe, we rind Hartmarm 
easily forgiving Nietzsche's exaggerations, for he understands 
that while the truth of that which Nietzsche f<ID':n.d it necessary 
to lie about was not th9'refore los't to us, new dimensions n~er 
known tcr; us before were thus gained through the philos~phar. 
Radiant Virtue·: Nietzsche: was also the first to give a name to 
what he: himself called the "unnamable" virtue - Radiant Virtue. 
We have alra&dy discussed it at length and it only remains to 
point out that Hartmann narrows the radius of Radiant Virtue withih. 
the realm of all values, and this is understamdable - while for 
Nietzsche: it was the haulmark par excellence of nobility, it is 
merely one value among values for Hartmarm. 
We recall that, f@r Nietzsche, life is in 
no way teleo:logically ordained, that for him cause and end fall 
together 1n the creative fUnction of man fus gre.atness c£wbLeh lies in 
. ' the fact that 1n it there is no consciousness of or scheming for 
a purpos:e beyond itself, ~o that. it is entirely natural to man; 
we are forcibly reminded of this when Hartmann writes of Radiant 
Virtue that "All teleology here finds its limit" (E II, p.339), and 
in the: light of Hartmann's delineation of the vaJLue we can once 
again see just why Nietzscha found it possible to equate tho ethos 
of Radiant Virtue with the noble m~ - Hartmann speaks of value il.t 
Nietzsche.an terms as a ttrruitftlllness, but only of a kind that is 
not wi1led, not aimed at. Just a~ hap,piness fo·llows virtue as its 
inevitable result bnt is disturbed if striven for, so fr\liit.fUlnes£. 
una:tmed at, tbl:'.o·ws inevitably from the conduct of the dispenser of 
sp~ir:ttua.l values; but if striven for, it violates tho meaning of 
the gift ••• Unplanned prodigality is the true form in which 
sp.iritual va:UUes are propagated. The superabundance, which arises 
naturally from their character, makes prodigality tho. adequate 
form of reproduction ••• (this) us·elossness is not worthlessness, 
bnt the abscence of an end in vieWJ it is no~t only not ttadaptation 
to an end without an em," but also not "purpos:ive activity without 
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a purpose." Rather d<l'J' end and means return upon each other; the 
means is the final end. All teleology here finds its limit" (E II, 
pp.338,339). 
Hartma:rm' s view of the rela·cion of Radiant 
Virtue to Love of the Remo,te also illustrates Nietzsche 1 s view 
of the supra-moral life of Becoming. In the light of Love of the 
Remote, the idea.I, for Nietzsche, was SUperman and that all mel!ll 
shall ultimately becooe Supermom, tra new people"'J arrd yet, we saw, 
the thought or an ult.imate actual!..izat:ion of the ideal could no~t 
be entertained; it was incumbent on Nie:tzsche to steer clear of 
the· accusation of absolutism. Yet even merely for the ideal to 
survive, there must alLways: be some man or a few men as carriers 
of the ideal, whether living 1n the nesh or in their work; and 
they are witnesses to the worth of the ideal, in themselves they 
exemplifY it - it is their task to live by Radiant Virtue. The whol· 
of this view and desire of Nietzsche is contained in Hartmann's 
jUdgement that "here even love o:f the romotest .finds a special 
vindica.t.ion. Its yearning and its hopo have before thGin a portion 
of fUlfilment. What one can otherwise behold only in vision as an 
ideal, can be seen hare 1n nesh and blood. Radiant Virtue is a 
power o.f the e'thos, it instils the Ideal into- the race; and where 
it occurs, it is as though the ideal man were already a reality. 
Certairll.y there is here only a fragment, but for all that a real 
one. Here the real anticipates the Ideal, a living proof that the 
Ideal is possible in the world of actuality" (E II, pp.339,340). 
Power and Life: When Hartmann discu;sses Power as a value, he is 
thinking of it as the ability which man has of controlling 
situat.ions, "to guide them, to mould them to, one's own desire" 
(E II, p.l59); as su:ch it is a matter of the "freedom and efficacy 
of will" (E II, p.l60). He distinguishes ttoutward power" (the power 
man possesses as a result ot the accumulation of goods-values) from 
n:tnner power 11 (the power of the spirit) and commends Nietzsche for 
having placed the will ta power above the will to life. Nietzsche 
himself, o·f course, considered that "He corta1nly did n<?'t hit the 
' 
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truth who shot at it the fo:rmula: "Will to existence": that wi+l -
doth not existt For what is not, cannot will; that; however, wfi4ch 
is in existence - how could it still strive for existenceL Only 
where thexe is life, is themalsa wi11: not, however, Will to Life~ 
but - so, teach I thee - Will to Power tn (AZ, II~ 34) o 
What Nietzsche actually did was to identify the will 
~ to life and the will to power and this: is. another re·ason why his 
ontology could serve Hartmann only as a point o:f departure, for 
Hartmann makes a distinction between the will to life aJJ']d the will 
to power which corresponds tcr an ontological differentiation -
Hartmann speaks of life as the "eleme!mtary value" which forms.ttthe 
onto:logical basis o·f the subject, and thereby indirectly also of 
the moral being and value-carrier, the perso~n" (E II, p:,.l31). 
Brotherly Love: 1he.al::ove tact nay holp to exp loin the differing 
opinions of the two philosophers on the value of Brotherly Love~ 
As soon as· :p·ersons stand out in life, as soon as they recognizably 
raise themselves above their ontological basis, the value of 
Brcrtherly Love. comes into P'lay since, according to Hartmann, 
Brotherly Love napproves another person as suchu and 
"is the living sense of another's wo,rth" (E II, p.273) • This',: he 
says, is the: main issue which Nietzsche igr1ores - Nietzsche 
considered Bro,therly Love as a disvalue or anti-value but "th(a 
argument is faulty: for it ignores the main issue. The essence 
of Neighbour-Love is not pity· at all nor suffering '~ D;~273).""""'QKr( 
is fully justified in believing that Nietzsche's error is related 
ta his p•sychology of resentment, his opposition to spiritual. . 
miserliness and mere humanism which he found so abundantly evident 
~ what he called 11Christo-European mo.ralsl'- Hartmann, however? 
Wants us to understa,nd that "spurious love) like a weed; springs 
Up everywhere, side by side with real love. Outwardly they are 
indistinguishable. The deceptive mimicry of the sp:urious extends 
even to the' highest: and finest flowers of the ethos. Only an 
unpervarted sense of value, which, as it were, listening, can 
detect the emotio;nal to•ne itself, is able to distinguish the one 
from the other" (E II, p.27,_J. 
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But even here Nietzsche's erro:r is informative 
and helps USJ 1n the first place, so Hartma:rnt"1. seems to think9 it 
has forced us to re-assess the meaning of Brotherly Love, and in 
the second p.lace to rea.li za the necessity of the SY'l'lthesis of 
Brotherly Love and Love of the Remote. He argues that one of the 
great errors of ethicist.s is that they tend to throw overboard 
all values: which appear to tbem to· be nlower" values as soon as 
they discern what they believe ta be a "highertr velue, without 
perhaps being aware of the fact that by so doing they are 
probably destroying the veTy roots. from which the "highern one 
has grown. A synthetic view of values is therefore necessary to 
ethical enquiryJ ttMany are, the errors and aberrations which miss 
this. synthe,sis, u writ&s Hartmarm, n·Tha majority of the current 
mo.ralities and phUo,sophical theories have not escap·ed them. 'l'he 
radical one-sidedness of the preferential trend joins with every 
one-sidedness that shows itself in the disce,rneu material. 'rhe 
new morality, which comes fo:rward with the claim that it. is a higher 
morality, only too easily' throws away the "lowern in the gross -
an error which will avenge itself, even if the new really be 
higher. It does not see that it is demolishing its own foundation~ 
(E II, pp.462,463). He finds that this has also been Nietzsche's 
mistake in the latter's interpretation of Christian ethics. 
Nietzsche was guilty of "'a fanaticism of love for the far d1stant 11 
(E II, p:.423) and cut away Brotherly Love from Love of the Remote 
whereas, m fact, Brotherly Lo·Ve is the on].y foundation from 
which Love of the Remote can spring. 
Nietzsche has weighed the anchors, he has let 
loose values - he did not sink any, although he thoUght so. It is 
this, Hartmann feels, for which we must be thankfUl. to him, but 
we must get beyond him since he did not and could not yet approacJ::. 
the realm of values in th'O: light of the spirit of synthesis & "Thut~ 
it befell Nie,tzsche in regard to Christian morality. He rightly 
saw that love of the faT dis.tant is the higher moral value·. Yet 
he was at. the same time wrong; fo·r brotherly love is· the "stronger;· 
value. ~he mistake of Christianity is the belief that. the fulfilment 
of the moral life depends upon brotheTly love alone. Nietzsche's 
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mistake is to suppose that love of the far distant is possible 
without a basis in brotherly love, that its aims are in 
themselves s\lfficient. Only in their synthesis is to be found 
the reciprocal content or both ideals. But to discern the SY'flthesi.s 
is a task of far greate-r magnitude than to att:"".eh oneself to the 
one side and despise the other" (E II, p.463). 
It must be clear that the questions arising 
in connection .with this view of synthesis in the field of ethics 
wUl no·t be easily answered. Oan a standard of judgement, a 
criterion for distinguishing between ttvalues" and "disvalues" be 
avoided here? We believe that Nietzsche· might have been more 
consistent and logical than Hartmann in this regard - in any case 
he saw that in the, light of his premisses he could not make much of 
sttch a crit&rion. Hartmann here speaks of the "'Wertgefiihl" J howevel', 
as we have already suggested, we can: place a le,gitimate question 
mark behind the "Wertge:fillll": Why the "WertgeflThl", in terms of 
what does it function, in terms. of what does it effect its 
distinctions.? It is not sufficient to say that "it is just so", 
that it just fUnctions as such, far then we must believe that its 
being is simply blind; and if we find it presumptuous to put 
fo.rward· an exp:lanation of its~ g, we must say so, and suspend our 
op·inion while we nevertheless basically maintain that there must 
be some explanation. Otherwise we are in actual fact distinguishill.g 
between good and bad without being bold enough to face and involvr: 
ourselves. in the ultimate p·roblematics of such a distinction. To 
this extent Hartmann and Nietzsche are both at fault. We will 
briefly consider the meaning of this tor the future of ethics in 
our Conclusion. 
Nietzsche can then be c1assed with those 
thinkers whose philosophies, as Hartmann told us, g1Te evidence 
of" the basic problematic quality of the world ("'die grossen 
unabweisbaren Pro·blamgehalte 11 ) as oppo·sed to a mere construction 
of speculative systems of thought ("Systembaume1stere1"). Nietzsch~ 
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was nat conscious of the dangers which lay beyond the barriers he 
has broken, bUJt Hartmann attributes tOJ him the reopening of the 
way for the great art of aporetics (''Die KUnst des Aruto'tElas, Ftobleme ,;·:;; 
diskutieren, olmH· sie um jeden Preis losen zti wollen" (MEl p·8 )) cmd 
considers that it would be: Wl'ong for us to blame· the thinker in an 
ultimate sense. His error was an inevitable factor in his proftmdi·:.:? 
Here Hartmann's expression of appreciation 
reaches. an. almost poetical peak. In Nietzsche's work, he tells us, 
"for the first time, with full consciousness, 11beyondu and 
independently of everything which in the cd,urse of the ages had 
been accepted as such, the question was raised concerning the 
content of good and evil. This question is a hazardous undertakin~:·~, 
for it tauche;s that which has been consecrated. And the hazardous 
undertaking avengei itself upon the daring doe,r. But his mistakes 
were quite natural ones.. • Perhaps no-one is ever wholly without 
blame for the misfortune of' being mis.understood§ but when the 
fault has been atoned for by the ill fate of being misunderstood 
and has become an historical fact, it falls back upon the one who 
misinterprets it ••• Seldom does a discoverer lmow fully wha~t he 
has discovered. Niatzsche: Imew it as little as did Columbus. The 
successors inherit the field; to them falls the task of acquiring 
what they have inherited, in order to possess it'' (E I, ppa84,85) o 
This is Hartmann's apology for Nietzsche, but 
it is also, the testimony o:f his indebtedness to the philoso,pher • 
------------------------------~------------------------------~ I 
CONCLUSION 
HARTMANN, NIETZSCHB AND THE FUTURE OF ETHICS 
SUMMARY OF CONTENT§ 
The problem of the: Ideal; Hartmann, Nietzsche and 
religion; Hartmann's "Ide,al Personalltyn, from which, however, 
all ground is cut away in his philosophy; there can be no 
sanction for the Ideal outside religion.; Hartmann 1 s fea.r of 
religion is responsible fo,r his erroneous view of Christianity; 
we ne:ed no longer fear theology; Hartmann and Nietzsche 
paradoxically, bring us close to true religion; the protlem or 
all fUture ethics. 
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CONCLUSION 
HARTMANN, NIETZSCHE AND THE FUTURE OF ETHICS 
Although Hartmann believes that "it would bo 
wrong to contest the virtue of a living man, merely because the 
axio·logical co:unterpoise was lacking 1n him" (E II, p•.426), he 
recognises the fact that "in the strict and absolute sensa only 
the> j.ust man can be truly- loving, only the proud truly humble, 
only the pure truly participant in the fUlness of life" (E II, 
p·.426). He points this out with reference to the Stoic idea that 
the virtuous man pos.sessas all virtues and no:t only- soma, that he 
would lack every virtue if he lacked one, since virtuosity is a 
whole. 
Nietzsche also·, despite. his rejection of 
Stoic nihilism - its denial of the wor]d - shares with it this 
idea of tho· ttunity of virtue". Superman would be a "complete" man, 
a definition of his ethos -would correspond to· the tautology that 
all values belong to him because every value belongs to him. 
Hartmarm. is right in saying that this is an 
ideal for man, but that practice tea.ches us something different. It 
is common lmowladge that "the actual conduct of man ••• is always 
only an approximation to the idea" (E II, p.426). And that 
actuality does rot cancel the necessity for an ideal, is something 
.Plato already told us. 
In order to make this actuality speak for 
itself, Hartmann wanted his central task to be an analysis of 
individual values, but he, admits that "the universal synthesis of 
values is contained in the idea of a table of values" (E II, p.426) 
- and little wonder: the plurality of values, rtthe rich manirold 
of the ethical oosmos" which Hartmann discerns "beyond good and 
evil", fixes. the, attention on the astonishing fullness of the 
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valuational life! and inevitably raises the question as to the 
unity of the manifo·ld. 
Hartmann does not once deny the legitimacy 
of the question E.t an attempt t<OJ define· an ideal is necessarily 
involved in a description of "realityn or "actuality"; he finds 
for instance that actual love is antirely dependent upon "the 
moving principle (which) is the ethical ideal, the Idea of man 
as he ought .to be. This too is a Platonic doctrine, the Eros looks 
to the Idea and is a passion for it" (E II, p.323). 
While Nietzsche's equivalent of what man 
"'ought t<OJ be" is Superman, Hartmann merely calls: it the "Ideal", 
a] though his definition is perhaps better outlined: "All Eros 
:in one way or other looks to the Ideal, u he tells us; all 
Eaterialistic and egotistic ideals cam be left out of 
consideration - "in mere existence for itself, " he says, 
"(personality) cannot become actualized. For sell-consciousness 
is co~ntrary to: its natura, which is not valuational but moral 
Be·ing wholly and sole·ly. It nece!ssarily seeks someone "fortt \>lhom 
it could Be ••• Since empirical personality never strictly 
co·rresponds to its own idea1 value, but love looks exclusively to 
the' lattex, it inheres in the· essence of personal love to pierce 
through the empirical pa~son to, his ideal va.lue" (E II, pp.368, 
369). 
We have already observed that Nietzsche 
was truer to his prem:!ssas here than Hartmann to· his, that he 
realized that in terms of them he coul.d not make too much of the 
Ideal. As we have: seen, in Nietzsche's "noble man" the Ideal even 
becomes merged with actuality. Hartmann, however, though 
infinite,Iy more cautious than Nietzsche in other things, openly 
takes his: stand on the Ideal. 
This constitutes a basic - though perhap·s 
subtle - difference between the two philosophers, a difference 
of which Hartmann himself might not have been aware. We have 
demonstrated conclusiv9'.ly that Nietzsche does not distingUish 
between ideality and rea:lity - for him ideality and rea.lity fall 
-115-
together in actuality. Indeed, Nietzsche's "higher men" play 
a greater role in his philosophy than Superman - more often than 
SUp~erman it is the actual (historical) Graeco-Roman tYPe of life, 
and an actual Napoleon, that constitute his ideal. It is in this 
sens.e that Niet.zsche, maintains that "the co-ncept 1 God 1 was 
invented as the counter-concept tO'· life - everything harmful, 
poisonous, slandero.us, and all deadly hostility to life, all 
oound to.gether in one horrible unitn (EH, Why I Am A Fatality:B). 
Hartmann, ho.wever, is a realist who distinguishes between 
idea.lity and reality, and makes moral values independent of man 
exactly in so far as they ara ideal structures. Now Hartmann 
declares that as far as the Ideal is concerned, it is ttonly in 
(man) and nowhere else in the ~ld (that it) finds something 
real that approximates to its. own value" (E II, p.369), Yet he 
cannot deny that for him the Ideal is in fact the ultimate 
ethical authority§ without it there can be no moral valuation and 
therefore no moral life. Hartmann explains that love for 
individual persons is possible only because the Ideal is 
partially exemillf'ied in the individual..J in the same passage from 
WhiCh we have just quoted, Hartmann remarks that love's 
ttcoomitment merges into the ideal of perso·nalitYJ it lets this 
stand for the empirical individual, accepting him as equivalent 
to his highest poss-ibilities, as raised to a power above his 
actual being. It loves in him what inheres in his essential 
tendency, the axiological idiosyncracy of his Ideal, yet not as 
an Ideal, but as a trond towards actuality, just as if it were 
already actualized in him" (E II, p.369). (We may note, here that 
Nie.t.zsche· could never say "as if" as Hartmann does hera - for 
Niet-zsche it is not nas if" it were already actualized in him, 
but it is already actualized 1n him.) - ttin this way, n continues 
Hartmann, ttlooking back from the Ideal upon its imperfect carrier, 
it loves the· empirical individual in his characteristic peculiarit.'-
For it the man, as he is, in the trend of his ethical preference, 
is accepted as a guarantor of a higher moral Being ••• Personal 
love lives by faith in this highest that is within the loved one, 
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which despite its inadequacy love senses prophat.ically. Such love 
is ethical divination in the pre-eminent sense of the word" (E II, 
pp.369,370). 
While we can tolerate Superman in Nietzsche's 
philosophy (although Nietzsche never defines St:.perman beyond 
saying that it is he the "higher men" should teach) simply because 
Nietzsche does.not make too much of Superman as an Ideal, we 
seriously question Hartmann's Ideal, however, since Hartmann 
stakes everything on it: "All Eros in one· way or the other looks 
to the Ideal" (E II, p.368). 
Hartmann does not want to say so, but this 
Ideal which "love senses p.rophetically" !1i the sanction behind 
the "Wertgeftihl" and "intnitionn in his philosophy. It is a 
standard, an absolute standard. However, it is itself without 
sanction. Is it the-n a creation of man's mind, a fiction, a thing 
of the imagination? Hartmann's position in ontology precludes 
this possibility. The Ideal represents the complete ftiUness of 
the being of value,s, but values, as we know, have an ideal 
self-existence-. This means that ideal self-existence should also 
be predicable of the unity of values. Ideal self-existence, 
howeveT, is not existenca in and through man. Consequently 
Hartmannts view that it is only in man that the Ideal finds a 
measure of existential expression, is untenable within the 
framework of his onto·logy. 
It is this error of Hartmann which, we believe~ 
cuts away all ground from the Ideal in his philosophy. 
It is possible that Hartmann saw that if the 
Ideal were itself to be given a sanction, it could not possibly 
be an ethical sanction according to his definition of morality as 
an exclusively human affair. On the one hand the Ideal could not 
be a Nietzschean Superman, but on the other hand it could not be 
allowed to, have an existential status· independent of man (like tha~ .. 
of the values whose unity it in any- case isO since, as such, it 
would necessarily have to ·t.e a person - Hartmann has 1n any- case 
told us that it is only in a person (man as moral being) "and 
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nowhere else 1n the. world" that the Ideal is to a certain extent 
existentia1J.y expressed; b'!lt here the person had to be such that 
in its ooing all values are drawn together, with none lacking, so 
that it complates in itsell the unity and synthesis of values; 
here the perso·n could not be an "empirical per::Jonali ty (whieh) 
never strictly corresponds to its own ideal value'' but, on the 
contrary·, a personality which always and in every instance 
strictly· corresponds to its, o-wn being. This, ho·wever, would bring 
Hartmann to the very verge of religion. But it was precisely the 
step into religion that he wanted to avoid. 
Despite the criticisms of both Nietzsche and 
Hartmann, these thinkers are obviously under pressure from Kant's 
work and they want to avoid the inputation of absolutism at all 
costs. Kant, however, did not kill metaphysics and it was not his 
intention to do so. He has only dealt the death-blow to clever but 
empty dialectics. Least of all did he do away with religion - he 
has only maimed the reputation of a certain tYPe of theology for 
always. 
Basically it is perhaps the same attitude 
towards religion which underlies Hartmann's entirely erroneous. 
judgement' that "the mistake of Christianity is the belief that the 
fulfilment of the moral life depends upon brotherly love alone" 
(E II, po463), for in this connection the commandment is ~ merel.":· 
"love they neighbour" but, according to Mark 12:30,31 : "Love the 
Lord thy God_ with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with 
all thy mind, and with all thy stmngth: th1s is the first 
commandment. And the second is like, namely this, Thou sha1t love 
thy neighbour as thyself." In true Christianity, love of God and 
love of neighbour fall together; neighbour-love alone need not be 
a matter of Christianity at all. Christendom with its elaborate 
social codes - especially since the rise of nat,ionalism with its 
emphatic enthusiasm for everything indigenous - could, however, 
wall give tho unwary the impression that Christianity is 
fund81!lentally a matter of concern for that which is nearest to us. 
It seems very important to us to emphasize 
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the fact that Hartmann missed the point about love of God in 
Christianity; he· might have realizad that whatever existential 
status was ascribed to: the Ideal, had to be that of a person; that 
values could not be drawn together or synthesized into a completely 
ct>-ordinate whole, and that there could be no 11 unity of virtue" 
outside the person - outside the· person there could only be the 
manifold of values, the plurality of values each one~ of which 
exists 1n its individuality. Only a valuational consciousness coul<'~ 
relate them one to another, and synthetically take them up into 
it~ell - necessarily into i.tself since it is O·bvious that the 
synthesis cannot be effected by the person and loft outside him, for 
he ~uld then be le:ft an empty· shell; but the perception of values 
is preci.sely· !:!!§. perception and works for his spiri tnal enrichment t; 
Man, however, has not the capacity to effect the oonmlete synthesiS 
of values -to this extent Hartmann satifies us. But then, we must 
rep,eat, if it can really be maintained that morality is man's 
affair and his alone, Hartmann had to keep quie:t about the Ideal 
1n the form in which it is contained in his philosophy - that is, 
as p~recisely this completely· coherent unity of values. It is 
r·eally useless for Hartmann to say that to sense such an Ideal is 
"not of oo·urse divination of a universal human ideal, but of the 
Ideal of a particular individual. It sees the perfect in 
imperfection, infinitude 1n the finite" (E II, p.370). On Hartmann'~· 
o·wn prem:isEas, in the light of his ontological description of 
valuational. being, it cannot be "the Ideal of a particular :fndividua 11' c 
Since for him al.l moral values are what they are,, never change and 
can neve,r be. chariged, the synthesis which they all share cE~.n at 
all times only be one and the same; and we cannot sense "the perfect 
in imperfection" if cur consciousness of the perfect, however 
deficient. it may be, does not p-recede our perception of the 
imperfect. 
Hartmann, however, fighting shy of God and o:. 
religion, and understandably so,, would not and could not yet take 
the oniy logical ste'P' to save his· view of the Ideal from being 
SUperfluous and unwarranted in the light of his presuppositions -
the step into religion w.hich need no longer be dangerous and a snare 
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to reason and a thinker's integrity. 
we have shown how Nietzsche throws religion 
overboard altogether and also how Hartmann separates tho domains of 
ethics and religion$ We be~ieve, however, that precisely through 
their criticism they help to bring us close to .u1blieal Christianity 
aga1ne NietzsChe has opened our eyas to ages of villainy parading 
under the banner of love and virtue, the imp·ressive organizations 
of' which, however, have paralysed us into submissi\eross ami 
servility befo1 .. a them and. the-ir office-bearers. Nietzsche's ridicule 
of clergy and kings is fUlly justified,and although it may not at 
all have beer.Jl his conscious intention, he rendered an invaluable 
service to· aJll men who are anxious for a return to true· religion, 
religion of the stamp of a Kierkegaard's, or the martyrs•, an 
active religion proved by one's life.. One must never forget 
Nietzsche 1 s descent, his relation to Protestantism. He was perhaps 
as little of a critic from noutside 11 as Kierke:gaard. We do not 
want to speculate about this, however, but what is certain is that 
it. is only- the most biased and stunted spirits whose attitude 
towards religion could remain the same as before, after Nietzsclla's 
devastating critique. The fact that. organized religion has 
generally remained unduly sceptic towards Nietzsche and censured 
him as an. eneJIIlY, is merely further evidence of what Hartmann has 
called the "morbid conditiontt of the tin:lG. 
Here, however, Nietzsche and Hartmann only 
indicate a direction and, though Nietzsche's sacrifice was 
fundamental enough, ne,ither of them has actually walked the path 
of unconditional risk to the extent. that Kierkegaard has done thisc 
It would be a most ungrateful gesture on our part, however, to 
leave Hartmann's error here unpardoned. He has shown us the- way 1n 
his appreciation of Nietzsche. There can be little doubt that, it 
rightly understood, his error and its history, that is the whole 
case of Hartmann-Nietzsche, is to our advantage. It is p~recisely 
Hartmann's error which shows us. (but then on a clear background 
brought about by Hartmann's ca].m and Nietzsche's lightning) that 
ultimately he cannot avoid religionJ nor can anyone e~se, including 
Nietzsche. 
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It is, of course, possible for us to do what 
Nietzsche did, that is to take our models from concrete history, to 
rely for them onljr on human evidence, but Hartmann himself has 
pointed out that as regards man's future and destiny, historical 
experience can never suffice as a guide. It is ·~;,;rue that he writes~ 
"That arr~thing whatsoever in heayen or on earth, even though it 
be God hims·elf, sho,uld take precedence over Man, would be ethically 
perverted; it wo,uld oot be. moraltt (E III, p.264). We know, however!' 
that this is: simp:ly not true; that despite this Protagorean boast 
theTa are in actual fact many;:- situations in life in which precedence 
over man is taken in one way or the othe-r; in fact, and this is 
real.ly- Hartmann's own view, since the individuaJL man's responsibili~y 
is aJLways primarily directed beyond hims.elf, his moral stature is in 
the l.ast resort entirely dependent on the continual precedence 
which otheTs take over him; and as for Hartmann, ·the Ideal 1n any 
cas.e cJLe-arly takes precedence over man - we love a man, he said, 
be,cause we lo:ok beyond him to the Ideal. 
Our time also is bringing home to us, am 
forcibly, that man is nc·t the measure of all things. 
Hartmann and Nietzsche re·stored the meaning of 
responsibility for us:; and it is precisely- for this reason that 
we be]ieve them to have brought. us closer to the exacting 
simplicity, rational.ity and pathos of Christianity- than they could 
ever suspecto Any ethics. which l.ight]y turns away· from religion 
after the-m, will not have understood their meaning, will not have 
-understood them better than they could understand themselves. "The 
older philosophic ethics," writes Hartmann, "related itself most 
elaborately to religiontt but, he says, "the ages of such dependencE' 
have passed away" (E I, p.llo). However, mythology, mere symbolism 
and moral relativism have been overcome in the face of Christendom 
by- Christianity itself, and we suggest: that any- future ethl.cs 
which wants to get beyond the insight. of HartmmQmn~~zsche may 
find its fundamen·tal probl.em to be that of its relation to) 
religion. The· position has been precipitated by Hartmann's own 
' 
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ontology which describes the ideaL seif-existence of moral 
values beyond which the problem as t.:Jl the·ir unity ·becomes 
manifest. In handling his no·tion of the Ideal, Hartmann showed 
an unwillingness to deal with the problem but at the same time 
bequeathed it as a problem to any fUture ethics .• 
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